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Phenomenology & Mind最新文献

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Psychopathology and psychotherapy of the Leib in schizophrenia 精神分裂症患者的精神病理与心理治疗
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2108
C. M. Esposito, Giuseppe Salerno
{"title":"Psychopathology and psychotherapy of the Leib in schizophrenia","authors":"C. M. Esposito, Giuseppe Salerno","doi":"10.17454/pam-2108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2108","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124967653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Intersubjectivity and social perception in epilepsy 癫痫的主体间性与社会知觉
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2107
Francesca Brencio, P. Morand, Lea O. Wilhelm, C. Sabourdy, P. Bauer
{"title":"Intersubjectivity and social perception in epilepsy","authors":"Francesca Brencio, P. Morand, Lea O. Wilhelm, C. Sabourdy, P. Bauer","doi":"10.17454/pam-2107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2107","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends the idea that alterations in social perception of people with epilepsy may be crucial in the development of co-morbidities, involving a circular and mutual relationship between the person and her/his social environment, between the self and the world. We aim at exploring the role of these processes in psychopathological phenomena in people with epilepsy. Through a phenomenological and enactive account of intersubjectivity and the model of circular causality, enriched with interviews conducted with people with epilepsy, we develop the hypothesis that the originary domain of a person’s experience with epilepsy expands and modifies the fundamental interrogation of the sense of self. Furthermore, we observe how disturbances in the dynamical coupling and coordination among agents may contribute to psychopathological phenomena, and to changes in intersubjectivity and social perception.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117119696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Autistics as empathic subjects. Phenomenology and Intense World Theory 自闭症患者作为移情对象。现象学与强烈世界理论
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2103
Elisabetta Angela Rizzo, Tina Röck
{"title":"Autistics as empathic subjects. Phenomenology and Intense World Theory","authors":"Elisabetta Angela Rizzo, Tina Röck","doi":"10.17454/pam-2103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2103","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the belief that autism is an empathy disorder, autistics declare their ability to empathize. To explore this experiential vision, we present the alternative explanation for social impairments in autism offered by the Intense World Theory (IWT) and substantiate it through the phenomenological analysis of empathy as an experienced phenomenon. According to IWT, autistics are characterized by hyper-emotionality and therefore their detachment is not the sign of a disrupted empathy, but a strategy to face a world of overwhelming stimuli. Taking the phenomenological account of empathy as a tendency to minimize the emotional and conceptual space dividing embodied and conscious subjects, our purpose is to explain that although autistics seem to expand this space, they may still be considered empathetic.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115673552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Intentionality and Inner Awareness 意向性和内在意识
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2205
Davide Zottoli
{"title":"Intentionality and Inner Awareness","authors":"Davide Zottoli","doi":"10.17454/pam-2205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2205","url":null,"abstract":"The contemporary discussion on the subjective character of conscious experience is characterized by a stark contrast between higher-order intentionalism, according to which any state of awareness depends on the instantiation of intentional properties by mental states, and anti-intentionalism, according to which the inner awareness constitutive of subjective experience is fundamentally different from ordinary instances of external or introspective awareness, in that one’s experience is not given to the subject as an ordinary intentional object. The purpose of this paper is to outline the most fundamental dimensions of variation among the different kinds of higher-order theories and to show, by providing a comprehensive analysis of the logical space available, that these seemingly incompatible views can be reconciled within an intentionalist framework.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125072659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them “鞋匠倒退”的两个问题及应对方法
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2209
Maik Niemeck
{"title":"Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them","authors":"Maik Niemeck","doi":"10.17454/pam-2209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2209","url":null,"abstract":"With his now famous regress argument, Sydney Shoemaker (1968) aimed to provide justification for the assumption that at least some cases of self-awareness cannot be based on identification. The overall goal of this paper is to discuss two possible worries one may have about Shoemaker’s argument. I will show that these problems have far-reaching consequences that may diminish the argument’s importance for an adequate theory of self-awareness and that another conclusion Shoemaker and other philosophers draw may be unwarranted.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124131895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists Naïve现实主义者的现象基础意向性
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2211
G. Martina
{"title":"Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists","authors":"G. Martina","doi":"10.17454/pam-2211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2211","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounded: perceptual experiences have intentionality in virtue of being relations of conscious acquaintance to aspects of the mind-independent environment. By contrast, hallucinations have intentionality dependently or derivatively, in virtue of their indiscriminability from, or similarity with respect to, perceptual experiences. Within this proposal, naïve realists can allow that perceptions and hallucinations have a property in common – that of being intentionally directed at apparently mind-independent entities – whilst having wholly different metaphysical natures.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134067068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
(Inter)corporeality and Temporality in Music Therapy. A Phenomenological Study 音乐治疗中的物质性与时间性。现象学研究
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2110
Valeria Bizzari, C. Guareschi
{"title":"(Inter)corporeality and Temporality in Music Therapy. A Phenomenological Study","authors":"Valeria Bizzari, C. Guareschi","doi":"10.17454/pam-2110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129121154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Ghost in the Shell or an Anatomically Constrained Phenomenon? Consciousness through the Spatiotemporal Body 《攻壳机动队》还是解剖学上的局限现象?通过时空体的意识
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2208
Federico Zilio
{"title":"A Ghost in the Shell or an Anatomically Constrained Phenomenon? Consciousness through the Spatiotemporal Body","authors":"Federico Zilio","doi":"10.17454/pam-2208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2208","url":null,"abstract":"Intuitively, we can conceive of the existence of a conscious state as a pure activity that does not necessarily require a body (or even a brain). This idea has found new support in certain recent theories that present the possibility of a totally disconnected and disembodied consciousness. Against this hypothesis, I argue that human experience is intrinsically embodied and embedded, though in a specific way. Using Sartre’s phenomenology of the body, I first analyze the concept of consciousness as intentionality and a world-disclosing activity, thus explaining how conscious activity can only be expressed through a body that is spatiotemporally related to the world. Then, I argue that bodily consciousness does not necessarily imply the actual presence of an anatomical body but, rather, a process of spatialization and temporalization (hodological space and temporal synthesis) through the “spatiotemporal body”. Finally, I test my thesis by critiquing some cases of apparent disembodied/disconnected consciousness, i.e., dreams, out-of-body experiences, and the brain-in-a-vat scenario.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131786845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental 作为精神标志的内在意识
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2204
Jakub Mihálik
{"title":"Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental","authors":"Jakub Mihálik","doi":"10.17454/pam-2204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2204","url":null,"abstract":"While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in favor of this phenomenal presence. I argue that while these arguments may show that experience is not transparent, they crucially fail to demonstrate that ‘inner transparency’ must be false too, i.e. that inner awareness is phenomenally present. I conclude that non-conscious inner awareness is an open possibility and Brentano’s posit of inner awareness as a mark of the mental thus looks unpromising.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116460720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction. Phenomenology of Social Impairments: Towards New Research Paths 介绍。社会缺陷现象学:走向新的研究路径
Phenomenology & Mind Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2101
Valeria Bizzari, T. Fuchs, Oren Bader
{"title":"Introduction. Phenomenology of Social Impairments: Towards New Research Paths","authors":"Valeria Bizzari, T. Fuchs, Oren Bader","doi":"10.17454/pam-2101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2101","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121790450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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