Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology最新文献

{"title":"Philosophy and the Art of WritingReview of Richard Shusterman’s <b> <i>Philosophy and the Art of Writing</i> </b> , Routledge, 2022, 142 pages. ISBN 9780367354909","authors":"Uku Tooming","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2239606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2239606","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsFunding information: Estonian Research Council Grant MOBTP1004Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.Additional informationNotes on contributorsUku ToomingUku Tooming is a Research Fellow in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Tartu. He works primarily on philosophy of mind, aesthetics and epistemology, and has published papers on imagination, desire, self-knowledge and aesthetic appreciation in journals like Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, European Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Aesthetic Education, etc.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"380 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135798454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Witty Winds: Japanese Contributions to a Phenomenology of Laughter and Irony","authors":"Lorenzo Marinucci","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2239604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2239604","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper explores philosophically the experiences of laughter and irony, focusing on Japanese sources but with a cross-cultural outlook. I ask whether globally unfavorable attitudes towards the comic in the European canon might have left unexplored or misunderstood several insights offered by the bodily and spiritual dimension revealed by laughter, and examine them through Japanese sources. Following a short but poignant triad of examples in Kuki Shūzō’s work, the paper analyses three instances of Japanese laughter and irony: the orgiastic laughter of the gods luring Amaterasu out of the Heavenly Cave in Kojiki; the anthropomorphic animal scrolls of Chōjūgiga, and the “Tiger Cubs Crossing” stone garden in Ryōanji, Kyoto, concluding how each one of them offers an important insight on the bodily and conceptual phenomenological cluster of laughter and irony. I conclude with a further exploration of laughter in Zen, a religious tradition with a unique stress on the spiritual potential of humor, following Nishitani’s reading of Mumonkan and his connection to the experience of “emptiness”.KEYWORDS: laughterhumorironyfūryūKukiNishitaniZen Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For an overview, see Marinucci, “Japanese Atmospheres: Of Sky, Wind and Breathing”.2 Schmitz, Atmosphären, 7–12; for an explicit discussion of the affinity between Schmitz’s phenomenological work and Japanese cultural patters, Ogawa, Philosophy of Wind, 11–28.3 Kuki, “A Reflection on Poetic Spirit”, 96.4 Plessner, Laughing and Crying, 26.5 Ibid., 31–32.6 Ibid., 37.7 Schmitz, Atmosphären, 32–33.8 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 178.9 Solger, Erwin II, quoted in Garber, Romantic Irony, 71.10 Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, 24.11 Ibid., 5-6.12 Marinucci “Japanese Atmospheres”.13 Marinucci, “Following the Footsteps of Wind”, 83.14 Kuki, “A Reflection on Poetic Spirit”, 104.15 Heldt, The Kojiki, 24.16 Schmitz, System der Philosophie III-4, 49–50.17 Akutagawa, Akutagawa Zenshū VIII, 195.18 Pinkola Estés, Women who run with the Wolves, 248–9.19 It is worth stressing how often humour and laughter gravitate around holes, either the mouth (laughter, food), or genitals and the anus (sexual humour, scatological humour). Even the word “humour” itself ultimately refers to the bodily fluids (humores) thought to control moods through their attunement to the external world. In order to understand the laughing or comical body, it is essential to include, or even centre our attention on its holes, not simply anatomically, but as the felt-bodily nexuses of our being into the world and with others.20 Plessner, Laughing and Crying, 85.21 Watsuji, Watsuji zenshū VIII, 35.22 Diog. Laer. VI-2 40.23 Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, 103.24 Kuki, “A Reflection on Poetic Spirit”, 104.25 Mitate 見立て is a visual pun by which an object is seen or represented as a stand-in for a very different one, creating a comic effect by effectively cas","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135798456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Appropriating the Neoliberal City: Populism, Post-Transcendental Phenomenology, and the Problematic of the “World”","authors":"Sebastiaan Bierema","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2239605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2239605","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the work of Ernesto Laclau, populism is treated as a hegemonic challenge. Hegemony describes the usurpation of the image of society as a totality by a particular and underdetermined social imaginary. Seen through the lens of what Johann P. Arnason terms “post-transcendental phenomenology”, this concerns the way in which a society sees and experiences both itself and the world it inhabits. This article suggests that hegemonic social imaginaries are built into a society’s public spaces, and are in turn experienced by citizens moving through these spaces, meaning that the built environment is central to the development of populist imaginaries. The article discusses how the neoliberal city exemplifies the way social imaginaries are inscribed into the physical landscape by highlighting three moments in the city; the institution of a certain imaginary as dominant; its sedimentation within the urban fabric over time; and finally, the re-activation of the original moment of institution, which opens up the possibility for new beginnings to overwrite the imaginaries encoded in the city. These three moments describe how physical, built spaces make concrete the power relations and horizons of possibility of the hegemonic imaginary—making possible and encouraging certain ways of being while discouraging (and hiding) others. This hegemonic logic of occupying a public space in the name of a particular subset of the population is a not only parallel to the form of populist politics, but populist sentiment is—at least in part—provoked by the experiences of inhabiting these spaces.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135798458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Strife of World and Earth as an Articulation of the Ontological Difference","authors":"Michael Thatcher","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2239602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2239602","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a passage from the addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art” often ignored in the secondary literature, Heidegger expands on how art institutes the unconcealment of the truth of Being with reference to the ontological difference—the difference between Being and beings which cannot rely on the comparison of predicates for clarification. The relationship between art and the ontological difference is not immediately obvious and lacks further explication in Heidegger’s other texts. This paper argues that there are two fundamental elements to the ontological difference that Heidegger focuses on that can be used to elucidate art as a strife of world and earth: “the Nothing” [das Nichts] outlined in “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) and world-projection described in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929–30). Understanding these two elements of the ontological difference (world-projection and the Nothing) as present together in the event of unconcealment (aletheia) thereby clarifies for the notorious concepts of earth, world, strife, and rift (Riß) that characterize the work of art. Recourse to the ontological difference as an explanatory mechanism for conceptualising Heidegger’s philosophy of art is a useful way of avoiding common issues in the prevailing literature that will be laid out below.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135798453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Seeing Serially: Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology Encountering Serial Drawing","authors":"Joe Graham","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2239600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2239600","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTGraham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology prioritises aesthetics as first philosophy, and finds increasing interest from those working across art, architecture and the humanities in general. This article tests the application of Harman’s ideas by applying them to a thorny issue related to the domain of serial art, and serially developed drawing in particular. The issue concerns the productive role of the beholder in constituting the serial artwork as a unified thing, wherein it appears manifestly deeper than the sum of its physical parts. Referring to an artwork produced by contemporary artist Stefana McClure, I build upon prior propositions on serial art put forward by Christy Mag Uidhir and Nicolas de Warren to make the case for seeing serially. This uses Harman’s understanding of aesthetics to claim that imagined iterations constitute an integral element to serial drawing, brought into play when the beholder reflects upon the loose relationship between the array of qualities the artwork palpably presents and its withdrawn reality as a unified object.KEYWORDS: Graham Harmanobject-oriented ontologydrawingserial artaesthetics Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1 Harman, Art and Objects, xi.2 Mag Uidhir, “How to Frame.”3 I am using the term “beholder” to indicate the kind of viewer who takes time to actively engage with a work of serially developed drawing, rather than one who merely superficially views it in passing. The term is borrowed from Harman’s “human beholder” (Citation2020, 45), who in turn imports the idea from the work of Michael Fried.4 Graham, Serial Drawing.5 Harman, Art and Objects, 2.6 de Warren, “Ad Infinitum”, 9.7 Mag Uidhir, “How to Frame”, 261.8 Ibid.9 Ibid.10 Ibid., 262.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid., 263.14 Ibid.15 Ibid, original italics.16 Ibid., 264.17 Ibid.18 Chavez et al, Infinite Possibilities.19 de Warren, “Ad Infinitum”, 9.20 Ibid., 14.21 The purpose of introducing Kant’s concept of the beautiful at this juncture is to outline Harman’s interpretation of the same, following on from de Warren’s invocation of Kant when considering the productive role of the imagination in constituting serial art. The purpose is not to employ Kant’s original understanding of beauty as-is, but rather to employ Harman’s modern reinterpretation of it as a methodology for analysing a serial drawing produced by McClure. This allows for Kantian inspired ideas about beauty to be sensibly applied to contemporary manifestations of minimalist art, which arguably sit outside the classical tradition to which Kant was originally referring.22 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 59.23 Ibid, 45.24 Ibid, 45.25 Ibid, 53.26 Harman, Art and Objects, xi. (italics added)27 Ibid, 35.28 Ibid., xii. Timothy Morton offers a slightly different interpretation of Kantian aesthetics by claiming that the Kantian experience of beauty presents, “an object-like entity that seems to inhere both in oneself and the beautiful objec","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135798457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reimagining AI: Introduction","authors":"Dominic Smith, Natasha Lushetich, Tina Röck, Edzia Carvalho, Kenny Lewis, Gabriele Schweikert","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2023.2213008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2023.2213008","url":null,"abstract":"The expression “AI” has become as commonplace as “computer.” While many people have a relatively clear idea of what an AI system or a computer does or can do, fewer have an idea of how precisely the “intelligence” in AI or “computing” in “computer” operates in practice. As machine learning scientist Joe Davidson humorously put it: “[w]hen you’re fundraising, it’s Artificial Intelligence. When you’re hiring, it’s Machine Learning. When you’re implementing, it’s logistic regression.” But does this mean that AI is a form of glorified statistics and that, consequently, there is no intelligence in “artificial intelligence”? Or, in a more quotidian register, that machine learning scientists have an ironic sense of humour? Regardless of whether we see this through the “object of discussion” or the “subject discussing” lens, it has by now become established that “artificial intelligence” is not an algorithmic variation on human intelligence, as authors such as Niels Nilsson have suggested (2010). Rather, it’s the system’s “ability to make generalizations” based on “limited data” and “iterative sequences.” How these iterative sequences are organised is clearly key. We are all familiar with systems that derive reductive conclusions from oversimplified procedures. This kind of “intelligence” is probably best labelled “obtuseness” since it shares many features with human obtuseness. Unlike human obtuseness, however, the artificial variant creates what could be called “future from structure” by turning possibilities into probabilities, and probabilities into mathematical-logical “necessities” many of which have lasting consequences. Artificial obtuseness can also be seen as a form of machinic enunciation, a variation on authoritarianism, minus the human agent: “you will either use the grossly reductive online form or you will not be able to submit your health insurance claim.” Or: “despite the fact that the decision to reject your health insurance claim was arrived at using oversimplified, and therefore inaccurate parameters, the decision is irrevocable.” Another category that differs from (what we might call) “artificial intelligence proper” is artificial militelligence (a mashup of “military” and “intelligence”). This is essentially a target machine concerned with understanding the enemy’s whereabouts, movements, and practices. Its purpose is to translate information into actionable knowledge and strategic advantage. In order to achieve this, artificial militellligence forces order on disorder, often by violent means.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"9 1","pages":"87 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47487641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Creative Agents: Rethinking Agency and Creativity in Human and Artificial Systems","authors":"Caterina Moruzzi","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2022.2150470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2022.2150470","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While the notions of creativity and agency have each received considerable attention in the literature on computational systems, the connections between these two concepts have rarely been addressed. In this paper, I contribute to this debate by discussing the results of an online questionnaire aimed at testing the interactions between the attribution of agency and creativity to human and artificial subjects. Findings of the study indicate that the ascription of agentive capabilities to a subject is positively correlated to the level of creativity attributed to the process they perform. This result supports the claim that a better understanding of the steps needed in order to achieve agency can help also shed light on the development of creativity in computational systems. I conclude the paper by suggesting that the technological revolution of the last decades is compelling us to re-think concepts such as authorship, ownership, agency, and creativity that, so far, have been typically attributed to humans only, and to consider how these notions are being transformed in dynamics of interaction between humans and machines.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"9 1","pages":"245 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43075854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Data as Expression","authors":"Jaana Okulov","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2022.2150465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2022.2150465","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In machine learning literature, the concept of expression is seldom addressed as a general term in relation to information construction and data. The term more often carries a narrower meaning and refers to human bodily, emotional, or artistic dimensions that are recorded to train a model. However, this paper discusses a view in which expression is understood as any human sensory realm that can bring incidents explicit through the act of “pressing out,” as the early etymology of expression indicates. Also, all the sensory data that are used to train a machine learning model and the data the trained model gives as an output are considered meaningful through their expressive mediality—a form that is actively produced and can therefore be subjected to critical phenomenological analysis. This paper contrasts nonverbal expressions with categorical or linguistic expressions and asks, “What do eye movements express when they are used in training a machine learning model? What kind of expression arises in linguistic models? What could be considered aesthetic data (and what would it express)?” For philosopher John Dewey, instinctive reactions in human behavior that for example exhibit mere discharge of an emotion should be separated from purposeful expressions. However, in machine learning, the two Deweyan positions (instinctive and intentional) collapse, as artificial expressions are purely simulations of learned logic. Therefore, the phenomenological question of this paper is traced back to the original stimulus and its human annotators. In this paper, philosopher Don Ihde’s experimental phenomenology explains how appearances can be attended to without subsuming them under any assumptions, whereas art theory—arising especially from philosopher Dieter Mersch’s thinking—provides an understanding of the mediality of expression. This paper introduces examples from machine learning that are not generally considered expressive but are used for regular tasks, such as object detection, and provides an alternative approach from aesthetics and artistic research that understands these modalities as expressive. If data are understood as expressive, it can be critically assessed how current machine learning models constitute knowledge.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"9 1","pages":"191 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41982239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prediction Promises: Towards a Metaphorology of Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Leonie A. Möck","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2022.2143654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2022.2143654","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Metaphors are a basic element of scientific language. In the context of Artificial Intelligence, metaphors facilitate the communication between experts and the public, as well as between scientists and engineers. Reimagining AI, here understood as a programmatic call, firstly requires us to be aware of the images we think with. Therefore, in this paper, I develop a claim for a hermeneutic metaphorology of AI, a philosophical investigation of our understanding of AI along metaphors. By studying metaphors of AI, we gain another tool for situating the discourse in and around AI towards its motivational background. This is important since our epistemic practices can’t be isolated from their political implications. Drawing mainly on Hans Blumenberg’s phenomenological philosophy of metaphor, this paper aims to mark the first step towards the broader metaphorological project. The focus hereby will lie on prediction as a paradigm of AI and a source for AI images. By analyzing two images, namely the expert and the black box, this article explores what these metaphors can tell us about the ways in which we perceive AI and how this affects the way we think about and practice human-machine relationality.","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"9 1","pages":"119 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43276711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Theoretical and Practical Paralogisms of Digital Immortality","authors":"Joel R. White","doi":"10.1080/20539320.2022.2150463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/20539320.2022.2150463","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Modern and contemporary transhumanism has seen a recent rise in academic and popular relevance; specific naïve metaphysical ideas, such as immortality, have returned with this rise. This article refrains from any ethical or political assessment of transhumanism. Still, it critiques the exact metaphysical or idealistic nature of transhumanism and its pursuit of digital immortality: the idea that, through technological advancements, precisely in Artificial General Intelligence, an immortal virtual “self” will become possible. The article follows the form of Immanuel Kant’s “Paralogisms” from the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant is concerned with the substantial, immortal nature of the soul and its experiential impossibility. The article will offer theoretical and practical paralogisms (false logical inferences), arguing that the transhumanist claim that digital immortality is possible fundamentally stems from two incorrect major premises. The first concerns the substantial nature of information, which informs the theoretical paralogisms; the second concerns infinite transformation (pure plasticity), which informs the practical paralogisms","PeriodicalId":41067,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology","volume":"9 1","pages":"155 - 172"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45217597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}