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Analisis Filosofico最新文献

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Moralismo y esteticismo 道德主义与唯美主义
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2020.333
Gustavo Ortiz Millán
{"title":"Moralismo y esteticismo","authors":"Gustavo Ortiz Millán","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.333","url":null,"abstract":"Aestheticism and moralism are two vices in which aesthetic or moral values are overrated in situations where other values are at stake and should also be taken into account, but are underrated. Carlos Pereda maintains that they are pathologies of judgment and argues that literature has been the victim of different variants of these vices. To do this, he distinguishes between different forms of aestheticism and moralism, and analyzes how some of them have implications at the semantic and communication levels. Pereda proposes a “reflective model” that counteracts the simplification that these pathologies represent. In this note, I critically examine Pereda’s theory and propose other ways that the analysis of aestheticism and","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"139-148"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45261114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wittgenstein sin vericuetos 维特根斯坦的真理论
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2020.332
P. Karczmarczyk
{"title":"Wittgenstein sin vericuetos","authors":"P. Karczmarczyk","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.332","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the two main thesis of the recently published Manuel Perez Otero’s book Vericuetos de la filosofia de Wittgenstein: the revision of the general symmetry between actions and omissions as intentional behaviour, and the proposal of a teleological (etiological) dispositional answer to Kripke’s Wittgenstein sceptical challenge about meaning. Concerning the first thesis, we show that the grammar of the attributions of intentions is neutral regarding causal determinism stressing the retrospective character implied by concept of a “justification post hoc”. Regarding the second thesis, we stress that the refusal of internism is not enough to make of teleological dispositions a satisfactory explanation of behaviour. We try to clarify the kind of problem posed by the Kripke’s Wittgenstein meaning scepticism: to abandon the conception that makes of “rule-following” the “praxis of a subject” for another that regards rule-followers as the “subjects of a practice”.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"93-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47973771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
El problema de ensamble 装配问题
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2020-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2020.338
M. Destéfano
{"title":"El problema de ensamble","authors":"M. Destéfano","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.338","url":null,"abstract":"Desde la bioloinguistica, ensamble sería una operación digital realizada en el cerebro que, en tanto tal, estaría asociada a principios específicos de la computación neural. En una primera aproximación, la computación digital consiste en el procesamiento de cadenas de dígitos de acuerdo a reglas generales. Sin embargo, los procesos neurales no se desarrollarían de acuerdo a los principios de la computación digital. Estas afirmaciones en conflicto, e.g., la caracterización digital de ensamble y la caracterización no digital del cerebro, llevan al siguiente escenario: o bien ensamble es una operación que no realiza el cerebro, o bien es realizada por el cerebro pero no digitalmente. El propósito de este artículo es evaluar los problemas de estas dos tesis.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"63-91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47548213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reasoning and Self-Knowledge 推理与自我认识
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.36446/AF.2018.282
Martin Frické
{"title":"Reasoning and Self-Knowledge","authors":"Martin Frické","doi":"10.36446/AF.2018.282","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/AF.2018.282","url":null,"abstract":"What is the relation between reasoning and self-knowledge? According to Shoemaker (1988), a certain kind of reasoning requires self-knowledge: we cannot rationally revise our beliefs without knowing that we have them, in part because we cannot see that there is a problem with an inconsistent set of propositions unless we are aware of believing them. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. A second account, versions of which can be found in Shoemaker (1988 and 2009) and Byrne (2005), claims that we can reason our way from belief about the world to self-knowledge about such belief. While Shoemaker’s “zany argument” fails to show how such reasoning can issue in self-knowledge, Byrne’s account, which centres on the epistemic rule “If p, believe that you believe that p”, is more successful. Two interesting objections are that the epistemic rule embodies a mad inference (Boyle 2011) and that it makes us form first-order beliefs, rather than revealing them (Gertler 2011). I sketch responses to both objections.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45898367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Deliberación moral, creencia y aceptación 道德思考、信仰和接受
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2018.279
M. Leclercq
{"title":"Deliberación moral, creencia y aceptación","authors":"M. Leclercq","doi":"10.36446/af.2018.279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.279","url":null,"abstract":"La meta del presente artículo es probar que existen contextos de acción en los que tiene lugar una escisión entre el conocimiento moral de los sujetos y la justificación, también moral, de sus acciones. Para que ello ocurra, según sostendremos, deben darse al menos dos condiciones: el costo de actuar sobre la base de creencias falsas debe ser muy elevado para el bienestar de los afectados y la probabilidad de que tal resultado se produzca efectivamente, aunque baja, debe ser significativa o no trivial. Sostendremos que la escisión entre conocimiento y justificación de la acción referida tiene importantes consecuencias para la estructura de la deliberación moral.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42621023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Los animales entre la mente y el mundo 动物在思想和世界之间
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2018.285
Andrés Crelier
{"title":"Los animales entre la mente y el mundo","authors":"Andrés Crelier","doi":"10.36446/af.2018.285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.285","url":null,"abstract":"El trabajo pone en relación la propuesta filosófica de John McDowell con los estudios recientes sobre cognición animal. La primera sección reconstruye la noción liberalizada de naturaleza desarrollada por este autor en Mente y mundo a partir del umbral representado por las ciencias naturales modernas, y explica luego el lugar que ocupan en ella los animales no humanos. La segunda sección examina dos problemas que posee esta propuesta: su inestabilidad interna y la dificultad para ubicar en ella a los animales no humanos tal como los estudia la etología cognitiva. La tercera sección sostiene que estos problemas no resultan acuciantes si se piensa que la naturaleza liberalizada de McDowell es reencantada desde la etología.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44624880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Manuel García-Carpintero, Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: Una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea, Madrid, Cátedra, 2016, 200 pp. Manuel García-Carpento，讲述作为发明发生的事情：当代小说哲学导论，马德里，主席，2016年，200页。
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2018.287
L. Bucci
{"title":"Manuel García-Carpintero, Relatar lo ocurrido como invención: Una introducción a la filosofía de la ficción contemporánea, Madrid, Cátedra, 2016, 200 pp.","authors":"L. Bucci","doi":"10.36446/af.2018.287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.287","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"38 1","pages":"103-109"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44520359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Instruments, Artifacts and Context 仪器、人工制品和背景
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2018.286
R. Mena
{"title":"Instruments, Artifacts and Context","authors":"R. Mena","doi":"10.36446/af.2018.286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2018.286","url":null,"abstract":"It is notoriously difficult to model the range of application of vague predicates relative to a suitable sorites series. In this paper I offer some critical remarks against an interesting view that has received little attention in the literature. According to it, the sharp cut-offs we find in our semantic models are just artifacts of the theory, and, as such, they are harmless. At the end I discuss a contextualist view that, at a cost, may be able to get around the problems related to sharp cut-offs incurred in by other theories of vagueness.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"38 1","pages":"83-102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48873481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Juan Manuel Durán, Computer Simulations in Science and Engineering: Concepts-Practices-Perspectives, Cham, Springer International, 2018, 209 pp. Juan Manuel Durán，科学与工程中的计算机模拟:概念-实践-视角，Cham，施普林格International, 2018, 209页。
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2019.325
L. Giri
{"title":"Juan Manuel Durán, Computer Simulations in Science and Engineering: Concepts-Practices-Perspectives, Cham, Springer International, 2018, 209 pp.","authors":"L. Giri","doi":"10.36446/af.2019.325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2019.325","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46423885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Regulación emocional como modulación emocional 情绪调节作为情绪调节
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2019-11-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2019.321
A. Paz
{"title":"Regulación emocional como modulación emocional","authors":"A. Paz","doi":"10.36446/af.2019.321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2019.321","url":null,"abstract":"Aunque el estudio de la regulación emocional es un campo de investigación pujante, todavía hay un debate en torno a la noción misma de regulación emocional. Una propuesta muy difundida afirma que la regulación es un proceso de segundo orden que es diferente (y modifica) a la emoción. Esta caracterización ha sido cuestionada sobre la base de que frecuentemente las emociones se regulan a sí mismas por medio de diferentes formas de retroalimentación. La retroalimentación emocional sugiere que la regulación podría ser una forma de control (tal como es caracterizada en la teoría del control). En este trabajo, argumento que ninguna de estas dos caracterizaciones captura todas las aplicaciones pretendidas de la noción y propongo en cambio identificar a la regulación con ‘modulación’. En neurociencia, la modulación es el proceso de cambiar la forma de una relación input-output. Esta es una noción que puede ser aplicada a las diferentes estrategias regulatorias propuestas en la literatura y que es compatible con la regulación de segundo orden y la retroalimentación emocional.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47200688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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