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Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind 认知主义和知性主义的心智观
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2111
Mariela Destéfano
{"title":"Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind","authors":"Mariela Destéfano","doi":"10.17454/pam-2111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2111","url":null,"abstract":"No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully post-cognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125780317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness 意向性、感质和无意识流
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2203
Sam Coleman
{"title":"Intentionality, Qualia, and the Stream of Unconsciousness","authors":"Sam Coleman","doi":"10.17454/pam-2203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2203","url":null,"abstract":"According to Brentano, mentality is essentially intentional in nature. Other philosophers have emphasized the phenomenal-qualitative aspect of conscious experiences as core to the mind. A recent philosophical wave – the ‘phenomenal intentionality programme’ – seeks to unite these conceptions in the idea that mental content is grounded in phenomenal qualities. However, a philosophical and scientific current, which includes Freud and contemporary cognitive science, makes widespread use of the posit of unconscious mentality/mental content. I aim to reconcile these disparate, influential strands of thought concerning mentality’s essence, by defending a conception of the mark of the mental as consisting in content-carrying qualitative character (or mental qualities) – but understood as properties that can exist both in conscious (i.e. phenomenal) form and unconsciously. I describe this conception, deal with major historical objections to the notions of unconscious qualitative character and mentality, and explain the virtues of construing the mark of the mental in this way.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128237631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Is Presence Perceptual? 在场是感性的吗?
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2213
Max Minden Ribeiro
{"title":"Is Presence Perceptual?","authors":"Max Minden Ribeiro","doi":"10.17454/pam-2213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2213","url":null,"abstract":"Perceptual experience and visual imagination both offer a first-person perspective on visible objects. But these perspectives are strikingly different. For it is distinctive of ordinary perceptual intentionality that objects seem to be present to the perceiver. I term this phenomenal property of experience ‘presence’. This paper introduces a positive definition of presence. Dokic and Martin (2017) argue that presence is not a genuine property of perceptual experience, appealing to empirical research on derealisation disorders, Parkinson’s disease, virtual reality and hallucination. I demonstrate that their arguments fall short of establishing that presence is not perceptual.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125565023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics 维特根斯坦在伦理学中的先验思想实验
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2215
Simone Nota
{"title":"Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Thought Experiment in Ethics","authors":"Simone Nota","doi":"10.17454/pam-2215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2215","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I argue that Wittgenstein attempted to clarify ethics through a procedure that, by analogy with “transcendental arguments”, I call “transcendental thought experiment”. Specifically, after offering a brief perspectival account of both transcendental arguments and transcendental thought experiments, I focus on a thought experiment proposed by Wittgenstein in his 1929 Lecture on Ethics, arguing that it deserves the title of “transcendental”.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128431546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three Concepts of Character 性格的三个概念
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2112
R. Mordacci
{"title":"Three Concepts of Character","authors":"R. Mordacci","doi":"10.17454/pam-2112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2112","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122747772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Operationalizing Disembodied Interaction: The Perceptual Crossing Experiment in schizophrenia Research 操作性非实体互动:精神分裂症研究中的知觉交叉实验
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2109
Leonardo Zapata-Fonseca, Lily Marti, T. Fuchs
{"title":"Operationalizing Disembodied Interaction: The Perceptual Crossing Experiment in schizophrenia Research","authors":"Leonardo Zapata-Fonseca, Lily Marti, T. Fuchs","doi":"10.17454/pam-2109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2109","url":null,"abstract":"Embodied and phenomenological approaches to neuropsychiatry have proven to be promising for assessing social cognition and its impairments. Second-person neuroscience has demonstrated that the dynamics of social interaction make a difference when it comes to how people understand each other. This article presents the Perceptual Crossing Experiment (PCE) as a paradigm for studying real-time dyadic embodied interactions in the context of schizophrenia. We draw on the phenomenological concept of interbodily resonance (IR) and show how the PCE can be used to accurately model and assess IR. We then turn to disembodied interaction in schizophrenia and finally propose the PCE as a translational tool for systematically assessing the hindered IR that individuals with schizophrenia suffer from. We offer an experimental approach to phenomenology which could be informative for the development of more embodied interventions aiming to remedy the profoundly disrupted social life that patients with schizophrenia live with.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"495 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113989288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Dementia as Social Disorder – A Lifeworld Account 痴呆症是一种社会障碍——生活世界的描述
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2106
E. Dzwiza-Ohlsen
{"title":"Dementia as Social Disorder – A Lifeworld Account","authors":"E. Dzwiza-Ohlsen","doi":"10.17454/pam-2106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2106","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124453763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Intentionality and Dualism: Does the Idea that Intentionality Is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism? 意向性与二元论:意向性即MOM的观点是否必然包含二元论?
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2206
Andrea Tortoreto
{"title":"Intentionality and Dualism: Does the Idea that Intentionality Is the MOM Necessarily Entail Dualism?","authors":"Andrea Tortoreto","doi":"10.17454/pam-2206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2206","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that Franz Brentano was the first to suggest intentionality, the property of being about something, as a criterion for demarcating the domain of the mental. He suggested that intentionality is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to qualify as a mental event. It is important, for the purposes of this paper, to pay attention to the fact that Brentano’s theory came from within a broader philosophical outlook that was thoroughly dualistic. He sought a total separation of the mental from the physical, and his appeal to intentionality as a defining criterion for the mental is in the service of producing such a separation. In Brentano’s view, only mental events have intentionality, and it is in virtue of this feature that they differ from the events of the physical world. The aim of this paper is to explore whether Brentano’s intentionality criterion for defining the domain of the mental is committed to the broader dualism from which it originated.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121097747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Naïve Realism and Minimal Self Naïve现实主义和最小自我
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2212
Daniel S. H. Kim
{"title":"Naïve Realism and Minimal Self","authors":"Daniel S. H. Kim","doi":"10.17454/pam-2212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2212","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how phenomenological discussions of minimal self-consciousness can enhance our understanding of the phenomenology of conscious perceptual experiences. As a case study, I investigate the nature of the relationship between naïve realism, a contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, and experiential minimalism (or, the ‘minimal self’ view), a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness originated in the Phenomenological tradition. I argue that naïve realism is not only compatible with, but can be supplemented with experiential minimalism in a novel way. The suggestion is that there are reasons to combine naïve realism and experiential minimalism. My focus here will be on drawing a connection between the notion of minimal self and two core theoretical commitments of naïve realism, relationalism and transparency.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132199527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vindicating Avowal Expressivism: A Note on Rosenthal’s Performance-Conditional Equivalence Thesis 为自白表现主义辩护:罗森塔尔的性能条件等价命题述评
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2216
Nadja-Mira Yolcu
{"title":"Vindicating Avowal Expressivism: A Note on Rosenthal’s Performance-Conditional Equivalence Thesis","authors":"Nadja-Mira Yolcu","doi":"10.17454/pam-2216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2216","url":null,"abstract":"The paper comments on David Rosenthal’s claim that saying “p” is performance-conditionally equivalent to saying “I believe that p”. It is argued, by way of counterexamples, that the proposed performance-conditional equivalence does not hold in this generality. The paper further proposes that avowal expressivism gives necessary conditions for the performance-conditional equivalence: it holds only if the speaker’s utterance of “p” is a non-explicit expressive act expressive of the belief that p and the utterance of “I believe that p” is an explicit expressive act expressive of the very same belief. If that is correct, the performance-conditional equivalence thesis provides an argument against Rosenthal’s preferred avowal descriptivism and in favor of avowal expressivism.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133499451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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