Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2002.13
Christopher J. Neely
{"title":"How Expensive Are Stocks","authors":"Christopher J. Neely","doi":"10.20955/ES.2002.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2002.13","url":null,"abstract":"P eople buy assets, such as stocks, to obtain future income. A firm’s earnings determine its ability to generate income for investors and therefore should influence its stock price. The ratio of a firm’s stock price to its recent earnings—called a P/E ratio—is often used to gauge how expensive a stock is. Because earnings fluctuate and have seasonal patterns, recent earnings are usually summed over the past year to smooth this variation. The upper chart shows that the conventionally calculated P/E ratio for the S&P 500 Composite Index is now unusually high by historical standards. In fact, it is higher than it has been since before World War II. This high P/E ratio implies that stocks are unusually expensive relative to their past values. Many analysts predict that future returns will be low as prices grow slowly—until they get back in line with earnings. But past performance might not be a good guide to the future. If recent earnings have been unusually high or low, they might not accurately forecast future gains; conventional P/E ratios, then, might be misleading. Indeed, the lower chart illustrates that earnings fell precipitously during last year’s recession, which drove up the P/E ratio. There fore it might be more sensible to calculate P/E ratios with a less volatile earnings measure. One such measure that captures the rise in earnings with the size of the economy is an exponential growth trend (see the lower chart). The upper chart shows that the two methods of calculating P/E ratios have usually tracked each other fairly closely because stock prices have typically been more volatile than earnings. One period in which they diverged was 1991-95, when earnings were unusually low, as they are now. While the current P/E ratio calculated using the exponential growth trend is still fairly high by historical standards, it is not as extreme as the P/E ratio calculated from earnings over the last year. Hence, stocks now seem considerably less expensive when one compares their price with the exponential trend for earnings rather than with earnings of only the past year. How Expensive Are Stocks?","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134498006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2004.15
Hui Guo
{"title":"Why do stock prices react to the Fed","authors":"Hui Guo","doi":"10.20955/ES.2004.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2004.15","url":null,"abstract":"Observers of financial markets have noted that monetary policy actions sometimes have a large effect on the equity market; stock prices respond rapidly and positively (negatively) to unexpected monetary easing (tightening), e.g., an unexpected decrease (increase) in the federal funds rate target. This behavior is consistent with rational capital asset pricing models, in which a stock’s price is equal to the discounted future cash flow of income to the owner of the stock. That is, many financial economists argue that, if the equity premium—the rate of return that investors demand on stocks relative to the risk-free rate of interest—is approximately constant, a monetary tightening raises the risk-free rate and thus the discount rate, which in turn lowers stock prices. Alternatively, a monetary tightening might lower stock prices by adversely affecting future cash flows. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show that this effect can be important if (i) firms have insufficient internally generated funds to finance new projects and (ii) external funds are more expensive than internal funds.1 In particular, they argue that the premium on external funds is negatively related to a firm’s collateral or net worth. Therefore, a monetary tightening, by reducing net worth, increases the cost of external financing and forces liquidity-constrained firms to operate at lower scale. A distinct implication of this credit channel of monetary transmission is that monetary policy has a greater impact on small firms than on large firms because small firms usually have less retained earnings and thus are more vulnerable to adverse liquidity shocks. Also, the effect should be more pronounced during economic recessions, when liquidity is scarce, than during economic expansions, when liquidity is generally more abundant. Therefore, we would expect stock prices of small firms to respond more strongly to monetary innovations than those of large firms during econ omic downturns, although not necessarily during economic upturns. Guo (forthcoming) analyzes the stock market reaction to unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate target in the periods 1974-79 and 19882000.2 In the 1990s, the United States enjoyed the longest economic expansion since World War II. Business conditions were not so favorable in the late 1970s: The U.S. economy suffered from a severe recession and high inflation after the 1973 oil crisis and stock prices fell steeply as well. Thus, these two periods provide an opportunity to investigate the asymmetric effect of monetary policy on equity prices. The accompanying chart plots the average response of stock prices to an unanticipated 1-percentage-point increase in the federal funds rate for stock portfolios formed on market capitalization, ranging from the smallest stocks (decile 1) to the largest stocks (decile 10). As expected, all stock portfolios reacted negatively to a monetary tightening in both periods. Interestingly, the absolute value of the response d","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115180844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2006.13
{"title":"Gas-price inflation","authors":"","doi":"10.20955/ES.2006.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2006.13","url":null,"abstract":"During April 2006 the retail price of gasoline increased from $2.73 to $2.97 per gallon.1 Analysts sometimes play down consumers’ concerns about the high prices of gas by noting that in real terms, i.e., relative to other goods and services, gas is still relatively cheap compared with prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the recent increases in the prices of oil and gas undermine this argument. The consumer price index (CPI) for all items provides a measure of prices of all goods and services. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also publishes consumer price indices for expenditure categories, including one for gasoline. The green line in the chart tracks the real price of gasoline since 1967, i.e., the ratio of the CPI for gasoline to the CPI for all items. Even disregarding the September 2005 spike due to Hurricane Katrina, it is clear that gas has become more and more expensive with respect to other goods since 2003. The real gas price has not yet reached record high levels, but it is above the longrun average and comparable to mid-1980s levels. Gasoline price inflation tracks closely the growth rate of the price of oil, and the price of oil in the week of April 21 crossed the $70 per barrel threshold.2 The high oil price is the result of sustained world demand, at a time when several factors restrain the supply of oil. The world demand for oil is fueled by sustained growth in oilhungry China and India, sustained demand from the United States, and Japan’s recovery. On the supply side, the oil industry does not have much spare capacity. Any disruption, due for example to the war in Iraq, rising tensions with Iran, civil unrest in Nigeria, risk of expropriation of foreign oil companies in Venezuela or Bolivia, would be reflected immediately in higher spot oil prices. Futures prices suggest that the prices of oil and gasoline are likely to remain high in the medium term. Even if the real price of gasoline is high by historical standards, and trending toward record levels, the trend will have to be sustained for quite some time before U.S. consumers trade in their existing stock of vehicles for smaller and more fuel-efficient cars. The fraction of personal consumption expenditures spent on gasoline (as shown by the black line in the chart) is on the rise, but close to its historical average (3.7 percent) and much lower than the 6 percent peak in the early 1980s.3","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"262 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122655915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2007.13
Rajdeep Sengupta, William. R. Emmons
{"title":"What is subprime lending","authors":"Rajdeep Sengupta, William. R. Emmons","doi":"10.20955/ES.2007.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2007.13","url":null,"abstract":"Mortgage loans are typically classified as either prime or subprime, depending on their credit risk—the risk that a borrower will default on the loan. Interest rates are higher on subprime mortgages, reflecting their higher credit risk. However, despite its common usage, the primesubprime distinction is not clear-cut and there is still some confusion regarding a precise characterization of subprime lending. Some agencies characterize subprime lending in terms of lender practices. For example, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) uses Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data and interviews with lenders themselves to identify lenders that specialize in subprime mortgages. This approach raises the obvious query: Why not simply look for lenders that make high-priced mortgages? One problem lies in the fact that HMDA reports did not include interest rate data prior to 2004. Moreover, HUD argues that a high average mortgage interest rate is neither a necessary nor a sufficient characteristic of subprime lending.1 HUD has published a list of subprime lenders annually since 1993, with 210 lenders on the 2005 list. It notes that, in contrast to prime lenders, subprime specialists typically (i) have fewer originations, (ii) have a higher share of refinance loans as a proportion of total originations, and (iii) sell a smaller percentage of their portfolios to the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Importantly, HUD notes that some prime lenders originate a significant number of subprime loans and some subprime lenders also originate prime loans. A second approach to identifying subprime lending is to focus on borrower attributes, regardless of the lender involved. In a joint proposal to provide expanded guidance to institutions that engage in subprime lending, the federal bank and thrift supervisory agencies—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Super vision—specify that “subprime” refers to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers. They characterize subprime borrowers as those who display, among other characteristics, (i) a previous record of delinquency, foreclosure, or bankruptcy, (ii) a low credit score, and (iii) a debt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater. Again, this checklist includes the caveat that the “list is illustrative rather than exhaustive and is not meant to define specific parameters for all subprime borrowers.”2 Clearly, a precise characterization of subprime lending is elusive. The difficulty lies in that, unlike prime mortgages, subprime mortgages are not homogenous. Indeed, each underwriter independently evaluates the credit risk on the mortgage which, in addition to borrower-specific attributes, depends also on the terms of the loan contract. Therefore, a third (and perhaps simpler) way might be to define a prime mortgage an","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129744305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How effective is monetary policy","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2003.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2003.1","url":null,"abstract":"T he sluggish recoveries from the past two recessions suggest that monetary policy might have limited impact on economic activity. The figure below shows that the Fed reduced its policy instrument—the effective federal funds rate—by 525 basis points during each recession. During the most recent recession, the Fed was preemptive, reducing the effective funds rate in advance of the business cycle peak. Moreover, the Fed was aggressive, reducing the effective funds rate 475 basis points in the span of a year. Uncertainty about the strength of the expansion caused the Fed to reduce the rate an additional 50 basis points in November 2002—bringing the federal funds rate to it lowest level since the mid to late 1950s. In both recession episodes the economy’s response to the Fed’s aggressive policy actions appears to have been anemic. Economic activity coming out of the 1990-91 recession was weak relative to previous post-WWII recessions. The same is true of economic activity after the recent recession—which, indeed, may be somewhat weaker. Why is it that monetary policy appears to have produced such modest results? One possibility is that the Fed’s actions have had only a limited effect on long-term interest rates. According to the standard view of the monetary transmission process, monetary policy affects real economic activity by changing interest rates; but it is long-term rates that are important for spending decisions (especially investment) and not short-term rates, which are more directly affected by policy actions. While there are several reasons why the Fed’s ability to influence spending through the interest rate channel may be limited, recent experience suggests that the Fed’s inability to directly affect long-term rates may be important. The figure shows that despite the Fed’s aggressive policy actions during the two recent recessions, long-term rates, illustrated by Moody’s Aaa bond yield, declined only modestly. Bond yields declined much less than the funds rate during both recessions and during the specific months over which the effective funds rate was cut. The decline in bond yields was smaller during the recent recession, suggesting that the more aggressive policy actions this time around had a smaller impact on long-term yields.1 Why long-term rates responded only modestly to these policy actions is unclear. The conventional wisdom is that monetary policy affects long-term rates by changing the market’s expectation for future short-term rates. Hence, it could be that market participants expected the reduction in the funds rate to be relatively short-lived. However, the effective funds rate remained more than 200 basis points below its pre-recession peak for nearly a decade after the 1991 trough. Of course, long-term rates may be determined by factors other than simply the market’s expectation for short-term rates. Whatever the explanation, recent policy actions appear to have had only a limited impact on longterm yields, which affect ","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127422383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"U.S. currency at home and abroad","authors":"R. Anderson, Marcela M. Williams","doi":"10.20955/ES.2007.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2007.6","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Despite the increasing use of electronic payments and credit cards, currency remains the most familiar medium for face-to-face transactions in the U.S. economy. In addition, U.S. currency, more than any other of the world’s currencies, is widely held as a store of value and used as a medium of exchange outside its home country. The chart shows the currency component of M1 and the Federal Reserve Board staff’s estimates of U.S. currency held by the rest of the world. In 2005, approximately 50 percent of all U.S. currency in circulation, or about $350 billion, was held outside the United States. U.S. currency is an attractive asset to residents of nations with political or economic uncertainty. Much of the recent growth in demand for U.S. currency has been in countries of the former Soviet Union and Latin America. Indeed, anecdotal press reports tell of Moscow taxi drivers insisting to be paid in U.S. dollars rather than rubles. Other stories tell of merchants in the most remote areas of China accepting—and giving change in—U.S. banknotes. The extensive, widespread use of U.S. currency benefits American taxpayers because, unlike Treasury bonds, the currency is a liability of the Treasury on which no interest is paid.1 The use of the banknotes also is a social and economic benefit to the residents of foreign countries who might otherwise lack a currency that is stable in value and widely accepted in transactions. This same popularity also is a curse, encouraging counterfeiting of U.S. banknotes. Despite the temptation and potential profit from counterfeiting, the Treasury and Federal Reserve estimate that the frequency of counterfeiting is low, approximately 1 note in 10,000 both in the United States and abroad. At Federal Reserve cash offices, during 2005, $100 denominations had the highest frequency of counterfeit notes, at 44.1 notes per million processed, followed by $10 denominations, at 7.8 notes per million. Overall, 6.4 counterfeit notes were detected per million notes processed.2 Technological innovations in color copying, scanning, and printing have intensified the race between increasingly sophisticated banknote counterfeiters and government banknote designers. Perhaps the most difficult-toduplicate counterfeit deterrence feature of U.S. banknotes is its unique yellow-green paper. Combined with intaglioprinted images and numerals, U.S. currency has a unique “feel,” which surveys have reported is the most common method of counterfeit detection by the public and bank employees. Other features include magnetic ink, large detailed presidential portraits, color-shifting ink in the front lower-right corner of notes (the color of which differs by denomination), watermarks, security threads that glow different colors under ultraviolet light, microprinting, subtle shades of color overprinted on the front and reverse, and embedded machinereadable features. ","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126343498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are banks vulnerable to a housing bust","authors":"David C. Wheelock","doi":"10.20955/ES.2006.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2006.3","url":null,"abstract":"House prices in the United States have soared over the past five years. A common measure of the trend in house prices is the repeat sales index produced by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. Accord ing to this measure, between 2001:Q1 and 2005:Q3, U.S. house prices increased by an average of 40 percent in nominal terms and 29 percent relative to the consumer price index (excluding the shelter component of the index). This rapid appreciation has led some analysts to forecast a correction in real house prices—possibly even a decline in nominal prices. A decline in house prices would reduce household wealth, which could restrain the growth of consumer expenditures and overall economic activity. Mortgage default rates could increase sharply if a decline in house prices were accompanied by slower growth of household income or rising interest rates. Furthermore, a decline in house prices would reduce the value of collateral behind the $8 trillion residential mortgage debt market and would thereby increase the losses lenders experience on loan defaults. The popularity of nontraditional mortgage loans, such as interest-only loans and adjustable-rate loans that permit negative amortization (“option ARMS”), raises additional concern about default risk because such loans expose borrowers to more interest-rate and house-price risk than traditional fixed-rate, amortizing loans. How exposed are banks to residential real estate? As a share of their total assets, commercial bank holdings of residential real estate loans and securities have risen markedly since the mid-1990s. For example, between 1999:Q1 and 2005:Q1, the sum of bank holdings of 1-to-4-family residential real estate loans and the market value of their holdings of mortgage-backed securities (excluding those issued or guaranteed by a government agency or governmentsponsored enterprise, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) increased from about 15 percent of total bank assets to nearly 20 percent. More comprehensive measures that include all residential real estate loans show similar increases in exposure, as does the ratio of untapped home equity lines of credit to total bank assets. These simple exposure measures provide little information, however, about whether banks today are more vulnerable to a decline in house prices than they were in the past. Although the share of bank assets consisting of residential real estate loans and securities has increased since 1999, so too has bank equity-capital relative to total bank assets. Between 1999:Q1 and 2005:Q1, equity-capital increased from 8.5 percent of total bank assets to 9.9 percent of total assets. Because capital serves as a cushion against loan and security losses, the increase in real estate loans and securities as a share of bank assets is less worrisome than it would have otherwise been. The national averages, of course, mask considerable variation across banks in their holdings of residential real estate loans and securities a","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124093945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2008.21
R. Anderson, Charles S. Gascon
{"title":"Fueling expected inflation","authors":"R. Anderson, Charles S. Gascon","doi":"10.20955/ES.2008.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2008.21","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Maintaining expectations of a low, stable inflation rate is essential to achieving the goals of monetary policy. But how, exactly, do households and firms form inflation expectations? It seems reasonable that rapidly rising prices for frequently purchased goods would attract more notice than stable prices for goods purchased less frequently. Recent correlations between increases in gasoline prices and in inflation expectations provide an example. Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke cited this risk in his July 15 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: “...the currently high level of inflation, if sustained, might lead the public to revise up its expectations for longer-term inflation. If that were to occur, and those revised expectations were to become embedded in the domestic wageand price-setting process, we could see an unwelcome rise in actual inflation over the longer term. A critical responsibility of monetary policy makers is to prevent that process from taking hold.”1 During 2008, through June, the U.S. all-items CPI increased at a 5.4 percent rate, while the chain-price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased at a 3.3 percent pace. The comparable “core” measures that exclude food and energy increased at 2.3 percent and 1.9 percent rates, respectively. By some measures, inflation expectations increased as well. In the University of Michigan’s household survey, the median expected inflation rate for the next 12 months increased from 3.4 percent in the December 2007 survey to 5.1 percent in the July 2008 survey, its secondhighest level since 1981, just below May’s 5.2 percent figure. Although the survey’s median expected inflation rate for the next 5 to 10 years changed little, from 3.1 percent in December to 3.2 percent in July, it is at its second-highest level since 1995, just below May and June’s 3.4 percent figures. These increases seem incongruous with the 1.9 percent rate of increase of the chain-price index for core PCE, the FOMC’s preferred inflation measure. Linkages between commodity prices and inflation expectations also are a concern in Europe. In the United Kingdom, the all-items CPI increased 0.7 percent in June and is 3.8 percent higher than one year earlier, the largest year-over-year increase since June 1992. The core CPI, however, was up only 1.6 percent year-over-year. Accord ing to the YouGov/Citicorp survey, inflation expected during the next 12 months jumped to 4.6 percent in June from 4.1 percent in May. Similarly, inflation expected for the next 50 years (inferred from inflation-indexed gilt bonds) rose to 4 percent. In the euro area, June consumer price inflation was at a 4 percent annual rate, double the European Central Bank’s (ECB) desired rate; on July 3, the ECB raised its benchmark interest rate to 4.25 percent. Press reports cited concern that inflation expectations were increasing. Increases in gas","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125216312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2004.28
R. Anderson, Jason J. Buol, R. Rasche
{"title":"A neutral federal funds rate","authors":"R. Anderson, Jason J. Buol, R. Rasche","doi":"10.20955/ES.2004.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2004.28","url":null,"abstract":"The stance of monetary policy with respect to aggregate demand is widely measured in terms of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) federal funds rate target. Too low a target, it is suggested, will cause the Open Market Desk to inject too much liquidity, “overstimulating” aggregate demand and increasing the inflation rate. Too high a target will result in undue pressures on liquidity, unnecessarily high market interest rates, and slower-thandesired economic activity. Like Goldilocks exploring the three bears’ forest home, many analysts appear to believe there exists a “just right,” or neutral, target between the two extremes. But what exactly is a neutral monetary policy and is it possible to achieve it? A neutral level of the federal funds rate often is discussed as having two properties. First, it is a level that neither stimulates nor slows output relative to potential. Second, it is a moving target that varies from one period to another. But such a characterization raises an interesting question: If the neutral rate changes frequently, can it be measured accurately and does the concept have any value for policymakers? Arguments for the existence of a steady-state neutral federal funds rate frequently begin with the assertion that the historical record suggests bounds for the neutral rate, say, greater than 1 percent and less than 10 percent, and that the task is to narrow that range, perhaps to a single number. One oftmade claim is that the neutral rate, in the long run, should equal the sum of the growth rate of potential real GDP plus the target inflation rate. The Congressional Budget Office projects that real potential GDP will grow at approximately a 3.1 percent rate during 2004-05, with similar growth rates in later years. If measured inflation is to be in the neighborhood of 2 percent with no expectation of an increase or decrease, then a neutral funds rate target might be slightly greater than 5 percent. This analysis, however, does not allow for the typical upward slope of yield curves—that is, for a positive term premium. Macroeconomic steady-state growth models often assume a horizontal yield curve, thereby excluding such a premium. In financial markets, however, yields on longer-term assets typically are higher than those on shorterterm assets. To estimate a neutral overnight federal funds rate target, we need to isolate the maturity-related term premium from the inflation-related risk premium that is included in longer-maturity yields as a result of uncertainty regarding future inflation. One possibility is to observe maturity-related Treasury rate spreads during a period when market participants expect future inflation rates to be approximately unchanged from their then-current pace. The figure shows the rate spread between the 10-year Treasury constant-maturity yield and the bond-equivalent yield on 3-month Treasury bills. It seems likely that the inflation-uncertainty risk premium was approximately zero during th","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"13 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120980871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}