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Struktury uzasadniania. Część III. Kontekstualizm
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-10-30 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2018.0020
J. Ziobrowski
{"title":"Struktury uzasadniania. Część III. Kontekstualizm","authors":"J. Ziobrowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2018.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is the last part of a series of three articles concerning the structure of justification. The author discusses contextualism regarding the structure of justification in the versions put forward by David Annis and Michael Williams. Williams explicitly contrasts his view with both foundationalist and coherentist theories. He gives a novel and valuable account of the system of beliefs and the structure of justification. Still, one can have doubts as to its normative dimension, i.e. as to whether it correctly shows what the structure of justification should be like from the epistemic point of view.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41332498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Struktury uzasadniania. Część II. Fundacjonizm
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2018.0012
J. Ziobrowski
{"title":"Struktury uzasadniania. Część II. Fundacjonizm","authors":"J. Ziobrowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2018.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is the second part of a series of articles concerning the structure of justification. The author discusses foundationalism — the most often adopted position on this issue. He distinguishes different kinds of this position and points out the main objections against it. General considerations concerning foundationalism are illustrated by solutions included in the theories of “the late” Laurence BonJour and Robert Audi.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41521095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Przyczynki do teorii definicji 对定义理论的贡献
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0013
A. Brożek
{"title":"Przyczynki do teorii definicji","authors":"A. Brożek","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0013","url":null,"abstract":"Being the results of conceptual analysis, definitions play a crucial role in philosophy. On the one hand, providing a good definition is often counted as a significant philosophical result. On the other, the lack of a correct definition is sometimes the main reason for futile philosophical controversies. That is why the theory of definitions is among the central aims of the methodology of philosophy. The paper proposes some improvements of the traditional semiotic conception of definitions, especially as it is applied in philosophy. Classifications of definitions are analyzed and new kinds of definitions are distinguished (with respect to structure, genesis, type of sense indicated, etc.). The paper also describes various ways of establishing definitions and reconstructs the criteria of correctness that apply to definitions.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47488263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim as a Logical Consequence of Semiotic Idealism. 皮尔斯语用格言:符号学唯心主义的逻辑推论。
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0008
Segiusz Tokariew
{"title":"Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim as a Logical Consequence of Semiotic Idealism.","authors":"Segiusz Tokariew","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to show that the pragmatic maxim can be construed as a logical consequence of semiotic idealism. Peirce proposed his semiotic idealism in the 1860s and based it on two premises: first, that we could know only symbols and, second, that the only things that exist are those that could be known. From these premises, he concluded that only symbols exist. This conception was meant to refute the distinction between the substance and its phenomenal manifestations. If semiotic idealism implies the pragmatic maxim, then it becomes clear why the pragmatic maxim says that the conception of the effects of the object is the conception of the object: it is because Peirce thought that the effects are the object. Furthermore, the close link between these conceptions may account for Peirce’s prolonged silence about pragmatism.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46408149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciwko nominalizmowi tropowemu 相似性回归。反对痕迹唯名论的双重关系论证
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0009
P. Rojek
{"title":"Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciwko nominalizmowi tropowemu","authors":"P. Rojek","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Trope nominalists claim that resemblance is a primitive relation. There are two well-known arguments that aim to prove that such resemblance leads to a vicious regress. On the one hand, Bertrand Russell famously argued that resemblance relations imply an infinite series of resemblances holding between them. On the other hand, less famously, Edmund Husserl claimed that resemblance must be grounded in identity, for otherwise it falls into a vicious regress. In this paper, I argue that these arguments are intimately connected and, in fact, form a single complex case against nominalism. The point is that the standard solution to the Russell regress, which takes resemblance to be an internal relation, leads to the Husserl regress, and vice versa: a solution to the Husserl regress is possible when resemblance is taken to be an external relation, which immediately leads to the Russell regress.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48147410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Quo vadis, realisme? O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy 库瓦迪斯，现实主义？论科学实在论争议的现状
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2018.0014
M. Kotowski
{"title":"Quo vadis, realisme? O obecnym stanie sporu o realizm naukowy","authors":"M. Kotowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2018.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0014","url":null,"abstract":"The article investigates the intuition that both scientific realism and scientific antirealism are turning into degenerating research programs. The evolution of realism in reaction to pessimistic (meta)induction has certainly led to its increased sophistication as it has given rise to various versions of selective realism. However, many current discussions seem either too focused on semantic niceties or are turning into endless quarrels over case-study refutations of particular forms of realism. The point of finding a better understanding of the relations of scientific knowledge to the world seems to get lost in the process. Magnus, Callender, and Saatsi are among those who see the problem. Although drawing on different observations, they agree that the source of the problem is the wholesale approach according to which it is possible to resolve the realism debate in one move, by finding a single universal method of interpreting any scientific theory. Instead, they call for a more modest approach, based on case-by-case analyses. Particularly promising is Saatsi’s idea of exemplar realism, according to which realism should be an attitude motivating detailed case studies rather than a specific account of science in general.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45952767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Problem Butlera z perspektywy racjonalnego sprawcy
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-06-30 DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0010
A. Wierzbicki
{"title":"Problem Butlera z perspektywy racjonalnego sprawcy","authors":"A. Wierzbicki","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2018.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Butler’s problem poses a challenge to philosophical theories of intentional action because it suggests that intentionality attribution is dependent on moral judgement. Experimental results reached so far seem to confirm this thesis. However, the agent described in Butler scenarios seems to lack fundamental rationality, which may distort intuitions about the intentionality of his/her actions. An experimental study described in this work aims to overcome this problem by providing explicit reasons for action. Strength of motivation is also compared with moral judgement as a factor in intentionality attribution. The results of the study suggest that neither explicitly described reasons nor strength of motivation have a significant influence on intentionality attribution in Butler scenarios.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43725645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
O implikaturach konwersacyjnych pytań 会话问题的含义
IF 0.1 4区 哲学
Filozofia Nauki Pub Date : 2018-03-25 DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2018.0002
Tomasz A. Puczyłowski, Daniel Ziembicki
{"title":"O implikaturach konwersacyjnych pytań","authors":"Tomasz A. Puczyłowski, Daniel Ziembicki","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2018.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2018.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the connection between questions and conversational implicatures. We put forward a theoretical argument to the effect that questions can contain such implicatures. We also present extensive empirical material that confirms this hypothesis. The article focuses on a class of utterances used simultaneously to express an epistemic stance toward a state of affairs stated in a subordinate clause and to receive a response from an interlocutor, like in the following example: Don’t you think Peter should be going home now?","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66789276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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