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Downside risk-neutral probabilities 下行风险中性概率
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-03-05 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00165-5
Pierre Chaigneau, L. Eeckhoudt
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引用次数: 0
Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints 纳什福利主义和信息约束的分配含义
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6
Yves Sprumont
{"title":"Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints","authors":"Yves Sprumont","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"49 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00164-6","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment 通过战略投资实现自主合作
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-02-09 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7
H. Moulin, A. Seth, B. Taub
{"title":"Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment","authors":"H. Moulin, A. Seth, B. Taub","doi":"10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types 具有类型连续体的一般拟线性环境下最优机构的单调性
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-12-31 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1
Yu Chen
{"title":"Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types","authors":"Yu Chen","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"277 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences 具有不完全偏好的可解决优势的多标准游戏
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2
G. Gerasimou
{"title":"Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences","authors":"G. Gerasimou","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"165 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium 稳定平衡中的转移悖论
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-10-24 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3
R. Dubey, Minwook Kang
{"title":"Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium","authors":"R. Dubey, Minwook Kang","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"259 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0158-3","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44016674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium 稳定平衡中的转移悖论
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3144038
R. Dubey, Minwook Kang
{"title":"Transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium","authors":"R. Dubey, Minwook Kang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3144038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3144038","url":null,"abstract":"The transfer paradox describes the situation in which transfers of initial endowments within competitive market make the donor better off and (or) the recipient worse off. Advantageous redistribution, strong transfer paradox, and Chichilnisky paradox are the three cases of the transfer paradox in a stable equilibrium, wherein each case produces a different welfare outcome. This paper shows that the three paradoxes are concretely related by applying Kaldor welfare measure.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"259-269"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46588547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Game-theoretic optimal portfolios in continuous time 连续时间的博弈论最优投资组合
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0156-5
Alex Garivaltis
{"title":"Game-theoretic optimal portfolios in continuous time","authors":"Alex Garivaltis","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0156-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0156-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"235 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0156-5","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Perception, utility, and evolution 感知、效用和进化
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-08-31 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8
José F. Tudón M.
{"title":"Perception, utility, and evolution","authors":"José F. Tudón M.","doi":"10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"7 1","pages":"191 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1007/s40505-018-0153-8","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"52812903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability 知情本金、道德风险和有限责任
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3083159
Teddy Mekonnen
{"title":"Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability","authors":"Teddy Mekonnen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3083159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3083159","url":null,"abstract":"I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an informed principal. The contractible outcome is correlated to both the principal’s private information and the agent’s hidden action. In contrast to a model without a privately informed principal or without limited liability, I show that the first-best payoff cannot be implemented by any equilibrium mechanism.","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"9 1","pages":"119-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/ssrn.3083159","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49077929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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