基于学生最优稳定机制的一致性帕累托改进

IF 0.4 Q4 ECONOMICS

Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2019-05-21 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3007223

Battal Doğan, M. B. Yenmez

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引用次数: 4

摘要

我们证明了在任何稳定机制上都不存在一致的Pareto改进。我们引入了以下弱一致的Pareto改进（相对于学生最优稳定匹配）要求：每当一组学生被分配到一所在学生最优稳定匹配对中需求不足的学校时，他们被分配的座位被移除，那么剩余学生的分配就不会改变。我们的主要结果是，效率调整的延迟接受机制（Kesten在Q J Econ 125（3）:1297–13482010中）是相对于学生最优稳定机制的唯一弱一致Pareto改进。

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Consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism

We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement ( over the student-optimal stable matching ) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010 ) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.

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来源期刊

Economic Theory Bulletin ECONOMICS-

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The purpose of Economic Theory Bulletin is to provide an outlet for research in all areas of Economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning. The Economic Theory Bulletin together with Economic Theory are the official journals of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. The Economic Theory Bulletin is intended to publish: 1. Short papers/notes of substantial interest. Content is subject to the same standards as Economic Theory: research in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning and on topics in mathematics that are supported by the analysis of economic problems. Published articles contribute to the understanding and solution of substantive economic problems. Theory papers with the substance and style for other journals that specialize in short papers are welcomed. Corollaries of already known results in the literature are not appropriate for publication. 2. Survey papers that clearly picture the basic ideas at work in the area, the essential technical apparatus that is used and the central questions that remain open.