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Filozofia Nauki最新文献

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Mechanika arystotelesowska a współczesna fizyka. Na tropach ciągłości wewnętrznej logiki rozwoju nauki
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2020-03-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0001
W. Grygiel
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引用次数: 0
Filozofia a nauka w kontekście laboratoryjnego stylu badań naukowych Roberta Boyle’a
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2020-03-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0005
M. Sikora
{"title":"Filozofia a nauka w kontekście laboratoryjnego stylu badań naukowych Roberta Boyle’a","authors":"M. Sikora","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review of Radoslaw Kazibut’s book Filozofia przyrody i przyrodoznawstwa Roberta Boyle’a. Filozoficzna geneza nauki laboratoryjnej (Robert Boyle’s Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science: The Philosophical Origins of Laboratory Research), in which I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed approach. On the one hand, I appreciate the author’s effort to examine the origin of the laboratory style of research, which is found in Boyle’s studies, as a basis for a novel approach to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. On the other hand, I am critical of the fact that the author has overlooked several issues relating to the subject matter which, in the context of the topics addressed in the book, should be recognized as relevant. The characterization of the laboratory sciences presented in the book is too selective as it ignores the problem of the undesirable products of the laboratory sciences as well as their increasingly practical character.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41559761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Methodological Pluralism in Economics: The ‘Why’ and ‘How’ of Causal Inferences 经济学中的方法论多元主义：因果推理的“为什么”和“如何”
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-12-31 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0025
Mariusz Maziarz
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引用次数: 0
Examining the Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools: Converging Insights 研究概念作为工具的结构化使用：融合见解
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-12-31 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0023
Eden T. Smith
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引用次数: 1
Co mówi o prawach przyrody geneza tego pojęcia? Polemika z Ronaldem N. Gierem 这个概念的起源说明了自然规律是什么？与罗纳德·吉尔的争论
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0020
Joanna Luc
{"title":"Co mówi o prawach przyrody geneza tego pojęcia? Polemika z Ronaldem N. Gierem","authors":"Joanna Luc","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0020","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to analyze Ronald N. Giere’s claim that the four characteristics associated with laws of nature — truth, universality, necessity, and objectivity — have a theological origin. It is argued that in some important cases theological justification of these features was absent, that some theological ideas made it even more difficult to think about laws of nature in this way, and that there were good reasons internal to science to formulate the notion of laws of nature in this particular way.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45835916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Index Visual Contents 如何为可视化内容编制索引
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0016
Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez
{"title":"How to Index Visual Contents","authors":"Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0016","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Content View (CV), visual perceptual experiences represent the subject’s surroundings or have representational content. A critical question posed by Charles Travis against CV is how the subject of experiences could index or introspectively ascribe a specific representational content of a given (occurring) visual experience: if her visual experiences incorporate representational contents, how could she ascribe a particular content to any given visual experience of hers? According to Travis, while visual representation is supposed to be “a familiar phenomenon; something we can tell is happening” (Travis 2004: 86), there is no good available evidence that our visual experiences represent our surroundings; and he thinks so because there seems to be no method of visual contents’ indexation or self-ascription. The aim of this paper is to show how CV could meet what I shall call the Indexing Problem for perceptual — more specifically, visual — content. My main positive suggestion turns on the thought that the contents of visual experiences could be indexed by the way things demonstrably look to the subject of experiences.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41935158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Neopopperowski argument przeciw funkcjonalizmowi Neopopper反对功能主义的论点
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0018
M. Pawłowski
{"title":"Neopopperowski argument przeciw funkcjonalizmowi","authors":"M. Pawłowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46935870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Modele jaźni w samowiedzy 自我认识中的自我模型
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0017
Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
{"title":"Modele jaźni w samowiedzy","authors":"Anita Pacholik-Żuromska","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0017","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues for an externalist self-model in self-knowledge, as an answer to the question of how to defend self-knowledge in the face of evident errors in self-cognition such as self-illusions. The externalist model is contrasted with an internalist model, although both are based on a predictive coding mechanism. The main thesis is that for preserving the status of self-knowledge as knowledge an external element is needed — namely, some feedback from the environment — which corrects not only cognitive prediction errors regarding the world but also errors in self-cognition by forcing the proper action of the subject (agent) and dynamic adaptation of the model of the embodied self. The mechanism of self-corrections is best described by externalist models.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44961109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Uwagi Wittgensteina O pewności a teoria kolektywów myślowych i stylów myślowych Flecka 维特根斯坦论确定性与弗莱克的思想集体与思想风格理论
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0019
W. Sady
{"title":"Uwagi Wittgensteina O pewności a teoria kolektywów myślowych i stylów myślowych Flecka","authors":"W. Sady","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0019","url":null,"abstract":"In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein declares that he is neither creating a theory nor explaining anything: he is merely describing the ways of using words and sentences, thus trying to make philosophical problems disappear. In fact, however, he proposes a theory of the nature of language games and their functions, even though — because of the above declaration — he expresses it in a fragmentary and unclear way. After 1946, his views underwent significant transformations: he abandoned the philosophy of mathematics for the philosophy of psychology. And in the last months of his life, in the notes published posthumously as On Certainty, he expressed a number of epistemological claims that explain our cognitive attitudes. He did not manage to finish this work. We have to do it for him, and crucial supplements are provided — as this paper argues — by Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought collectives and thought styles.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45898697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism 论味觉表达论的不足
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2019-10-31 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0015
M. Zouhar
{"title":"On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism","authors":"M. Zouhar","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0015","url":null,"abstract":"It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters “This is tasty” and another one responds with “That’s not true.” The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are unable to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which another kind of dissent phrase — like “Nuh-uh” — is employed). This is because utterances of “That’s not true” are typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it, however, that when one utters “This is tasty,” one typically manifests her evaluative attitude (which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward that thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism in the case of disagreements in which speakers respond with “Nuh-uh” but departs from it in situations in which they respond with “That’s not true.” The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty or not.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43282460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
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