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The Market Performance of Tracking Stocks 跟踪股票的市场表现
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 2001-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.229549
Anand M. Vijh, Matthew T. Billett
{"title":"The Market Performance of Tracking Stocks","authors":"Anand M. Vijh, Matthew T. Billett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.229549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229549","url":null,"abstract":"Tracking stocks have been a popular form of equity restructuring in recent years. AT&T, Disney, General Motors, Sprint, US West, and many others have issued tracking stocks. While the positive announcement returns of tracking stocks are well documented, an examination of their post-issue market performance is lacking. This paper examines the post-issue returns and the subsequent restructuring events through December 2000 by using a comprehensive sample of tracking stocks. We document three key results. First, we find that tracking stocks earn significantly negative buy-and-hold excess returns during a three-year period following the issue date. We also find significantly negative returns surrounding the earnings announcements during this period. This evidence contrasts with the post-issue returns of spinoffs, which are known to be positive, and of carveouts, which are known to be insignificant. Second, contrary to a common justification given to adopt tracking stocks, we find that they do not increase the transparency of firm earnings. Third, we find large positive announcement-period returns to events resulting in the elimination of tracking stock structure.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130403685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Prestige, Intrafirm Tournaments and Failure Aversion in Corporate Decisions 企业决策中的声望、企业内部竞争和失败厌恶
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1999-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.160256
Todd Milbourn, A. Thakor, Richard L. Shockley
{"title":"Prestige, Intrafirm Tournaments and Failure Aversion in Corporate Decisions","authors":"Todd Milbourn, A. Thakor, Richard L. Shockley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.160256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.160256","url":null,"abstract":"The pervasive \"tournament\" style of organization is beneficial in that it allows shareholders to place the most talented managers in senior positions. We demonstrate that this benefit is achieved only at a cost: competition for promotions to prestigious positions induces excessive failure aversion among competing managers. Failure aversion emanates from the interaction between the huge rewards promised to the winning manager (the CEO) - the \"winner-take-all\" phenomenon - and the limited opportunities for managers to influence perceptions about their abilities. Failure aversion in turn corrupts corporate decisions, resulting in distorted project and effort choices. Importantly, it may not be possible to remove the resulting distortions through wage contracts as the organization architecture itself creates implicit contracts that constrain the efficacy of explicit compensation contracts.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125546748","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Lines of Credit and Relationship Lending in Small Firm Finance 小企业融资中的信用额度和关系贷款
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1994-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.124708
Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell
{"title":"Lines of Credit and Relationship Lending in Small Firm Finance","authors":"Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.124708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.124708","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of relationship lending using a data set on small firm finance. We specifically examine price and nonprice terms of commercial bank lines of credit (L/C) extended to small firms. Our focus on bank L/Cs allows us to examine a type of loan contract where the bank-borrower relationship is likely to be an important mechanism for solving asymmetric information problems associated with financing small enterprises. We find that borrowers with longer banking relationships tend to pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. These results are consistent with theoretical arguments that relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122405391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 63
Momentum Strategies and Financial Databases: An Investigation of Intraday Pattern in Price Momentum 动量策略与金融数据库:价格动量盘中形态的研究
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.607782
Bidisha Chakrabarty, Charles Trzcinka
{"title":"Momentum Strategies and Financial Databases: An Investigation of Intraday Pattern in Price Momentum","authors":"Bidisha Chakrabarty, Charles Trzcinka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.607782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607782","url":null,"abstract":"How do different databases define a firm? What are the rules for listing/de-listing firms across different databases? In this paper we show that the divergence in the criteria for listing/de-listing firms between the CRSP and TAQ databases is significant enough to impact the magnitude and direction of statistical profits of momentum portfolios. We show that while the standard momentum returns established in the literature can be replicated using CRSP data, TAQ data leads to entirely different results due to listing/de-listing discrepancies. We construct a two-stage filtering process to eliminate new/de-listing discrepancies between CRSP and TAQ to show a convergence in results. We then document that intra-day momentum profits exhibit an inverted U-shape. Given that intra-day stock prices follow a U-shape, we then show that an investor can \"time\" the market and enhance the profits of momentum portfolios if (s)he buys at noon prices and sells at the close.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129794800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
An Identity Perspective on Coopetition in the Craft Beer Industry 精酿啤酒行业竞争的认同视角
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.1002/SMJ.2734
Blake D. Mathias, A. Huyghe, Casey J. Frid, Tera L. Galloway
{"title":"An Identity Perspective on Coopetition in the Craft Beer Industry","authors":"Blake D. Mathias, A. Huyghe, Casey J. Frid, Tera L. Galloway","doi":"10.1002/SMJ.2734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/SMJ.2734","url":null,"abstract":"Research Summary: To further our understanding of how and why organizations engage in coopetition, we explore cooperative and competitive actions in the craft beer industry. Through an inductive field study, including interviews with craft brewery owners, we propose collective identity and collective norms play a critical role in the persistence of coopetition over time. Our process model suggests that (a) an oppositional collective identity, (b) the shared belief that a rising tide lifts all boats, and (c) the shared belief that advice and assistance should be paid forward, can lead to the persistence of coopetition beyond market category emergence. \u0000 \u0000Managerial Summary: This paper develops a theory of how smaller, craft-based organizations (i.e., “Davids”) encourage cohesion and cooperation amongst themselves when operating against an incumbent market of mass-producers (i.e., “Goliaths”). An ideological opposition to existing players can lead to a shared belief that helping organizations like your own benefits everyone—the rising tide lifts all boats mentality. Similarly, when organizations first enter a market and receive help from established members, they can feel compelled to help others who enter the market after—the pay-it-forward mentality. Together, these mechanisms offer an explanation as to how and why coopetition might persist in a market category over time.","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"193 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115637818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 113
The Optimal Design of Ponzi Schemes in Finite Economies 有限经济条件下庞氏骗局的最优设计
Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.99929
Utpal Bhattacharya
{"title":"The Optimal Design of Ponzi Schemes in Finite Economies","authors":"Utpal Bhattacharya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.99929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.99929","url":null,"abstract":"As no rational agent would be willing to take part in the last round in a finite economy, it is difficult to design Ponzi schemes that are certain to explode. This paper argues that if agents correctly believe in the possibility of a partial bailout when a gigantic Ponzi scheme collapses, and they recognize that a bailout is tantamount to a redistribution of wealth from non-participants to participants, it may be rational for agents to participate, even if they know that it is the last round. We model a political economy where an unscrupulous profit-maximizing promoter can design gigantic Ponzi schemes to cynically exploit this \"too big to fail\" doctrine. We point to the fact that some of the spectacular Ponzi schemes in history occurred at times where and when such political economies existed - France (1719), Britain (1720), Russia (1994) and Albania (1997).","PeriodicalId":412480,"journal":{"name":"Indiana University Kelley School of Business Research Paper Series","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130044930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 37
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