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How to be a perspectival pluralist 如何成为视角多元主义者
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12980
Olla Solomyak
{"title":"How to be a perspectival pluralist","authors":"Olla Solomyak","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12980","url":null,"abstract":"The temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of <jats:italic>perspectives on reality</jats:italic>: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective <jats:italic>privileged</jats:italic> above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a <jats:italic>pluralist</jats:italic> conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the <jats:italic>absoluteness</jats:italic> of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140842322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Which is More Important? Moral Virtue or Life itself?: An Exploration of a Confucian Theme 哪个更重要？道德美德还是生命本身？对儒家主题的探索
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12973
Sihao Chew
{"title":"Which is More Important? Moral Virtue or Life itself?: An Exploration of a Confucian Theme","authors":"Sihao Chew","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12973","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a dilemma within the Confucian tradition wherein one is forced to choose between upholding moral virtue and preserving one's own life. The mainstream view valorises and exalts the act of sacrificing one's life in order to uphold moral virtue. There are many supporters of this view, spanning across different periods, including but not limited to Confucius, Mencius, the Cheng brothers, Zhu Xi, and so on. There is, however, an opposing voice within the Confucian tradition. Wang Gen, a Neo‐Confucian thinker and founder of the Taizhou School of thought, opposes the mainstream position by arguing for the primacy of life and against the glorification of these acts of sacrifice. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to trace the development of the mainstream view within the Confucian tradition. The second aim investigates how Wang Gen argues against the mainstream position whilst situating himself within the Confucian tradition.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140826673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recent empirical work on religious experience: New directions 关于宗教体验的最新实证研究：新方向
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12977
Wes Skolits
{"title":"Recent empirical work on religious experience: New directions","authors":"Wes Skolits","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12977","url":null,"abstract":"Novel developments in neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology have spawned a thriving empirical literature on religious experience. Previous literature in the cognitive science of religion has largely ignored empirical results from these fields, focusing narrowly on results from evolutionary psychology. Additionally, it has ignored the epistemological relevance of non‐paradigmatic cases of religious experience discussed in the literature from these subspecialties. In this article I submit that philosophical research on religious experience should take empirical work outside of evolutionary psychology as its primary foci towards uncovering fresh perspectives. I focus on three different literatures from neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology as case studies for generating novel philosophical research. I show that empirically‐discovered factors related to non‐paradigmatic religious experiences raise crucial and unique epistemological questions.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140842551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reliability in Machine Learning 机器学习的可靠性
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12974
Thomas Grote, Konstantin Genin, Emily Sullivan
{"title":"Reliability in Machine Learning","authors":"Thomas Grote, Konstantin Genin, Emily Sullivan","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12974","url":null,"abstract":"Issues of reliability are claiming center‐stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning – as far as they are concerned with reliability.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140809501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles 规则遵循 II：最新工作和新难题
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-04-27 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12976
Indrek Reiland
{"title":"Rule‐Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles","authors":"Indrek Reiland","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12976","url":null,"abstract":"“Rule‐following” is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something <jats:italic>general</jats:italic> in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule‐following with emphasis on Kripke's skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two‐part contribution was devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II is about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian's and Wright's new puzzles.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140812865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Imagination as a source of empirical justification 想象是经验论证的源泉
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-03-19 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12969
Joshua Myers
{"title":"Imagination as a source of empirical justification","authors":"Joshua Myers","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12969","url":null,"abstract":"Traditionally, philosophers have been skeptical that the imagination can justify beliefs about the actual world. After all, how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? However, within the past decade or so, a lively debate has emerged over whether the imagination can justify empirical belief and, if so, how. This paper provides a critical overview of the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140181833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Symmetries and Representation Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass 对称与表象》即将在《哲学指南针》上发表
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-03-18 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12971
Geoffrey Hall, Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez
{"title":"Symmetries and Representation Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass","authors":"Geoffrey Hall, Sebastián Murgueitio Ramírez","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12971","url":null,"abstract":"It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or <jats:italic>could</jats:italic> provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention in developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140166446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Objectionable Commemorations: Ethical and Political Issues 教学指南：反对性纪念活动：伦理和政治问题
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-03-16 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12970
Chong‐Ming Lim, Ten‐Herng Lai
{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: Objectionable Commemorations: Ethical and Political Issues","authors":"Chong‐Ming Lim, Ten‐Herng Lai","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12970","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"99 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140151608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Mental Files 心理档案
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-03-14 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12967
Rachel Goodman
{"title":"Mental Files","authors":"Rachel Goodman","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12967","url":null,"abstract":"The so‐called ‘mental files theory’ in the philosophy of mind stems from an analogy comparing object‐concepts to ‘files’, and the mind to a ‘filing system’. Though this analogy appears in philosophy of mind and language from the 1970s onward, it remains unclear to many how it should be interpreted. The central commitments of the mental files theory therefore also remain unclear. Based on influential uses of the file analogy within philosophy, I elaborate three central explanatory roles for mental files. Next, I outline several common criticisms of the file picture, which have been a source of resistance to the view. Finally, I outline several interpretations of the theory, thus highlighting that the best interpretation of the file‐theory's central analogy remains a live issue.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140151610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Corrective Duties/Corrective Justice 矫正职责/矫正司法
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-03-11 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12968
Giulio Fornaroli
{"title":"Corrective Duties/Corrective Justice","authors":"Giulio Fornaroli","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12968","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the <i>ground</i> (why correct?) and <i>content</i> (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140098713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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