Symbolic Side-Channel Analysis for Probabilistic Programs

P. Malacaria, M. Khouzani, C. Pasareanu, Quoc-Sang Phan, K. S. Luckow
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引用次数: 27

Abstract

In this paper we describe symbolic side-channel analysis techniques for detecting and quantifying information leakage, given in terms of Shannon and min-entropy. Measuring the precise leakage is challenging due to the randomness and noise often present in program executions and side-channel observations. We account for this noise by introducing additional (symbolic) program inputs which are interpreted probabilistically, using symbolic execution with parametrized model counting. We also explore a sampling approach for increased scalability. In contrast to typical Monte Carlo techniques, our approach works by sampling symbolic paths, representing multiple concrete paths, and uses pruning to accelerate computation and guarantee convergence to the optimal results. A key novelty of our approach is to provide bounds on the leakage that are provably under- and over-approximating the exact leakage. We implemented the techniques in the Symbolic PathFinder tool and demonstrate them on Java programs.
概率程序的符号边信道分析
在本文中,我们描述了用于检测和量化信息泄漏的符号侧信道分析技术,给出了香农和最小熵。由于程序执行和侧信道观测中经常出现的随机性和噪声,测量精确的泄漏是具有挑战性的。我们通过引入额外的(符号)程序输入来解释这种噪声,使用带有参数化模型计数的符号执行。我们还探讨了提高可伸缩性的抽样方法。与典型的蒙特卡罗技术相比,我们的方法通过采样符号路径来工作,表示多个具体路径,并使用修剪来加速计算并保证收敛到最优结果。我们的方法的一个关键的新颖之处在于提供泄漏的边界,可以证明是低于和过接近确切的泄漏。我们在Symbolic PathFinder工具中实现了这些技术,并在Java程序中进行了演示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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