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Continuity and sensitivity analysis of parameterized Nash games 参数化纳什对策的连续性和敏感性分析
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2020-07-08 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00228-0
Zachary Feinstein
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引用次数: 10
The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma with discontinuous excess demand 不连续过剩需求的Gale-Nikaido-Debreu引理
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2020-01-04 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00181-5
B. Cornet
{"title":"The Gale–Nikaido–Debreu lemma with discontinuous excess demand","authors":"B. Cornet","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00181-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00181-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"169 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00181-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
On Machina’s paradoxes and limited attention 论Machina的悖论与有限关注
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-11-02 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00179-z
Anastasia Burkovskaya
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引用次数: 1
Can price dispersion be supported solely by information frictions? 信息摩擦是否可以单独支持价格分散？
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2528234
José Tudón
{"title":"Can price dispersion be supported solely by information frictions?","authors":"José Tudón","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2528234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2528234","url":null,"abstract":"Even with identical consumers and identical firms, if firms set prices in a first stage, and if consumers search sequentially in a second stage, price dispersion arises in the form of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. One only needs to assume consumers know the realized price distribution and that they do not know which firm has what price. In contrast to Burdett and Judd ( 1983 ), price quotes are not required to be “noisy.” Moreover, actual search is predicted to be nontrivial.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"9 1","pages":"75-90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.2528234","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45047775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Belief-consistent Pareto dominance 信念一致的帕累托支配
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-09-25 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0
Xiangyu Qu
{"title":"Belief-consistent Pareto dominance","authors":"Xiangyu Qu","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"219 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00178-0","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45126109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Job search costs and incentives 找工作的成本和动机
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-09-10 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00176-2
Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ro’i Zultan
{"title":"Job search costs and incentives","authors":"Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ro’i Zultan","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00176-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00176-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"181 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00176-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44095002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games 不连续有序和正规对策中纳什均衡的唯一性
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-08-03 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3
V. Scalzo
{"title":"On the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous ordinal and normal form games","authors":"V. Scalzo","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"163 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00175-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 学生最优稳定机制的一致Pareto改进
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-06-11 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6
Battal Doğan, M. B. Yenmez
{"title":"Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism","authors":"Battal Doğan, M. B. Yenmez","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"125 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48544000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism 基于学生最优稳定机制的一致性帕累托改进
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-05-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3007223
Battal Doğan, M. B. Yenmez
{"title":"Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism","authors":"Battal Doğan, M. B. Yenmez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3007223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3007223","url":null,"abstract":"We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement ( over the student-optimal stable matching ) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010 ) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"125-137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43042309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits 成本不对称的Stackelberg与Cournot双寡头:初级加价、进入威慑以及社会福利与行业利润的比较
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-04-30 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00167-3
J. Zouhar, Martina Zouharová
{"title":"Stackelberg versus Cournot duopoly with asymmetric costs: primary markups, entry deterrence, and a comparison of social welfare and industry profits","authors":"J. Zouhar, Martina Zouharová","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00167-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00167-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"89 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00167-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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