{"title":"Wage Theft in Silence: Why Migrant Workers Do Not Recover Their Unpaid Wages in Australia","authors":"Bassina Farbenblum, Laurie Berg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3289002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289002","url":null,"abstract":"Wage Theft in Silence presents findings from the National Temporary Migrant Work Survey -- the most comprehensive study of working conditions and access to justice among international students, backpackers and other temporary migrants in Australia. It draws on responses from 4,322 temporary migrants across 107 nationalities of every region in the world, working in a range of jobs throughout all Australian states and territories. The report reveals that although the majority of migrant workers were paid well below minimum wage in Australia, the overwhelming majority suffered in silence. Indeed, among international students and backpackers who acknowledged they had been underpaid, only 9% took any action to recover wages they were owed. The report considers the institutions from whom those 9% sought assistance, and whether they were able to recover their wages. These include the Fair Work Ombudsman, education providers and unions.<br><br>The report also presents data on the attitudes and experiences of the 91% of migrant workers who suffered wage theft in silence. Though it is often assumed that most underpaid migrant workers are not interested or willing to take action to get the wages they are owed, in fact well over half of survey participants indicated that they were open to trying to recover their wages. The report presents findings on the range of psychological, practical and other barriers that deterred them from doing so. It concludes that many of these barriers can be addressed through practical measures and policy reform, and it presents a range of recommendations to government, parliament, business and the international education sector to make reporting wage theft possible and rational for migrant workers. These include recommendations for a new or improved process for wage recovery, better resourced support services, and a firewall between the labour regulator and the immigration regulator that guarantees that migrants’ visas will not be jeopardised if they report wage theft.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114249629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Challenge of Job Creation","authors":"Ashok Kotwal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3149911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149911","url":null,"abstract":"The Indian media is full of reports about the layoffs due to the current slowdown in the economic growth partially caused by demonetization and poor implementation of the Good & Services Tax (GST). However, this paper focuses on the long run course of Indian development by asking why the process of economic transformation that entails labour transiting from low to high productivity activities, has been much slower in India than in other Asian countries like China. First, the article examines how China has transformed itself into an industrial powerhouse, while India has not, considering that both countries had similar levels of poverty in 1978 when the Chinese reforms began. Following, this article analyzes the structure of the Indian economy by looking at the structure of its labour market and the anatomy of the Indian growth spurt. The organized sector has failed to absorb much labour from the unorganized sector in India, where the productivity increases have been modest if any. While the obstacles to the expansion of the organized sector have been widely discussed, this article draws attention to the importance of improving the productivity of the activities in India’s unorganized sector.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128942426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uber and the Unmaking and Remaking of Taxi Capitalisms: Technology, Law and Resistance in Historical Perspective","authors":"E. Tucker","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3042742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3042742","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of digital platforms through which labour is bought and sold is transforming the world of work and challenging the existing regulatory regimes that govern it. Depending on one’s point of view, Uber has become the poster child or bete noir of this transformation, challenging traditional taxi regulation and labour and employment law. Technological utopians celebrate the transformation of traditional workers into micro-entrepreneurs, free to work whenever and for as long as they want in proportion to their preferences for income and leisure, while critics see a degradation of the standard employment relation and higher levels of precariousness and labour market vulnerability. However, with few exceptions, most discussions of Uber fail to put it into historical perspective and in particular do not examine the history of taxi cab capitalism and its underlying relations of production. Using Toronto, Canada as a case study, this study explores the shifting modes of capitalism that have existed over the motorized taxi industry’s 100 year history, focusing on the impact and interaction of technological change, changing legal regulation and worker resistance in driving these changes. Viewed from this perspective, the Uber challenge to prior regimes of taxi capitalism is less a matter of technological innovation than a bold challenge to the law and its future is likely to be determined by the effectiveness of worker and taxi industry resistance.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126692830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition and State Aid Implications of ‘Public’ Minimum Wage Clauses in EU Public Procurement after the RegioPost Judgment","authors":"A. Sanchez-Graells","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2958296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2958296","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses the use of public procurement to enforce labour standards from a competition and State aid perspective, and concentrates on the establishment of contract compliance clauses under the rules of Article 26 of Directive 2004/18/EC and Article 70 of Directive 2014/24/EU and in relation with the Posted Workers Directive. In particular, it assesses the case law of the European Court of Justice in Ruffert, Bundesdruckerei and RegioPost from an economic perspective. This highlights the potential negative competitive implications that derive from the asymmetrical rules the case law creates for the cross-border and the inter-regional provision of services to the public sector. It also underlines the risk of (regional) economic protectionism that they create. The chapter then assesses these issues from the perspective the EU public procurement, competition and State aid rules. It concludes that, given the current ineffectiveness of the checks and balances theoretically oriented towards the prevention of these undesirable effects, contracting authorities and policy makers would be well advised to abandon their efforts of setting partial, incomplete and difficult to monitor minimum/living wage requirements for public contracts only.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131807028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Government Employment Guarantee, Labor Supply and Firms’ Reaction: Evidence from the Largest Public Workfare Program in the World","authors":"Sumit Agarwal, Shashwat Alok, Yakshup Chopra, Prasanna Tantri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2880629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2880629","url":null,"abstract":"Using establishment-level employment and operating data, we examine the impact of Indian government’s employment guarantee program on labor and firm behavior. Using the staggered implementation of the program for identification, we find that the program leads to 10% reduction in permanent workforce in factories. Factories respond to the adverse labor supply shock by resorting to increased mechanization. As a result, firms’ cost of production increases significantly leading to a reduction in net profits and productivity. These effects manifest primarily in firms paying low wages, having low labor productivity, greater cash-flow volatility and firms located in states with pro-employer labor regulations.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"390 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116168448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Transmitting the Costs of Unsafe Work","authors":"Charlotte S. Alexander","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2759020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2759020","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the ways in which employers are made to \"feel\" the costs generated by workers' occupational illnesses and injuries. In economic terms, many of those costs are externalized, i.e. experienced by parties other than the employer, whose safety decisions are therefore distorted. The law and the labor market set up a variety of mechanisms that may transmit costs back to the employer: workers' compensation claims, government complaints, union activity, workers' demands for safety improvements or compensatory wages, and worker quits. Yet each of these requires that workers have sufficient knowledge, power, and resources to act as cost transmitters. Using worker survey data, this article explores cost transmission at the bottom of the labor market. Finding flaws in the operation of all cost transmission mechanisms, the article proposes a hybrid system that would give a greater role to government enforcement and consumer and investor pressure, as well as unions, filling in where workers are particularly unwilling or unable to transmit costs effectively themselves.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129486005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Workers Still Need a Collective Voice in the Era of Norms and Mandates","authors":"C. Estlund","doi":"10.4337/9781781006115.00024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781006115.00024","url":null,"abstract":"The drastic decline of union representation in the U.S. has opened up a large and by now familiar ‘representation gap’ in the workplace. Different workers prefer different forms of representation: Many want independent union representation, a choice that is formally available but difficult to secure in the face of management opposition; others want a more cooperative form of collective representation that is unlawful under federal labor law. But the vast majority of workers wants some form of collective representation, and does not have it. On some accounts, workers no longer need collective representation because their interests are adequately protected by a combination of legally-enforceable mandates and self-enforcing norms. This chapter argues that these accounts are wrong and workers are right: Most workers not only want but need some form of collective representation in order to enforce the mix of legal mandates and informal norms by which they are currently governed at work. But both the nature of the collective representation that workers need and the path by which they might achieve it differs for workers at the top and the bottom of the labor market. This chapter, part of an edited volume on the economics of labor and employment law, maps the current regime of individual contract and employment mandates by which the overwhelming majority of private sector employees are governed nowadays, and the widely divergent results of that regime for workers at the top and the bottom of the labor market. It proposes a two-track approach to workplace governance reform, and to labor law reform, that responds to both the shared need and desire for collective representation and the distinct barriers and opportunities that workers face at the top and the bottom of the labor market.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134431582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Norma B. Coe, Mashfiqur R. Khan, Matthew S. Rutledge
{"title":"Sticky Ages: Why is Age 65 Still a Retirement Peak?","authors":"Norma B. Coe, Mashfiqur R. Khan, Matthew S. Rutledge","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2196061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2196061","url":null,"abstract":"When Social Security’s Full Retirement Age (FRA) increased to age 66 for recent retirees, the peak retirement age increased with it. However, a large share of people continue to claim their Social Security benefits at age 65. This paper explores two potential explanations for the “stickiness” of age 65 as a claiming age: Medicare eligibility and workers’ lack of knowledge about their future Social Security benefits. First, we analyze the impact of Medicare eligibility by comparing two groups – one has an FRA of exactly 65; the other, between age 65 and 2 months and age 66. We find that the group with later FRAs who do not have access to retiree health benefits through their employer are more likely to claim Social Security at age 65. We interpret this finding as evidence that Medicare eligibility persuades more people to retire, because they can begin receiving federal health coverage. Individuals without access to retiree health insurance at work are 7.5 percentage points more likely to retire soon after their 65th birthdays and are 5.8 percentage points less likely to delay retirement until the FRA than those with that insurance. This result fits into extensive research showing that access to health insurance is an important component of the retirement decision. On the question of whether misinformation about Social Security benefits may drive individuals to claim at age 65, we find that some individuals are unable to accurately forecast their retirement benefits. However, our analysis suggests that there is no relationship between this confusion and the age 65 peak for claiming Social Security.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"123 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127409623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Temporary Job Protection and Productivity Growth in EU Economies","authors":"M. Damiani, F. Pompei, A. Ricci","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1793087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1793087","url":null,"abstract":"The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in fourteen European countries and ten sectors from 1995 to 2007. The main aim is to ascertain the role of employment protection of temporary contracts on TFP by estimating their effects with a “difference-in-difference” approach. Results show that deregulation of temporary contracts negatively influences the growth rates of TFP in European economies and that, within sectoral analysis, the role of this liberalisation is greater in industries where firms are more used to opening short-term positions. By contrast, in our observation period, restrictions on regular jobs do not cause significant effects on TFP, whereas limited regulation of product markets and higher R&D expenses positively affect efficiency growth.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"273 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131719437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Independent Contractors in the U.S. Economy","authors":"J. Eisenach","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1717932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1717932","url":null,"abstract":"More than 10 million workers, comprising 7.4 percent of the U.S. workforce, are classified by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as independent contractors, and another 4 million work in alternative work arrangements in which they may be legally classified as independent contractors for one or more purposes. Alternative workers in 2010 will account for approximately $626 billion in personal income, or about one in every eight dollars earned in the U.S. Independent contractor arrangements are commonplace throughout the U.S. economy, from computer software engineers and emergency room physicians to home health care providers and timber harvesters. Such arrangements generate substantial economic and other benefits for both workers and employers, allowing both firms and households to use labor services in situations where a traditional employment relationship is either impractical or uneconomic for the worker, the client, or both. The economic benefits of independent contracting include workforce flexibility, avoidance of fixed costs, the ability to “pay for performance,” the avoidance of legal and economic barriers in efficient contracting, and, perhaps most important, the satisfaction of workers’ desires to “be their own boss” and benefit from the independence associated with independent contractor relationships. Another important reason workers prefer independent contracting is that it serves as a stepping stone to entrepreneurship and small-business formation. Policy changes that curtail independent contracting, such as the proposed repeal of the Section 530 “safe harbor” for classification of workers for tax purposes (which would increase regulatory risk for independent contractors and their clients alike), would result in higher unemployment, slower economic growth and reduced economic welfare. Specifically, curtailing independent contracting would: reduce job creation and small business formation; reduce competition and increase prices; create sector specific disruptions; and produce a less flexible and dynamic work force.","PeriodicalId":407537,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Empirical Studies of Employment & Labor Law (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125012916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}