Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2003.10
David C. Wheelock
{"title":"Replacement windows: new credit programs at the discount window","authors":"David C. Wheelock","doi":"10.20955/ES.2003.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2003.10","url":null,"abstract":"T he Federal Reserve lends directly to commercial banks and other depository institutions (hereafter “banks”) through its discount window. Such lending helps ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system and serves as a backup source of short-term funding for banks. On January 9, 2003, the Federal Reserve introduced new lending programs designed to better accomplish these functions. The Fed replaced its previous programs, “adjustment” and “extended” credit, with “primary” and “secondary” credit programs. (The “seasonal” credit program remains unchanged.) The new programs differ from their predecessors in several respects, the most significant of which are (i) that the interest rates charged for primary and secondary credit are set above the prevailing rate for federal funds and (ii) that banks ordinarily face few, if any, restrictions on their use of primary credit.1 Traditionally, the Fed’s discount rate was set below the market rate for federal funds. The volume of outstanding discount loans was ordinarily small, however, because the Federal Reserve prohibited banks from using discount window loans to finance sales of federal funds or for otherwise expanding their assets. Banks also were thought to be reluctant to borrow from the discount window because of a stigma associated with such borrowing. The chart shows the levels of the discount rate and market federal funds rate, as well as discount window borrowing as a percentage of total reserves, for 1987-2002. Except for a brief surge in borrowing after September 11, 2001, discount loans rarely exceeded 1 percent of total banking system reserves in these years, even though the discount rate was almost always less than the funds rate. In contrast to adjustment and extended credit, primary credit may be used for any purpose, including financing the sale of federal funds, and banks are no longer required to seek funds from alternative sources before requesting a discount window loan. Primary credit, however, is available only to sound banks—generally those with adequate capital and supervisory ratings for safety and soundness (i.e., CAMELS composite ratings of 1, 2, or 3). Secondary credit is intended for banks that are not eligible for primary credit, and may not be used to fund an expansion of a bank’s assets. The primary credit lending rate is set above the Federal Open Market Committee’s target federal funds rate, and the secondary credit rate is set above the primary credit rate. Thus, the discount window should serve only as a backup source of funds for banks, as sound banks ordinarily will choose to obtain short-term funds less expensively from the federal funds market or other market sources. Indeed, the primary credit rate is expected to cap the market funds rate. By introducing a separate lending program for sound banks and imposing few restrictions on the use of primary credit, however, the Fed has likely minimized banks’ reluctance to borrow from the discount window. Hence, the new cr","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114647651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2005.28
J. Bullard
{"title":"Understanding the Inflation Targeting Debate","authors":"J. Bullard","doi":"10.20955/ES.2005.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2005.28","url":null,"abstract":"The nomination of Ben Bernanke to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has rekindled a smoldering debate in U.S. monetary policy circles—namely, whether the Federal Reserve should join the ranks of the world’s inflation targeting central banks. “Inflation targeting” is a sometimes nebulous phrase used to describe a monetary policy style which, at its heart, has the central bank setting an explicit, long-run, numeric target for inflation. Beginning in the 1990s, several countries in the world, perhaps most prominently the United Kingdom, formally began inflation targeting. Bernanke is on the record favoring inflation targeting, while outgoing Chairman Alan Greenspan has been opposed. One particularly relevant summary of this debate occurred at the conference “Inflation Targeting: Prospects and Problems,” held at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in October 2003.1 At that conference, Bernanke, then a Fed Governor, participated in a panel discussion with Fed Governor Donald Kohn and European Central Bank (ECB) Executive Board member Otmar Issing. Governor Kohn, like Chairman Greenspan, has generally been opposed to inflation targeting. The ECB, the central bank most like the Fed in size and influence, has wrestled with inflation targeting issues since its inception in 1998. Thus, the panel provided an opportunity to debate the pros and cons of inflation targeting. What were the main arguments? In his discussion, Bernanke stated that he felt there was an optimal, long-run inflation rate (OLIR) “that achieves the best average economic performance over time with respect to both the inflation and output objectives” [p. 166]. There would be no drawback, in Bernanke’s view, to announcing an explicit target in the neighborhood of 2 percent, provided the FOMC makes no particular commitment to a timetable for reaching the OLIR. This last proviso would make sure that there were “no unwanted constraints on short-run monetary policy” [p. 167]. In suggesting a numerical target near 2 percent, Bernanke emphasized that very low levels of inflation are generally preferred, but not so low that the FOMC would face an unacceptably high risk of encountering the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, as has occurred in Japan over the past decade. The ECB experience is perhaps only cold comfort for the United States. Issing stressed that euro-zone monetary policy has been implemented only since 1999 and that many of the issues surrounding the introduction of the euro are special. Still, the ECB Governing Council did successfully introduce the new currency after adopting price stability as a main objective. The Council stated that it would strive to maintain a euro-zone inflation rate “below but close to 2 percent over the medium term” [p. 175]. Issing, like Bernanke, felt that 2 percent was reasonable in part because “a sufficient safety margin against the risk of deflation” [p. 175] was needed. Issing also emphasized that inflation targeting approaches ofte","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126184158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2008.29
Edward Nelson
{"title":"The great recapitalization","authors":"Edward Nelson","doi":"10.20955/ES.2008.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2008.29","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. On October 14, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced a voluntary Capital Purchase Program intended to increase the flow of financing to U.S. businesses and consumers. Under the program, the Treasury will inject capital directly into the banking system by purchasing senior preferred equity shares from certain depository financial institutions. Historical precedents exist for these measures, including the bolstering of bank capital with U.S. government funds by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the 1930s and the recapitalization of banks by governments in the Nordic countries in the 1990s. This new Treasury recapitalization program is simply the latest policy action of its kind, implemented to respond to recent changes in market perceptions of the risks facing the U.S. banking sector. During the past several decades, U.S. commercial banks have diversified, continually moving away from their traditional deposit-taking and lending business into lending that is not financed by deposits or by other bank liabilities. Beginning in the 1970s, securitization permitted banks to originate and sell loans, rather than holding loans on their balance sheets. Banks developed new instruments—such as leveraged loans and guarantees on commercial paper—that allowed participation in commercial lending without on-balance-sheet intermediation. This trend was accelerated, to some extent, by the incentive to avoid new regulations and increased capital requirements. The innovations were widely regarded as effectively strengthening the banking system. For example, a 2003 analysis observed that “the improvements in risk management offered by securitization, loan syndication, and hedging via derivatives instruments have helped banks shed unwanted risks.”1 Recent financial turmoil has strained bank balance sheets and called into question previous opinion on how securitization would affect bank risk. Many highly leveraged loans became unmarketable. Contingent liabilities, such as letters of credit, became burdensome as banks found themselves obliged to bring onto their balance sheets these securities whose market prices were substantially below the original values. House price declines called into question the value of mortgage-based derivatives, while the government conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as the Lehman Brothers collapse, meant that banks incurred losses on their investments in these institutions. The deteriorating outlook has led financial institutions to become more conservative in their loan-making policies and more prudent overall: Banks are rebuilding their capital at the same time that equity price declines have damaged their capital base. One clear result of the retrenchment of banks and the deterioration of balance sheets is the high spread on interest rates on interbank loans (which have risen) over returns on Treasury securities (which have ","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116327021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2002.15
R. Gilbert, Sarosh Khan
{"title":"The condition of banks: what are examiners finding?","authors":"R. Gilbert, Sarosh Khan","doi":"10.20955/ES.2002.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2002.15","url":null,"abstract":"B ank supervisory agencies use on-site examinations to measure the condition of banks. Federal law requires these agencies to examine each bank at least once every 18 months. Most of these examinations assess six aspects of a bank’s operations: capital protection (C), asset quality (A), manage ment competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S). Accord ing to this CAMELS system, a bank receives a rating of 1 (best) through 5 (worst) on each of these six aspects as well as a composite rating. Composite CAMELS ratings of 1 or 2 indicate that supervisors consider a bank to be in sound condition. Supervisors use a CAMELS 3 rating for banks that exhibit some degree of concern in one or more areas; a rating of 4 or 5 indicates more serious problems. While the CAMELS ratings assigned to individual banks are confidential, comparison of CAMELS ratings across all banks over time may provide useful information about the condition of U.S. banks as a whole. The percentage of banks rated below CAMELS 1 or 2 was substantially higher during 1991 (a recession year) than during recent recessionary quarters. In the first quarter of 1991, 17.8 percent of banks had CAMELS ratings of 3 and 10.1 percent had ratings of 4 or 5. In the first quarter of 2002, in contrast, 6.2 percent of banks had CAMELS ratings of 3 and 1.5 percent had ratings of 4 or 5. The CAMELS rating of a bank at a given point in time reflects the results of an examination con ducted sometime during the prior 18 months. The figure indicates the extent to which examiners identified problems during exams conducted in each quarter since 1987. For each quarter, the denominator of the ratio plotted in the figure is the number of banks that entered the quarter with a CAMELS 1 or 2 rating and were subject to examinations begun during that quarter. The numer ator is the number of these banks that received CAMELS ratings of 3, 4, or 5 on those examinations begun during that quarter. The shaded areas are recession periods. CAMELS ratings downgrades from 1 or 2 to a 3, 4, or 5 have been much less frequent since March 2001, the peak of the last expansion, than during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The percentage of banks down graded in a quarter rose to just over 10 percent during the recession of the early 1990s, peaking at about 11 percent in the fourth quarter of 1990. In contrast, the downgrade percentage was just above 2 percent during 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. By this indicator, most banks continue to be in sound condition. The conclusion is unchanged if we weight the banks examined in each quarter according to their assets. Thus, the percentage of banks currently rated below CAMELS 2 is low by standards of recent years—and especially low by standards of the prior recession period. The Condition of Banks: What Are Examiners Finding?","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116514895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2003.25
Michael R. Pakko
{"title":"Monetary policy in jobless recoveries","authors":"Michael R. Pakko","doi":"10.20955/ES.2003.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2003.25","url":null,"abstract":"T he relatively slow pace of economic growth during the current recovery—particularly the sluggish performance of labor markets—has inspired numerous comparisons to the “jobless” recovery that followed the 1990-91 recession. While there are some striking similarities between the two episodes, each recession is unique and one should not carry comparisons too far. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider similarities and differences in the responses of monetary policy during the two recoveries. Based on the official dating by the National Bureau of Economic Research, both the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions lasted for eight months. Both recessions were relatively mild compared with previous economic downturns, and both were followed by recoveries that did not display the typical rapid bounce-back in growth and employment. Following the business cycle trough of March 1991, cumulative growth in private nonfarm payroll employment remained negative for 18 months. Similarly, cumulative employment growth during the 21 months since the November 2001 turning point has also been negative. By at least one measure, the stance of monetary policy during these recession/recovery periods has been similar as well. The chart shows a measure of the “real” federal funds rate—the spread between the federal funds rate target established by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the inflation rate, measured here as the previous 12-month change in the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. This measure shows that the FOMC progressively eased policy during both recessions. In the periods following these recessions, the real federal funds rate ultimately declined to below zero and remained near zero for several months. The chart also shows an important difference in the real funds rate behavior: During the most recent recession, the FOMC lowered the federal funds rate target more rapidly than it did in the previous recession. Between July 1990 and March 1991 the funds rate target was reduced eight times for a cumulative total of 225 basis points. A series of further small rate cuts lowered the funds rate an additional 2 percentage points by the end of 1991, bringing the real federal funds rate down to zero. Three more rate cuts followed in 1992, which maintained a real funds rate near zero as inflation declined. During the more recent recession, the FOMC also reduced the funds rate target eight times, but in larger increments. Rate cuts in March through November 2001 reduced the target by 350 basis points, bringing the real funds rate close to zero by the trough of the recession. Addi tional rate cuts in December 2001, November 2002, and June 2003 reduced the funds rate another percentage point. The timing and magnitude of policy changes during these two episodes are significant because monetary policy is thought to affect the economy with a lag. Ultimately, the sluggish recovery of the early 1990s gave way to the rapid expansion later in the decade, b","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124513255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2008.13
Edward Nelson
{"title":"Commercial bank balance sheets rebalanced","authors":"Edward Nelson","doi":"10.20955/ES.2008.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2008.13","url":null,"abstract":"United States Treasury bill rates have declined to below 1 percent, and the spread between those rates and the federal funds rate has widened. Both effects are evidence of financial institutions’ “flight to safety” since the subprime crisis hit financial markets in August 2007. By bidding away very liquid Treasuries from households and other firms, financial institutions have put upward pressure on the prices—and thus downward pressure on the yields—of these short-term Treasuries. One anomalous aspect of this flight to safety is that, unlike other financial institutions, depository institutions (commercial banks) have not been increasing their holdings of Treasuries over the past several months (see upper chart).1 Moreover, commercial bank holdings of Treasuries have not risen as a proportion of their aggregate balance sheet, which is shown by expressing these assets as a percentage of banks’ total (M2) deposit liabilities. Commercial banks on the whole have not flocked to U.S. government securities, in part, because new developments oblige them to move more of their off-balance-sheet activities onto their balance sheet; as a result, commercial banks have taken on non-government securities formerly held by other institutions. For example, Chairman Bernanke has noted that many banks initially served in underwriting or advisory roles for subprime mortgage arrangements overseen by other institutions: “As the problems with these facilities multiplied,” he observed, “banks came under increasing pressure to rescue the investment vehicles they sponsored... by taking the assets of the off-balance-sheet vehicles onto their own balance sheets.”2 In short, commercial banks have dramatically increased their holdings of “other” (non-Treasury) securities and in turn have had to reduce their holdings of Treasuries to make room for this accumulation (see lower chart). So, the increase in Treasury holdings in the financial system from August 2007 to March 2008 was predominantly due to purchases by non-depository U.S. financial institutions and foreign financial institutions. It remains to be seen what effect this rebalancing will have on commercial banks’ investment and lending policies in the longer term.","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114998179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2005.21
D. Thornton
{"title":"The monetary policy transmission mechanism","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2005.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2005.21","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Despite the fact that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has increased its target for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points at each of its previous ten meetings, and markets anticipate still further increases, the 10-year Treasury yield has remained largely unchanged. (See p. 9.) Chairman Greenspan recently suggested that the behavior of long-term rates in the face of such changes in the funds rate is “clearly without precedent in our recent experience.”1 In his final speech before leaving the Fed, former Governor Ben Bernanke gave an explanation for this “unprecedented” experience. Specifically, Bernanke provides strong evidence that “the relatively low level of long-term real interest rates in the world today” is the result of structural change over the past decade that “has created a significant increase in the global supply of saving—a global saving glut.”2 One possible implication of Bernanke’s analysis is that domestic real long-term interest rates are determined in a global market, whereas short-term interest rates are determined in domestic markets by monetary policy actions. If real long-term yields are determined in the global market, the core real rate in each country would be the same. Crosscountry differences would be due to idiosyncratic risk factors. This possibility is supported by the fact that the inflation index yields on long-term bonds in the United States, France, and the United Kingdom have been relatively close to each other and behaved similarly in recent years. (See p. 11.) The possibility that domestic real long-term interest rates are segmented from domestic short-term rates has strong implications for perhaps the most widely held theory of the monetary policy transmission mechanism—the interest rate channel of monetary policy. The interest rate channel of monetary policy exists if monetary policy actions affect interest rates that cause individuals and businesses to alter their spending decisions that, in turn, bring about changes in output and prices. While consumption accounts for more than two thirds of gross domestic product (GDP), it is relatively stable over time and is thought to be relatively insensitive to changes in interest rates. In contrast, GDP’s most variable component, investment, is thought to be more interest sensitive. Investment spending might be more sensitive to long-term interest rates than to short-term rates, such as the overnight federal funds rate, which the FOMC targets. The crucial link between the federal funds rate and the long-term rate is the expectations hypothesis (EH), which states that at each point in time the long-term rate is equal to the average of the shortterm rate expected to prevail over the maturity of the long-term asset plus a constant risk premium. If the EH is correct, policymakers affect long-term rates by changing current and expected future short-term rates. There ","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116261403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2006.18
Jeremy Piger
{"title":"Is all that talk just noise","authors":"Jeremy Piger","doi":"10.20955/ES.2006.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2006.18","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Announcements by the Federal Reserve regarding its target value for the federal funds rate garner substantial attention from the media and participants in financial markets. Indeed, there is evidence that the “news” in these announcements, or the deviation of the targeted funds rate from market expectations, affects the price of assets traded in various financial markets, most notably those for equities and bonds. In recent years, however, communication from the Federal Reserve has increasingly included not just policy decisions on where to set the federal funds rate, but also many forms of non-quantitative communication: that is, the written statement released following meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee; testimony by Federal Reserve officials, particularly the Chairman, before Congress; and speeches made by Federal Reserve governors and regional Reserve Bank presidents. I discuss here some evidence regarding whether this large amount of written and verbal communication is also deemed important by market participants for valuing financial assets. This would be the case if buyers and sellers believed that Federal Reserve talk was informative about the direction of future policy, conveying information that should influence market expectations. In addition, market participants may value Federal Reserve talk if they believe it conveys some new information about the state of the economy. A difficulty in evaluating the market effects of Federal Reserve talk is obtaining a quantitative measure of the content of qualitative communication. One approach is to construct such a measure through a subjective reading of the text. However, this approach may be contaminated by the biases of the researcher and is cumbersome when there is a large amount of text to analyze. In a recent study, Michelle Bligh and Gregory Hess of The Claremont Colleges take a different approach based on “content analysis.” Content analysis assesses the prevalence of words in a text that match those in predetermined word lists created by linguists. For example, lists that contain words that express “optimism” or “pessimism” can be used to characterize the optimistic or pessimistic tone of any piece of text. Using this approach, Bligh and Hess study the effects of a variety of written and verbal communications by Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve Chairman, over the period 1999-2004. They find that the language used by Chairman Greenspan had significant predictive power for a number of financial variables. In particular, this language was a significant predictor of equity prices as well as shortand long-term interest rates in the days immediately following the communication, with the most sustained effects occurring in Treasury bond yields. Interestingly, all the forms of non-quantitative communication they analyzed, including statements, testimony, and speeches, had some amou","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123473513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2009.11
Kevin L. Kliesen
{"title":"Putting the financial crisis and lending activity in a broader context","authors":"Kevin L. Kliesen","doi":"10.20955/ES.2009.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2009.11","url":null,"abstract":"Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. Some economists, policymakers, and pundits view the financial turmoil that began in August 2007 as the worst financial shock to the U.S. economy since the end of World War II. Some even assert that it amounts to the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve and other government agencies have taken aggressive actions to support the financial system and spur economic growth. Other economists and analysts, citing continued modest loan growth and relatively few bank failures last year (compared with, say, the late 1980s and early 1990s), do not share this view. Regard less, many banks have announced sharp earnings declines, and the possibility of further financial losses looms large. A well-functioning financial sector is crucial to the perfor mance of the U.S. economy. In a market-based economy, the financial sector channels the supply of funds from savers to the demands of borrowers, which supports the wealth-creating abilities of the entrepreneurial sector. At the same time, the perfor mance of the financial sector also depends crucially on the health of the U.S. economy. Typically, growth of loans and leases at commercial banks declines sharply before a recession. Clearly, bank actions to limit the credit supply can exacerbate an economic downturn. For example, banks typically tighten credit standards and/or loan terms as the economy weakens and nonperforming loans increase. But an adverse shock from outside the financial sector can be just as important—such as a sharp increase in oil prices or a plunge in house prices. Such shocks also slow the demand for credit because of weaker future growth of incomes and profits. In large and open economies, forces that trigger changes in the supply and demand for credit are often synchronized and difficult to distinguish. Thus, it is not surprising that bank loans slowed when GDP growth slowed: When GDP averaged 2.7 percent for 2004-07, the growth of bank loans averaged 11.4 percent per year; when GDP fell slightly in 2008, growth of bank loans slowed to 5.6 percent. Most forecasters expect recessionary conditions through the first half of 2009, so continued weak growth of bank loans is likely. Indeed, in the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions, the yearto-year percentage decline in bank loans did not reach a trough until February 1993 and March 2002, respectively. Other factors have weakened household and business spending in the current recession and thus have adversely affected the supply and demand for bank loans. A 52 percent drop in the S&P 500 stock price index from October 9, 2007, to November 20, 2008, accompanied the oil shock and fall in house prices. Accord ingly, household net worth (financial and tangible net wealth) fell by about $7 trillion between 2007:Q2 and 2008:Q3. Another key factor has been the simultaneous slowing in economic growth in most of the world’s largest economi","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"2009 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129815561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2006.15
D. Thornton
{"title":"The Fed's inflation objective","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2006.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2006.15","url":null,"abstract":"MonetaryTrends Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. T he Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has a long-standing commitment to price stability. Given that, and the widespread acceptance that the Fed can control the long-run inflation rate within reasonable limits, most analysts believe that the FOMC has an implicit inflation objective—i.e., lower and upper limits for the desired long-run inflation rate. The FOMC has never officially stated these limits: They must be inferred from FOMC statements. This analysis argues that FOMC communications in 2003 caused some market participants to revise their estimate of the lower limit of the FOMC's inflation objective and reduced uncertainty about the inflation objective in general. With core inflation measures declining from already low levels, the May 2003 FOMC press release noted that \" the probability of an unwelcome substantial fall in inflation, though minor, exceeds that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level. \" This widely analyzed statement was interpreted as suggesting that an inflation rate of about 1 percent was near the lower limit of the FOMC's long-run inflation objective. The minutes of the May meeting reinforced this interpretation: \" Members commented that substantial additional disinflation would be unwelcome because of the likely negative effects on economic activity and the functioning of financial institutions and markets, and the increased difficulty of conducting an effective monetary policy. \" Moreover, the August, September, and October 2003 FOMC statements all noted that \" [t]he Committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foreseeable future \" (italics added). Concerns that inflation would go too low abated by the end of the year, as seen in the December FOMC statement: \" The probability of an unwelcome fall in inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of a rise in inflation. \" Concerns over too-low inflation have not been mentioned since. These statements had an observable effect on an important measure of inflation expectations, the TIIS spread—the difference between yields on nominal Treasury securities and the corresponding Treasury inflation-indexed security (TIIS). (Nominal yields reflect both a real return and inflation expectations; because TIIS holders are compensated for inflation over the holding period, TIIS yields reflect the real return.) The chart shows the end-of-month \" on the run \" (most recent issue) 10-year …","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"248 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115257406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}