2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献

Symbolic Side-Channel Analysis for Probabilistic Programs 概率程序的符号边信道分析

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00030

P. Malacaria, M. Khouzani, C. Pasareanu, Quoc-Sang Phan, K. S. Luckow

引用次数: 27

Publisher's Information 出版商的信息

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/csf.2018.00036

引用次数: 0

Guided Design of Attack Trees: A System-Based Approach 攻击树的引导设计:一种基于系统的方法

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00012

Maxime Audinot, S. Pinchinat, Barbara Kordy

{"title":"Guided Design of Attack Trees: A System-Based Approach","authors":"Maxime Audinot, S. Pinchinat, Barbara Kordy","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2018.00012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2018.00012","url":null,"abstract":"Attack trees are a well-recognized formalism for security modeling and analysis, but in this work we tackle a problem that has not yet been addressed by the security or formal methods community – namely guided design of attack trees. The objective of the framework presented in this paper is to support a security expert in the process of designing a pertinent attack tree for a given system. In contrast to most of existing approaches for attack trees, our framework contains an explicit model of the real system to be analyzed, formalized as a transition system that may contain quantitative information. The leaves of our attack trees are labeled with reachability goals in the transition system and the attack tree semantics is expressed in terms of traces of the system. The main novelty of the proposed framework is that we start with an attack tree which is not fully refined and by exhibiting paths in the system that are optimal with respect to the quantitative information, we are able to suggest to the security expert which parts of the tree contribute to optimal attacks and should therefore be developed further. Such useful parts of the tree are determined by solving a satisfiability problem in propositional logic.","PeriodicalId":417032,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131052014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 16

Symbolic Security of Garbled Circuits 乱码电路的符号安全

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00018

Baiyu Li, Daniele Micciancio

引用次数: 4

Backdoored Hash Functions: Immunizing HMAC and HKDF 后门哈希函数:免疫HMAC和HKDF

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00015

M. Fischlin, Christian Janson, Sogol Mazaheri

{"title":"Backdoored Hash Functions: Immunizing HMAC and HKDF","authors":"M. Fischlin, Christian Janson, Sogol Mazaheri","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2018.00015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2018.00015","url":null,"abstract":"Security of cryptographic schemes is traditionally measured as the inability of resource-constrained adversaries to violate a desired security goal. The security argument usually relies on a sound design of the underlying components. Arguably, one of the most devastating failures of this approach can be observed when considering adversaries such as intelligence agencies that can influence the design, implementation, and standardization of cryptographic primitives. While the most prominent example of cryptographic backdoors is NIST's Dual_EC_DRBG, believing that such attempts have ended there is naive. Security of many cryptographic tasks, such as digital signatures, pseudorandom generation, and password protection, crucially relies on the security of hash functions. In this work, we consider the question of how backdoors can endanger security of hash functions and, especially, if and how we can thwart such backdoors. We particularly focus on immunizing arbitrarily backdoored versions of HMAC (RFC 2104) and the hash-based key derivation function HKDF (RFC 5869), which are widely deployed in critical protocols such as TLS. We give evidence that the weak pseudorandomness property of the compression function in the hash function is in fact robust against backdooring. This positive result allows us to build a backdoor-resistant pseudorandom function, i.e., a variant of HMAC, and we show that HKDF can be immunized against backdoors at little cost. Unfortunately, we also argue that safe-guarding unkeyed hash functions against backdoors is presumably hard.","PeriodicalId":417032,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"171 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121794360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 24

Assuming You Know: Epistemic Semantics of Relational Annotations for Expressive Flow Policies 假设你知道:表达流策略的关系注释的认知语义

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00021

A. Chudnov, D. Naumann

引用次数: 4

Self-Guarding Cryptographic Protocols against Algorithm Substitution Attacks 针对算法替代攻击的自保护加密协议

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00013

M. Fischlin, Sogol Mazaheri

引用次数: 36

Invited Paper: Local Differential Privacy on Metric Spaces: Optimizing the Trade-Off with Utility 邀请论文:度量空间上的局部微分隐私:与效用权衡的优化

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00026

M. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, A. Pazii

引用次数: 17

Alethea: A Provably Secure Random Sample Voting Protocol Alethea:一个可证明的安全随机样本投票协议

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00028

D. Basin, S. Radomirovic, Lara Schmid

引用次数: 26

Invited Paper: Secure Boot and Remote Attestation in the Sanctum Processor 特邀论文:Sanctum处理器中的安全引导和远程认证

2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2018-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF.2018.00011

Ilia A. Lebedev, Kyle Hogan, S. Devadas

{"title":"Invited Paper: Secure Boot and Remote Attestation in the Sanctum Processor","authors":"Ilia A. Lebedev, Kyle Hogan, S. Devadas","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2018.00011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2018.00011","url":null,"abstract":"During the secure boot process for a trusted execution environment, the processor must provide a chain of certificates to the remote client demonstrating that their secure container was established as specified. This certificate chain is rooted at the hardware manufacturer who is responsible for constructing chips according to the correct specification and provisioning them with key material. We consider a semi-honest manufacturer who is assumed to construct chips correctly, but may attempt to obtain knowledge of client private keys during the process. Using the RISC-V Rocket chip architecture as a base, we design, document, and implement an attested execution processor that does not require secure non-volatile memory, nor a private key explicitly assigned by the manufacturer. Instead, the processor derives its cryptographic identity from manufacturing variation measured by a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). Software executed by a bootloader built into the processor transforms the PUF output into an elliptic curve key pair. The (re)generated private key is used to sign trusted portions of the boot image, and is immediately destroyed. The platform can therefore provide attestations about its state to remote clients. Reliability and security of PUF keys are ensured through the use of a trapdoor computational fuzzy extractor. We present detailed evaluation results for secure boot and attestation by a client of a Rocket chip implementation on a Xilinx Zynq 7000 FPGA.","PeriodicalId":417032,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE 31st Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115742345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 43