Wittgenstein sin vericuetos

This paper analyses the two main thesis of the recently published Manuel Perez Otero’s book Vericuetos de la filosofia de Wittgenstein: the revision of the general symmetry between actions and omissions as intentional behaviour, and the proposal of a teleological (etiological) dispositional answer to Kripke’s Wittgenstein sceptical challenge about meaning. Concerning the first thesis, we show that the grammar of the attributions of intentions is neutral regarding causal determinism stressing the retrospective character implied by concept of a “justification post hoc”. Regarding the second thesis, we stress that the refusal of internism is not enough to make of teleological dispositions a satisfactory explanation of behaviour. We try to clarify the kind of problem posed by the Kripke’s Wittgenstein meaning scepticism: to abandon the conception that makes of “rule-following” the “praxis of a subject” for another that regards rule-followers as the “subjects of a practice”.