{"title":"Pushing on a string","authors":"Jeremy Piger","doi":"10.20955/ES.2003.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2003.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"27 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132624011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Getting real about monetary policy","authors":"Jeremy Piger","doi":"10.20955/ES.2002.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2002.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124449959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does inflation targeting make a difference","authors":"Jeremy Piger","doi":"10.20955/ES.2004.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2004.8","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past 15 years, an increasing number of central banks have adopted explicit inflation targeting as a framework for conducting monetary policy. Inflation targeting takes many forms, but at its heart is an announcement by the monetary authority of its quantitative point target (or range) for inflation, regular communication with the public on the progress being made toward hitting the target, and mechanisms by which the monetary authority is held accountable should it miss its target. Inflation targeting was adopted by a handful of mainly industrial countries in the early 1990s. Spurred by its perceived success, a large number of countries, including many emerging market economies, have recently adopted inflation targeting. Despite the popularity of inflation targeting around the world, and a general perception that it “works,” most early research studies found little evidence that economic performance in non-inflation-targeting countries had suffered because they did not adopt inflation targeting. As more data have become available, however, recent studies have begun to unearth significant differences in the performance of inflation-targeting vs. non-inflation-targeting economies. One such study found that inflation targeting affects the public’s expectations about inflation. 1 In particular, under an inflation-targeting regime, expectations about inflation, particularly at longer horizons, should be “anchored” by the target, and thus should be less affected by changes in actual inflation. The table uses estimates from this study to show how the public’s expectations of future inflation (five and ten years out) would change in the face of a 1-percentage-point increase in average realized inflation over the preceding three years. For a group of inflation-targeting countries, comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the estimated response of inflation expectations to this increase in realized inflation is quite small. However, for the noninflation-targeting economies, namely, the euro area, Japan and the United States, the estimated responses are large and statistically significant. Having inflation expectations that are well anchored— that is, unresponsive to short-run changes in inflation—is of significant benefit to a country’s economy. Because expectations of higher future inflation will be negotiated into various sorts of pricing contracts, such as labor contracts, the public’s expectation of future inflation can be self-fulfilling. Thus, keeping inflation expectations anchored helps to keep inflation itself low and stable. Of course, there are also potential drawbacks to the adoption of inflation targeting that might offset any potential benefit in terms of anchored inflation expectations. For example, some Federal Reserve policymakers have argued that inflation targeting removes the flexibility needed to respond to changing macroeconomic conditions, as well as unusual events. Whether or not the United","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121951822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2007.21
D. Thornton
{"title":"Measure for measure: headline versus core inflation","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2007.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2007.21","url":null,"abstract":"When discussing long-run inflation trends, members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have tended to emphasize the “core” measure— which excludes food and energy prices—over the corresponding headline measure, which does not. It is not that policymakers believe that food and energy prices do not affect economic decisions; they know very well it is headline inflation that matters for household welfare. Rather, as Chairman Bernanke noted in his July 18 monetary policy report to Congress, the emphasis on core measures is motivated by a desire to track and predict persistent inflation: “Food and energy prices tend to be quite volatile, so that, looking forward, core inflation (which excludes food and energy prices) may be a better gauge than overall [headline] inflation of underlying inflation trends.” Despite close, long-run similarities between core and headline inflation, not all measures are created equal. As noted recently in this publication, there has been considerable persistence in the difference between the headline and core inflation measures for the PCE and the CPI.1 For example, from November 2002 to August 2006, average year-over-year headline CPI inflation was 1.04 percentage points higher than for core CPI. Over this same period, average year-over-year headline PCE inflation was 0.70 percentage points higher than for core PCE. This means that, based on the CPI measure, consumers experienced a 4 percent larger decline in purchasing power than the core measure would have indicated. Over the same period, the cumulative decline in purchasing power based on the PCE measure was smaller, 2.7 percent, but still significant. Consequently, even over fairly long periods of time, core inflation measures distort the inflation picture. If the core measure is misleading as an indicator of changes in purchasing power, can it still be useful? The core measure may indeed be useful to both consumers and policymakers if it does a better job of predicting future headline inflation than the corresponding headline measure does. In recent research comparing core and headline CPI inflation, evidence suggests that core CPI inflation better predicts future headline CPI inflation. For example, if headline CPI inflation is below the corresponding core measure, and the core measure is a better predictor of future headline inflation, one might conclude that headline CPI inflation is likely to increase in the future. Unfortunately, the same is not true for the PCE measure. Current research indicates that headline PCE inflation is a better predictor of future headline PCE inflation than is core PCE inflation.2 Consequently, core PCE inflation appears to provide no useful information about future PCE inflation. It is the case, however, that over sufficiently long periods of time, CPI inflation averages about a half of a percentage point higher than PCE inflation—apparently reflecting a larger bias in the former measure relative to the latter. For this reason,","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"65 Supplementum 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130312265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Symmetric inflation risk","authors":"Abbigail J. Chiodo, Michael T. Owyang","doi":"10.20955/ES.2003.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2003.8","url":null,"abstract":"I t is generally presumed that a reduction in the inflation rate, i.e., disinflation, is beneficial to the economy because high inflation raises the cost of holding money, increases the frequency of costly price changes, and lowers the value of nominal incomes. Disinflation can impose costs, however, and outright deflation—a sustained fall in the general price level—can be disastrous. A decrease in inflation causes real interest rates to rise, which can dissuade firms from committing to long-term investment spending and lead to lower output growth, which, in turn, can put further downward pressure on prices. Unanticipated disinflation is costly to bearers of long-term debt who, when borrowing, forecast higher inflation rates. These costs are incurred because disinflation increases the value of the dollars that borrowers must pay back relative to what borrowers had expected. Policymakers all over the world have judged that the benefits of lower inflation outweigh the costs of a decline in the inflation rate when the rate is high. However, once price stability has been achieved—when the inflation rate is near zero—continued disinflation will result in deflation and impose significant costs on the economy. Recent experience in Japan (as well as historical experiences in the United States and elsewhere) illustrate the problems that can arise from sustained deflation. When inflation was low in Japan during the late 1970s and 1980s, output growth was smooth. The persistent deflation since the 1990s (Japan’s average inflation rate between 1993 and 2002 was –0.2 percent) has been combined with slow growth and volatile fluctuations in output. The figure shows the rise and fall in U.S. inflation and interest (federal funds) rates since 1978. Economic theory tells us that there is a one-to-one positive relationship between the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate. During the period 1978 through 1986, for example, the average inflation rate (measured by the GDP deflator) was 5.7 percent. Over that same period, the federal funds rate averaged 10.6 percent. Recently, however, the inflation rate and the federal funds rate have been considerably lower. Between 1995 and 2002, the average inflation rate was only 1.8 percent while the federal funds rate was 4.8 percent. The current economic environment in the United States is one of low inflation and inconsistent output growth. To stimulate output growth, the FOMC has cut the federal funds rate to a historically low level. In the past, when inflation was high, such an expansionary monetary policy would have focused attention on the risk of an increase in inflation. Disinflation would not have been viewed as a potential problem. Yet, today’s low inflation rate has some different implications for policy. With the inflation rate as low as it is now, the risk of sustained deflation cannot be discounted, especially because disinflation now would yield little offsetting benefit. In this environment of near price ","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132046415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Expected inflation near and far","authors":"David C. Wheelock","doi":"10.20955/ES.2007.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2007.3","url":null,"abstract":"F luctuations in the price of oil and other apparently nonmonetary phenomena often seem to drive the near-term outlook for inflation. Nonetheless, economists widely accept the view that, over the long run, inflation is determined by monetary policy. Thus, at longer horizons, expected inflation primarily reflects the public’s view of the monetary policymaker’s inflation objective. Put another way, fluctuations in oil prices and other nonmonetary phenomena will have less impact on the public’s longrun inflation forecasts the more strongly the public sees policymakers as being committed to a particular inflation objective. To gauge inflation expectations, analysts typically look to either surveys or market measures, such as the difference in yields on ordinary Treasury securities and inflation-protected Treasury securities (TIPS) of similar maturity. An increase in the yields on ordinary securities relative to those on TIPS would suggest that market participants have raised their forecast for inflation over the life of the securities.1 The chart plots monthly observations on the 5-year TIPS spread from January 2004 through November 2006. The spread fluctuated widely in 2004 and 2005, reflecting both volatility in oil prices and uncertainty about the economic outlook following hurricanes Katrina and Rita. More recent changes in the spread have also closely coincided with fluctuations in energy prices. A sharp decline in the spread in the second half of 2006, for example, coincided with a large decline in the price of oil from over $74 per barrel in July to less than $60 per barrel in October. Although measures of near-term expected inflation, such as the 5-year TIPS spread, have moved closely with energy prices, measures of expected inflation over longer horizons have been less sensitive to fluctuations in energy prices. For example, the 5-year forward TIPS spread, which reflects expected inflation over the 5-year period beginning 5 years in the future, has been less closely correlated with fluctuations in oil prices than the TIPS spread covering the current 5-year period.2 The 5-year forward TIPS spread, which is also shown in the chart, has ranged between 2.25 and 2.75 percent since 2004 and declined only modestly with the fall in oil prices in the second half of 2006. Survey measures of expected inflation over long horizons, such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, have been even more stable. The median 10-year average CPI inflation forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters has been within 0.10 percentage points of 2.5 percent since 1999.3 The relative stability of measures of expected inflation over longer horizons indicates that market participants view the impact of fluctuations in oil prices on inflation as largely transitory. Appar ently, the public has remained convinced that the Federal Reserve is committed to keeping inflation low. If measures of long-term expected inflation wer","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127508446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Measured pace\" in the conduct of monetary policy","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2006.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2006.6","url":null,"abstract":"MonetaryTrends Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. A t the May 2004 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) introduced the phrase \" policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured \" into the statement it makes at the conclusion of each meeting. The \" measured pace \" language, which was repeated in the next 12 statements, became widely regarded as a signal that the FOMC would raise the funds rate target by 25 basis points at its next meeting. This language was modified at the December 2005 meeting and discontinued at this year's January meeting. Now that that experience is over, it is useful to consider the extent to which policy-makers should signal their next policy action. The \" measured pace \" language appears to be a product of the economic conditions that accompanied it. Beginning in January 2001, on evidence that the economy was weakening and that inflation was contained, the FOMC began to ease policy: The Committee reduced the federal funds target from 6.5 percent to 1.75 percent in 2001 and again in 2002 and 2003 to the historically low level of 1 percent. The 1 percent rate was well below anyone's estimate of the so-called \" neutral \" nominal rate—the real interest rate (which is independent of monetary policy) plus the FOMC's implicit objective for inflation. It was understood that a 1 percent funds rate was not sustainable. Faced with strong productivity growth and no evidence of deteriorating inflation expectations, the FOMC decided to increase the target at a \" measured pace. \" While signaling the timing and magnitude of the next funds rate target change appears to have been useful under these unusual circumstances, it is unlikely to be useful in others, particularly when the difference between the target and estimated neutral rates is relatively small. The neutral nominal rate changes over time and is subject to considerable uncertainty. Consequently, it is difficult to determine or predict ; furthermore, in circumstances where the difference between the target and estimated neutral rates is smaller than it has been in recent years, policymakers may be uncertain whether the target will need to be increased, decreased, or maintained at the next meeting. Indeed, it is not surprising that the measured pace language was phased out when the target rate got closer to a level that …","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"2006 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130806172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Monetary TrendsPub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.20955/ES.2007.23
D. Thornton
{"title":"Subprime side effects in the federal funds market","authors":"D. Thornton","doi":"10.20955/ES.2007.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/ES.2007.23","url":null,"abstract":"The recent turmoil in the subprime mortgage market has had implications for the federal funds market. An apparent flight to “safe” investments caused the federal funds rate to behave somewhat differently from what one might expect during a “liquidity crisis.” Specifically, in the wake of these developments, the rates on alternative sources of funds for depository institutions rose, while the federal funds rate dropped—falling and remaining below the FOMC’s target of 5.25 percent. The funds rate fell without any unusual open market operations (OMOs) or adjustment to the funds rate target. The chart shows daily data since January 2007 of the effective federal funds rate, the FOMC’s funds rate target, and the 4-week secondary market T-bill rate—as well as the New York Fed’s effective OMOs for the maintenance period (a 14-day period in which bank reserves are measured). To measure the effect that OMOs have on bank reserves and therefore the federal funds rate, I calculate the OMO maintenance-period effect, which is the sum of all securities purchased or sold by the New York Fed on a given day, each of which are multiplied by their own maturity; the sum is then divided by 14—the number of days in the reserve maintenance period. The resulting value indicates the cumulative effect that one day’s OMOs has on bank reserves over the entire maintenance period. Although the funds rate target was 5.25 percent on August 9, the chart shows that the effective funds rate was 5.41 percent, even though the Fed increased the supply of reserves by purchasing $24 billion in assets on that day. Because $12 billion of these transactions had a 14-day maturity, while the other $12 billion had an overnight maturity, the OMO maintenance-period effect of these purchases was $12.86 billion. The next day, the Fed purchased $38 billion in assets, with an effect of $8.14 billion. The funds rate averaged 4.68 percent, significantly below the FOMC’s target. The chart shows that, although these transactions are large, they are not particularly unusual relative to the size of OMOs made during the year. In sum, the funds rate was above the target on August 9, despite an apparent attempt by the Fed to lower the rate by adding reserves.1 The funds rate was below the target the next day, despite a relatively smaller purchase of reserves. Moreover, the funds rate remained below the target through the remainder of August. These facts suggest the possibility that the behavior of the funds rate is not particularly affected by daily OMOs. What did change in the wake of the developments in the subprime mortgage market is a sharp rise in the short-term liquidity premium. Specifically, the rates on short-term T-bills declined significantly relative to other short-term rates, apparently due to a “flight to quality.” The 4-week T-bill rate declined to 4.28 percent on August 10 and declined further to a low of 2.35 percent on August 20 before rising. T-bills and federal funds are very good substit","PeriodicalId":409124,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Trends","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126098863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}