Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS

Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2018-07-08 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3083159

Teddy Mekonnen

引用次数: 4

Abstract

I consider a moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties, limited liability, and an informed principal. The contractible outcome is correlated to both the principal’s private information and the agent’s hidden action. In contrast to a model without a privately informed principal or without limited liability, I show that the first-best payoff cannot be implemented by any equilibrium mechanism.

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知情本金、道德风险和有限责任

我认为风险中立方、有限责任方和知情委托人存在道德风险问题。可收缩结果与委托人的私人信息和代理人的隐藏行为都相关。与没有私人知情委托人或没有有限责任的模型相比，我证明了第一最佳回报不能通过任何均衡机制来实现。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economic Theory Bulletin ECONOMICS-

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期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory Bulletin is to provide an outlet for research in all areas of Economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning. The Economic Theory Bulletin together with Economic Theory are the official journals of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. The Economic Theory Bulletin is intended to publish: 1. Short papers/notes of substantial interest. Content is subject to the same standards as Economic Theory: research in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning and on topics in mathematics that are supported by the analysis of economic problems. Published articles contribute to the understanding and solution of substantive economic problems. Theory papers with the substance and style for other journals that specialize in short papers are welcomed. Corollaries of already known results in the literature are not appropriate for publication. 2. Survey papers that clearly picture the basic ideas at work in the area, the essential technical apparatus that is used and the central questions that remain open.