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The cost of proportional representations in electoral system design 选举制度设计中比例代表制的代价
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2024-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-024-00261-1
Byeong-hyeon Jeong
{"title":"The cost of proportional representations in electoral system design","authors":"Byeong-hyeon Jeong","doi":"10.1007/s40505-024-00261-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-024-00261-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We present an impossibility result concerning the design of dual vote electoral systems that meet three key conditions: proportional party representation, proportional local representation, and local accountability. By identifying the necessary number of compensatory seats to meet these three conditions in dual vote systems, we show that the number is not bounded in general; thus, it can be very costly to achieve the three conditions. When a cap is applied to the total seats, combined with a district-decentralization, semi-compensatory dual vote systems that distribute the limited compensatory seats to enhance proportionality become vulnerable to strategic manipulations. Specifically, when political parties seek to maximize their legislative representation, they might employ the strategy of creating ‘decoy’ party lists.</p>","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140072359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator 由外部创新者颁发减少福利的许可证
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2024-01-06 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1
Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu Sinha
{"title":"Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator","authors":"Arijit Mukherjee, Uday Bhanu Sinha","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00259-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is commonly believed that licensing of cost reducing technology increases welfare. We show that technology licensing by an outside innovator may reduce welfare when the technology is not useful for all final goods producers. Technology licensing reduces welfare if cost reduction by the licensed technology is small and the initial cost difference of the final goods producers is large. A higher intensity of competition, either due to lower product differentiation or due to Bertrand competition instead of Cournot competition, increases the possibility of welfare reducing licensing.</p>","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Valuation asymmetry in the dynamic private provision of public goods 动态私人提供公共产品中的估值不对称问题
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00260-8
Subhra K. Bhattacharya
{"title":"Valuation asymmetry in the dynamic private provision of public goods","authors":"Subhra K. Bhattacharya","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00260-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00260-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I consider a dynamic game of private provision of a <i>discrete public good</i> by individuals who derive <i>asymmetric flow benefits</i> every period upon project completion. The individuals are otherwise homogeneous. I show that an asymmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) exists, which is either <i>a completion equilibrium</i> (where the good is provided) or <i>a no-contribution equilibrium</i> depending on the benefits asymmetry. A completion equilibrium <i>does not</i> require all the agents to contribute at every period. Along an MPE, an individual contributes from the beginning (<span>(t=0)</span>), irrespective of others’ contributions, if her flow benefit exceeds <i>a contribution threshold</i>. Individual contributions are <i>strategic complements</i> across time; however, the coefficient of strategic complementarity is independent of valuation asymmetry. A higher valuation individual makes a larger <i>absolute</i> contribution every period. I show that all the socially beneficial projects get completed in an asymmetric MPE when the higher valuation individual’s flow benefit exceeds that <i>contribution threshold</i> and that an asymmetric completion MPE is efficiency improving compared to its symmetric counterpart.</p>","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139053083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies 论埃奇沃斯盒子经济中帕累托集合的形状
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-09-12 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00258-2
William Thomson
{"title":"On the shape of Pareto sets in Edgeworth box economies","authors":"William Thomson","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00258-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00258-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135879205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion 首价拍卖中的间谍行为和不完全承诺:一个默契勾结的案例
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3
Cuihong Fan, B. Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
{"title":"Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion","authors":"Cuihong Fan, B. Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00257-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":"255 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45965901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks 信息网络组织的相对绩效评估
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-08-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4
Xiangyu Shi
{"title":"Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks","authors":"Xiangyu Shi","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":"243 - 254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48898782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution 通过市场进行再分配的障碍和一个解决方案
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-08-24 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00255-5
R. Allen, John Rehbeck
{"title":"Obstacles to redistribution through markets and one solution","authors":"R. Allen, John Rehbeck","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00255-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00255-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":"235 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43942650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems 更正:优先函数:多准则排序问题的数值评价方法
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00254-6
Antonio Villar
{"title":"Correction: The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems","authors":"Antonio Villar","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00254-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00254-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134978033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games 敌人的敌人就是朋友:网络游戏的新形势
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-28 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7
Hideto Koizumi
{"title":"The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games","authors":"Hideto Koizumi","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00253-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":"223 - 233"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46314263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems 优先级函数：多准则排序问题的一种数值评价方法
IF 0.3
Economic Theory Bulletin Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00249-3
Antonio Villar
{"title":"The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems","authors":"Antonio Villar","doi":"10.1007/s40505-023-00249-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-023-00249-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40852,"journal":{"name":"Economic Theory Bulletin","volume":"11 1","pages":"211 - 219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45093696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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