{"title":"Effects of Taxes and Subsidies on Media Services","authors":"Hans Jarle Kind, Jarle Møen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2540508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2540508","url":null,"abstract":"We start out reviewing the justification for press subsidies. The social value of journalism can be larger than what the newspapers are able to extract because of knowledge externalities, public good characteristics of investigative journalism and nonappropriability of consumer surplus. A free market will then underinvest in journalism. Problems related to economies of scale and scope further imply that the number of newspapers and their circulations may be too small, while advertising can give newspapers too strong incentives to aim for the mass market. According to the media economics literature, a preferential VAT regime provides higher differentiation incentives for existing newspapers, while a tax deduction for editorial expenses is well suited to increase journalistic investments. Micro economic theory further indicates that fixed transfers is the most efficient instrument to reduce entry barriers and avoid newspaper mortality, and that a subsidy per copy sold will increase circulation. We end the article by summarizing empirical evidence on the effects of media support.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125107867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Church Membership and Social Insurance: Evidence from the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927","authors":"P. Ager, C. W. Hansen, Lars Lønstrup","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2530868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2530868","url":null,"abstract":"Religious communities are key providers of social insurance. This paper focuses on the devastating impact of the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 to investigate how an increase in the demand for social insurance affects church membership. We find a significant increase in church membership in flooded counties. This effect is stronger in counties with severe economic losses and where access to credit was limited. We also document that fundamental denominations gained more members in flooded counties, which is consistent with the theory of club goods emphasizing the efficient provision of mutual insurance in stricter religious communities.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"187 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114650083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Debt, Fiscal Decisions and Political Power","authors":"Krzysztof Waśniewski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2517967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2517967","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper treats the issue of economic foundations, on which political power rests, and the specific problem of public debt in the developed countries. Starting from the general question: “Why do rich governments borrow so much?” the paper develops a model of political power based on the possession of capital, and on the transformation of public possession into private property rights. Empirical investigation follows, in a sample of 21 countries, demonstrating that there is an objectively existing transfer of capital from public borrowing to private property rights; that transfer is connected mostly to the property of non-productive assets, and goes beyond the easily inferable relation to net exports. That the transfer from public borrowing to private property rights is strongly correlated with the relative dispersion or concentration of power in the political system. We are witnessing a progressive withdrawal of public finance and public borrowing as a means of transferring capital, with a simultaneously growing idiosyncrasy (cross-sectinal variance) of fiscality.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122706153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geography and Local (Dis)Advantage: Evidence from Muni Bond Funds","authors":"David A. Rakowski, Saiying Deng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1571380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1571380","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the relationship between the geographic location of mutual fund managers and fund performance using the unique setting of single-state municipal-bond mutual funds. We find that local managers underperform non-local muni-bond fund managers. Furthermore, we document that local muni-bond fund managers perform relatively better in states with more local funds, consistent with knowledge spillovers, business connections and networking effects associated with those areas. Locals also perform relatively better in states with higher levels of political integrity, consistent with less political pressure on local fund managers in these locations. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116940409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership","authors":"Bev Dahlby","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2510564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2510564","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we provide an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada and the issues that have been raised concerning the reform of the fiscal transfer system. Any reforms to the equalization grant system have to balance three concerns — “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of transfers, and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, “entitlement” to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, and “ownership” of resources and independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. Five proposals for reform of the equalization system are discussed. With regard to the inclusion rate for resource revenues in equalization formula, we argue that the rate should be reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and that ceiling on total equalization payments should be eliminated. We argue against the proposal to exempt from the calculation of equalization entitlements that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds because this would not reduce total equalization entitlements in present value terms, it would be complex to implement if it extended to all forms of savings by provinces (such as debt reduction), and it would not alter the resource rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource revenues. We argue against a proposal to reduce CHT and CST to provinces with above average fiscal capacities because this would reduce their incentive to develop and tax their resources, and it would be counter to the purpose of these block grants, which is to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial governments. We review the Gusen (2012a) proto-type model for incorporating variations in costs and needs in the computation of the equalization entitlements and argue that this procedure seems feasible and merits further analysis.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115469685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of Behavior of Tax Inspection Report Application User on Tax Performance Approach Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) on Tax Office Madya Makassar","authors":"Tenriwaru Tenriwaru, A. Amiruddin, G. Pontoh","doi":"10.35609/gjbssr.2014.2.3(6)","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.35609/gjbssr.2014.2.3(6)","url":null,"abstract":"Objective - This study aims to determine the impact of tax inspectors behavior observed of dimensional perception of convenience and expediency perception Tax Application Inspection Report (ALPP) on the performance of tax inspection on the Tax Office Madya\u0000\u0000Methodology/Technique - Methology usingMultiple linear regression analysis. The research data was obtained from questionnaires given to related parties in the KPP Madya from the examination and the public. Samples were obtained by the method of random sampling.\u0000\u0000Findings - Based on the total sample of 50 respondents obtained partial results of the study that each variable utilization and ease of use of ALPP significant effect on the performance of tax inspection with TAM approach. Simultaneously two independent variables (utilization and ease of use) has a significant effect on the performance of tax inspection.\u0000\u0000Novelty - The important role technology that affect the performance at the individual level are described in the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). The core of this model is to make information technology a positive impact on the individual performance of these technologies should be exploited and the technology must be in accordance with the type of work performed.\u0000\u0000Type of Paper - Empirical\u0000\u0000Keywords: Utilization, Ease of useand Performanceof tax audits.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124996556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Exploration of the Political Dimensions of Cities’ Fiscal Policy Space","authors":"Paul G. Lewis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2907067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2907067","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing upon literature from political science, economics, and sociology that has attempted to consider how local preferences are translated into policy outcomes, we delineate four conceptually distinct areas of “the local political system”: resident and interest-group demands, partisanship or ideology, local political culture, and municipal institutional arrangements. After describing the data and measures used to characterize political features of the 100 cities in the Fiscal Policy Space (FPS) dataset, we show how those measures can be distilled into a smaller, meaningful set of indicators of political constraint on fiscal policy. Some illustrations of how the FPS cities sort out along these various dimensions are then presented. We conclude by offering several hypotheses about the degree to which each of these dimensions might constrain local choices about budgeting and service provision.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129603355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the Child Tax Credit","authors":"Naomi E. Feldman, Laura Kawano, Peter Katuscák","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2350866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2350866","url":null,"abstract":"We develop an empirical test for whether households understand or misperceive their marginal tax rate. Our identifying variation comes from the loss of the Child Tax Credit when a child turns 17. Using this age discontinuity, we find that despite this tax liability increase being lump-sum and predictable, households reduce their reported wage income upon discovering they have lost the credit. This finding suggests that households misinterpret at least part of this tax liability change as an increase in their marginal tax rate. This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax complexity can cause confusion and leads to unintended behavioral responses. (JEL D12, D14, H24, H31)","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128860311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Mechanisms for the Control of Fiscal Deficits","authors":"Hans Peter Gruener","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2464119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2464119","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that a simple two-stage voting mechanism may implement a constrained optimal state dependent decision about the size of the fiscal deficit. I consider a setup with strategic fiscal deficits a la Tabellini and Alesina (1990). Three groups of voters are informed about the productivity of current public spending. Voters differ in their preferences for public goods and swing voters' preferences may change over time. The current government decides on the current spending mix and it has an incentive to strategically overspend. Under certain conditions, a simple two-stage mechanism in which a deficit requires the approval by a supermajority in parliament implements a constrained optimal decision. When the current majority is small, political bargaining may further increase social welfare. However, when the current majority is large, a supermajority mechanism with bargaining leads to a biased spending mix and reduces welfare whereas the laissez faire mechanism may yield the first best. An appropriately adjusted majority threshold can deal with this problem.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116102716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding and Measuring Online Fiscal Transparency","authors":"J. Justice, J. McNutt, Edward S. Smith","doi":"10.4324/9781315719542-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719542-9","url":null,"abstract":"The movement toward open government and fiscal transparency is a worldwide effort that promises the possibility of better and stronger democracy. Transparency is also presumed to help combat corruption and waste. Greater transparency in government thus has been an important goal of many reformers both outside and within governments over many decades, and contemporary methods of online information dissemination and communication are seen as one important set of tools for fostering transparency. But how do we know transparency when we see it? Efforts both to understand the extent and quality of online fiscal transparency and to implement or improve transparency are facilitated by good measures of quantity and quality. This chapter reviews efforts by academic experts and advocacy organizations to measure and evaluate fiscal transparency in order to draw from those efforts suggestions for the practice of fiscal transparency. An examination of these research efforts reveals significant progress in conceptualization and measurement toward addressing a number of methodological and epistemological issues that concern researchers in the field. The examination also indicates that measures such as those produced by a number of public-interest and academic researchers, although still imperfect from an academic perspective, nonetheless can provide useful guidance for practitioners and citizens seeking to understand and improve their jurisdictions' e-fiscal transparency.We conclude by synthesizing the key elements we found in the literature into a framework for conceptualizing, measuring, and implementing online fiscal transparency, and by drawing lessons for continuing efforts to advance the understanding and practice of transparency.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127804756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}