Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal最新文献

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Managerial Optimism and Debt Covenants 管理乐观主义与债务契约
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3508354
Jakob Infuehr, V. Laux
{"title":"Managerial Optimism and Debt Covenants","authors":"Jakob Infuehr, V. Laux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3508354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508354","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of managerial optimism on the optimal design of debt covenants. We find that managers that are more optimistic about the future success of their investment ideas, provide lenders with greater control rights via tighter covenants. This is optimal for optimistic managers even though they understand that tighter covenants increase the probability of covenant violations and lead to excessive lender intervention. The broad reason for this result is that optimists wish to write contracts that repay lenders more frequently in bad states rather than in good states, and the only way to achieve this is by granting lenders more control rights. Our model generates new predictions and offers a novel explanation for the empirical evidence that covenants in debt contracts are set very tightly, are often violated, and sometimes renegotiated or waived.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128571204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Worldwide Board Reforms 公司治理与现金持有:来自全球董事会改革的证据
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3554827
Ruiyuan Chen, O. Guedhami, Yang Yang, Gulnara R. Zaynutdinova, Ph.D.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Worldwide Board Reforms","authors":"Ruiyuan Chen, O. Guedhami, Yang Yang, Gulnara R. Zaynutdinova, Ph.D.","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3554827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554827","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using staggered board reforms as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, this study examines the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings in 41 countries. We find that board reforms are followed by significant reductions in cash holdings. This effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker pre-reform corporate governance and for firms from countries with weaker institutional environments. Analysis of cash spending suggests that, following board reforms, firms are more likely to use cash to increase R&D expenditures, dividend payouts, and share repurchases, but not to increase capital or acquisition expenditures. Finally, the results indicate that enhanced corporate governance following board reforms leads to higher (lower) cash (dividend payouts) values, consistent with the view that board reforms strengthen corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125907464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 38
Workplace Automation and Corporate Financial Policy 工作场所自动化和公司财务政策
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3556935
Thomas W. Bates, Fangfang Du, Jessie Jiaxu Wang
{"title":"Workplace Automation and Corporate Financial Policy","authors":"Thomas W. Bates, Fangfang Du, Jessie Jiaxu Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3556935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3556935","url":null,"abstract":"We document that a firm’s ability to substitute automated capital for labor is an important determinant of corporate financial policy. Using a novel occupational measure for labor’s susceptibility to automation, we show that firms with a more substitutable workforce hold less cash, use more financial leverage, and pay higher dividends. Following adverse shocks to operating cash flow, firms with a more substitutable workforce are more likely to replace labor with automated capital and increase financial leverage. Taken together, the potential for workplace automation gives firms the option to reduce labor-induced operating leverage, allowing them to adopt less conservative financial policies.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134539500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
When in Rome: Local Social Norms and Tournament Incentives 当在罗马:当地社会规范和比赛激励
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3547677
Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick, Mia L. Rivolta
{"title":"When in Rome: Local Social Norms and Tournament Incentives","authors":"Natasha Burns, Kristina Minnick, Mia L. Rivolta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3547677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547677","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether social capital influences the use and effectiveness of tournament structure of compensation. We find that pay differentials between the CEO and other executives, or tournament, are lower in U.S. counties with higher social capital. In addition, lower pay differentials are associated with better firm performance in regions with higher social capital. We use a variety of experiments which are shown to change social capital, such as legalization of medical and recreational use of marijuana or moving corporate headquarters. Our results remain robust. These findings suggest that social capital impact firms’ compensation setting decisions and firm performance.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115858999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
최고경영자의 영향력과 기업의 사적부채 선택 (CEO Power and Corporate Private Debt Choice) 首席执行官的影响力和企业的私人负债选择(CEO Power and Corporate Private Debt Choice)
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3554781
Jaehyung Bark, Pyung Kyung Kang, Minhee Lee
{"title":"최고경영자의 영향력과 기업의 사적부채 선택 (CEO Power and Corporate Private Debt Choice)","authors":"Jaehyung Bark, Pyung Kyung Kang, Minhee Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3554781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554781","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Korean Abstract:</b> 본 연구에서는 경영자의 영향력과 기업의 사적부채 선택의 관련성을 분석함으로써 경 영자가 기업의 자본구조에 영향을 미치는지 살펴본다. 이를 위해 2013년부터 2018년 사 이의 유가증권 및 코스닥 상장기업들의 자료를 이용해서 최고경영자 임금비중(CEO pay slice)으로 본 경영자 영향력과 사적부채 선택 간의 관계를 분석하였다. 분석결과, 최고경 영자 임금 비중과 사적부채 선택은 유의한 양(+)의 상관관계가 도출되었고, 상장시장별 로 나누어서 본 결과, 유가증권시장 표본에서도 유사한 결과가 나타나 경영자의 영향력 이 증가할수록 사적부채 의존도가 높아짐을 발견하였다. 본 논문의 실증결과는 경영자의 영향력 정도에 따라 기업의 사적부채 선택이 달라질 수 있으며, 이는 기업의 자본구조 형성에 유의한 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 보여준다. 본 논문의 연구결과를 통해 투자자들이 기업의 자본구조 파악 시 경영자 특성을 보다 신중히 고려함으로써 경영자의 재무의사 결정에 관한 예측 가능성을 보다 높일 수 있을 것이라 판단된다.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> This study examines whether the CEO‘s power relates to a firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we empirically investigate the relationship between a CEO pay slice and a firm's choice of private debt. To analyze the relationship of the CEO’s power with a firm’s debt decision, we use a sample of firms traded in the KOSPI and the KOSDAQ markets from 2013 to 2018. Our findings indicate that the CEO pay slice is positively and significantly related to a firm’s choice of private debt, implying that CEOs with higher power are more likely to prefer using private debt. Our study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence that a CEO’s power is one of the crucial factors which can influence the firm’s capital structure. This study also enables investors to enhance the predictability of managerial behavior. In addition, the results suggest that managerial characteristics should be considered when monitoring managers and corporate capital structures.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131491938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corporate Governance and Audit Risk 公司治理与审计风险
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3543972
Oladipupo Adebawojo
{"title":"Corporate Governance and Audit Risk","authors":"Oladipupo Adebawojo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3543972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543972","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate Governance is a contemporary issue in the business world. It could be described as a company’s overall efficient control to ensure transparency and full disclosure in organization business dealings. Despite organizations establishing various forms of Corporate Governance incidence of corporate failures still, occur which poses audit risk and affects auditors' reputation. This study was a form of explorative research which investigated how corporate governance affects Audit client audit risk. We carried out an in-depth study of past literature to gain a better understanding of the concepts of corporate governance and audit risk and to also know the findings of previous researches on the subject. Our study concluded that when there is good governance in the organization, the quality of the financial report will improve and this will ultimately reduce audit risk.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127533141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Mispricing and the Cost of Capital: The Example of Tesla 错误定价与资本成本:以特斯拉为例
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3539698
Bradford Cornell
{"title":"Mispricing and the Cost of Capital: The Example of Tesla","authors":"Bradford Cornell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3539698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3539698","url":null,"abstract":"Sentiment based mispricing of a common stock can be interpreted as a subsidy that reduces the cost of capital. The subsidy is provided by the investors who are willing to accept a lower return than the “true” cost capital. In the case of Tesla, I estimate the subsidy to be 248 basis points. To the extent that sentiment-based mispricing can be realized by issuing new shares at a lower effective cost of capital, Tesla has a significant competitive advantage over incumbent auto makers that is exacerbated by the capital-intensive nature of the business. This results in a feedback from stock market pricing to fundamental value. The feedback mechanism is a significant threat to traditional car makers.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130658661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance Affect Stock Price Crash Risk? 企业社会责任和公司治理如何影响股价崩盘风险?
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-02-07 DOI: 10.3390/jrfm13020030
Ahmed Imran Hunjra, R. Mehmood, Tahar Tayachi
{"title":"How Do Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance Affect Stock Price Crash Risk?","authors":"Ahmed Imran Hunjra, R. Mehmood, Tahar Tayachi","doi":"10.3390/jrfm13020030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm13020030","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance on stock price crash risk in manufacturing sector of India and Pakistan. We collect data of nine years from 2010 to 2018 from DataStream of 353 manufacturing firms. We apply the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to the analysis of the data. We find that when firms actively engage in CSR activities, they lead to reduced stock price crash risk. We further find that managerial ownership has a significant positive impact on stock price crash risk, while board size and CEO duality show a significant and negative impact on stock price crash risk.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130640284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 36
Financial Innovations and the Curse of Safety 金融创新和安全的诅咒
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3526183
Hammad Siddiqi, S. Anwar
{"title":"Financial Innovations and the Curse of Safety","authors":"Hammad Siddiqi, S. Anwar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3526183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526183","url":null,"abstract":"We show that financial innovations, by letting firms benefit from safe cash flows in new ways, potentially cause a misallocation of resources at the firm level with low net present value (NPV) projects (with larger amounts of safe cash flows) getting preference over high NPV projects. Even negative NPV projects may be accepted. Such financial innovations benefit large firms (with large cash flows) more than small firms; hence, they widen the value-gap between leader and follower firms. These results indicate that productivity slowdown and the rise of superstar firms are not independent phenomena, rather they share the same underlying cause: Financial innovations letting firms benefit from safe cash flows. We show that misallocation towards low NPV projects gets worse as interest rates approach zero. The value-gap between large and small firms also increases as interest rates approach zero. These results cast doubt on the effectiveness of monetary policy in a low interest rate environment.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129210027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do Financial Analysts Play a Complementary or Substitutive Role in the Corporate Information Environment? Evidence from Organised Labour 财务分析师在企业信息环境中扮演的是补充还是替代角色?来自劳工组织的证据
Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal Pub Date : 2020-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3708260
Steven Xianglong Chen, Edward Lee, K. Stathopoulos
{"title":"Do Financial Analysts Play a Complementary or Substitutive Role in the Corporate Information Environment? Evidence from Organised Labour","authors":"Steven Xianglong Chen, Edward Lee, K. Stathopoulos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3708260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708260","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the primary role of financial analysts in the context of unionised firms, where investors have greater information demand. Previous literature suggests that labour unions create substantial uncertainty in firms and undermine the information environment, while another strand of literature argues that analysts devote more effort to generating valuable information through original research in the case of heightened uncertainty or information asymmetry. To date, it is unclear whether financial analysts, as professional information intermediaries, are affected by organised labour. Using a large U.S. sample over the period of 1983-2015, we find that the labour unionisation rate is associated with lower forecast accuracy and higher forecast dispersion, suggesting that financial analysts predominantly play a “complementary role” rather than a “substitutive role” when firms are facing significant uncertainty in human capital. Overall, our study has important implications for managers, financial analysts and regulators, by highlighting the value and hence the necessity of non-financial information disclosure specific to a key intangible asset of firms, i.e., their employees.","PeriodicalId":416026,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Corporate Finance & Governance eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131299789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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