Lines of Credit and Relationship Lending in Small Firm Finance

Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell
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引用次数: 63

Abstract

This paper examines the role of relationship lending using a data set on small firm finance. We specifically examine price and nonprice terms of commercial bank lines of credit (L/C) extended to small firms. Our focus on bank L/Cs allows us to examine a type of loan contract where the bank-borrower relationship is likely to be an important mechanism for solving asymmetric information problems associated with financing small enterprises. We find that borrowers with longer banking relationships tend to pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. These results are consistent with theoretical arguments that relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality.
小企业融资中的信用额度和关系贷款
本文利用小企业融资数据集考察关系借贷的作用。我们特别研究的价格和非价格条款的商业银行信贷额度(L/C)扩展到小企业。我们对银行信用证的关注使我们能够研究一种贷款合同,其中银行-借款人关系可能是解决与小企业融资相关的信息不对称问题的重要机制。我们发现,拥有较长银行关系的借款人往往支付较低的利率,并且不太可能抵押抵押品。这些结果与理论观点一致,即关系借贷产生有关借款人质量的有价值信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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