改革均等化:平衡效率、权利和所有权

Bev Dahlby
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文概述了加拿大的均等化拨款制度以及在财政转移支付制度改革中提出的问题。任何对均等化拨款制度的改革都必须平衡三个问题——通过联邦资金转移而产生的“效率”效应,以及对省级财政政策的激励效应,在合理的可比税收水平上获得合理的可比公共服务的“权利”,以及省级政府对资源的“所有权”和财政政策的独立性。讨论了均等化制度改革的五项建议。关于将资源收入列入均衡公式的比率,我们认为,这一比率应从50%降至25%,并应取消均衡支付总额的最高限额。我们反对将存放在省级主权财富基金中的均等化权益从计算中豁免的提议,因为这不会以现值计算减少总均等化权益,如果将其扩展到各省的所有形式的储蓄(如债务减免),实施起来会很复杂,而且它不会改变资源丰富省份节省更多资源收入的动机。我们反对将CHT和CST减少到财政能力高于平均水平的省份,因为这将减少他们开发和征税资源的动力,而且这将违背这些大块拨款的目的,即减少联邦政府和省政府之间的纵向财政不平衡。我们回顾了Gusen (2012a)的原型模型,该模型将成本和需求的变化纳入平均化权利的计算中,并认为该过程似乎是可行的,值得进一步分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership
In this paper, we provide an overview of the equalization grant system in Canada and the issues that have been raised concerning the reform of the fiscal transfer system. Any reforms to the equalization grant system have to balance three concerns — “efficiency” effects that arise through federal financing of transfers, and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, “entitlement” to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation, and “ownership” of resources and independence of fiscal policies by provincial governments. Five proposals for reform of the equalization system are discussed. With regard to the inclusion rate for resource revenues in equalization formula, we argue that the rate should be reduced from 50 per cent to 25 per cent and that ceiling on total equalization payments should be eliminated. We argue against the proposal to exempt from the calculation of equalization entitlements that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds because this would not reduce total equalization entitlements in present value terms, it would be complex to implement if it extended to all forms of savings by provinces (such as debt reduction), and it would not alter the resource rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource revenues. We argue against a proposal to reduce CHT and CST to provinces with above average fiscal capacities because this would reduce their incentive to develop and tax their resources, and it would be counter to the purpose of these block grants, which is to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial governments. We review the Gusen (2012a) proto-type model for incorporating variations in costs and needs in the computation of the equalization entitlements and argue that this procedure seems feasible and merits further analysis.
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