Cognitivism and the intellectualist vision of the mind

No one can deny that enactive approaches to the mind are here to stay. However, much of this revolution has been built on the grounds of conceptual confusions and hurried anlyses that undermine enactive claims. The aim of this paper is to weaken the charge of intellectualism against cognitivism developed by Hutto and Myin. This charge turns to be central to the enactive purpose of setting up a fully post-cognitivist position. I will follow a strategy of conceptual elucidation of “intellectualism”. Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) present two alternative characterizations of this notion. The first is tied to the Cartesian conception of the mind (which I will call “Cartesian intellectualism”), and the second is tied to the idea that there is no cognition without content (which I will call “semantic intellectualism”). I would like to go into the problems considering cognititivsm either as Cartesian or semantic intellectualism.