Philosophy Compass最新文献

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Norms of Reasoning 推理规范
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.13008
Conor McHugh
{"title":"Norms of Reasoning","authors":"Conor McHugh","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13008","url":null,"abstract":"When we reason, we can be assessed against diverse norms. Unfortunately different types of such norms are often conflated. This article distinguishes some different types of norms to which we are subject when we reason, and shows how this can help to clarify certain philosophical debates. It then considers, briefly, ‘norms of starting points’, and, at more length, ‘norms of transitions’. In closing it briefly considers whether we might expect to find a unifying account of the source of these norms, and if so what it might look like.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141742763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fake News! 假新闻!
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-06-28 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.13005
James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O’Connor
{"title":"Fake News!","authors":"James Owen Weatherall, Cailin O’Connor","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13005","url":null,"abstract":"We review several topics of philosophical interest connected to misleading online content. First we consider proposed definitions of different types of misleading content. Then we consider the epistemology of misinformation, focusing on approaches from virtue epistemology and social epistemology. Finally we discuss how misinformation is related to belief polarization, and argue that models of rational polarization present special challenges for conceptualizing fake news and misinformation.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141508644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Etiology of injustice: An introduction 不公正的根源:导言
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12978
Susan Erck
{"title":"Etiology of injustice: An introduction","authors":"Susan Erck","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12978","url":null,"abstract":"To formulate a plan of action for bringing about a decisive and reasonably stable <jats:italic>end</jats:italic> to an injustice, it is helpful to understand the factors and conditions that critically make the difference in <jats:italic>causing</jats:italic> that injustice. This intuitively seems correct regarding active and ongoing problems. But what precisely is involved in this kind of explanatory endeavor, and what is its role in practical efforts to confront existing wrongs? This paper offers an introduction to <jats:italic>etiology of injustice</jats:italic>, which is the study and explanation of the <jats:italic>operative causation</jats:italic> of injustices. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of social transformation, causation, and remedial justice, I sketch a conceptual framework for understanding and undertaking the task of etiology of injustice and outline the contours of the etiological tradition of thought.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141514011","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models 因果模型与形而上学--第二部分:解读因果模型
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-06-27 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.13007
Jennifer McDonald
{"title":"Causal Models and Metaphysics—Part 2: Interpreting Causal Models","authors":"Jennifer McDonald","doi":"10.1111/phc3.13007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.13007","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141508643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal Models and Metaphysics – Part 1: Using Causal Models 因果模型与形而上学 - 第 1 部分:因果模型的使用
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12975
Jennifer McDonald
{"title":"Causal Models and Metaphysics – Part 1: Using Causal Models","authors":"Jennifer McDonald","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12975","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a general introduction to the use of causal models in the metaphysics of causation, specifically structural equation models and directed acyclic graphs. It reviews the formal framework, lays out a method of interpretation capable of representing different underlying metaphysical relations, and describes the use of these models in analyzing causation.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Amoralism in the Hanfeizi 韩非子》中的无道德主义
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12979
Gabrièle Escoffier
{"title":"Amoralism in the Hanfeizi","authors":"Gabrièle Escoffier","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12979","url":null,"abstract":"This article surveys three possible ways to assess morality in the <jats:italic>Hanfeizi</jats:italic>. The first is the “traditional” outlook, according to which Han Fei disregards all moral considerations in politics. The second acknowledges the presence of moral questions in the text but maintains that it ultimately promotes amoralism as an essential feature of the Legalist state. A (less common) third way is to say that there is a moral core to Han Fei's political philosophy. I will defend the third way, which shifts the perception of the <jats:italic>Hanfeizi</jats:italic> from a mere manual of political manipulation to a comprehensive ideal vision for the world. This interpretation necessitates a recognition of how political morality can coherently exist alongside an apparent divide between private ethics and political action. This is something that those seeking more systematic forms of ethics in the <jats:italic>Hanfeizi</jats:italic> might overlook.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"55 32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141191364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pain Philosophy: Recent Debates and Future Challenges 疼痛哲学:近期辩论与未来挑战
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12981
Sabrina Coninx
{"title":"Pain Philosophy: Recent Debates and Future Challenges","authors":"Sabrina Coninx","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12981","url":null,"abstract":"In the last decades, pain has moved more and more into the foreground of philosophical discussion. Still, there exists substantial disagreement concerning the exact nature of pain. The paper provides an overview concerning central topics in recent pain philosophy, indicating remaining challenges and outlining promising directions for future research. Starting point is the assumption that broadly constructed pain episodes are composed of at least four paradigmatic components: (a) physiological disturbance, (b) phenomenal experience (sensory + affective), (c) action tendency, and (d) alteration in a broader mental network. On that basis, the paper first addresses the challenge to fathom which of these components provides the necessary and sufficient condition for an episode being a pain episode. This involves discussions on the folk concept of pain as well as the closer examination of dissociative cases in which some components are apparently absent. Second, the paper addresses the challenge to define how the relevant components relate to each other, for example, how closely the phenomenal experience of pain is bound to the presence of a particular physiological disturbance or action tendency. This debate takes place mainly in the context of strong intentionalist theories—indicative, evaluative, and imperative. Third, the paper argues for the future development of a research program that centrally resolves around the challenges that chronic pain poses. This focus may open stronger interdisciplinary connections to clinical research and practice and advance considerations on topics that have so far received insufficient attention in pain philosophy (e.g., pain‐related suffering).","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"1932 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141191346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shamelessly Blue: Pitch Complexes and the Social Otherwise 无耻的蓝色投球情结与其他社会现象
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12972
Andrea Dionne Warmack
{"title":"Shamelessly Blue: Pitch Complexes and the Social Otherwise","authors":"Andrea Dionne Warmack","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12972","url":null,"abstract":"Early american Black Blueswomen—such as Ma Rainey, Alberta Hunter, Bessie Smith, Billie Holiday, and Nina Simone—perform Blues as a praxis that both critiques and transforms the ways in which american Black people were—and continue to be—excluded from the construct of the human subject. Merleau‐Ponty's account of inter‐subjectivity is predicated on his account of the human subject who is always‐already in a social milieu in which they are never taken for an object. Subjectivity is affirmed through the subject's ability to <jats:italic>differentiate</jats:italic> itself from objects via sight. In this way the human subject is sensorially, affectively, epistemically, and axiologically organized as eye‐forward. The human subject's ability to exceed objectification runs counter to the lived experiences of a number of precaritized peoples, specifically, american Black people. If being seen without being objectified is the lived experience of the subject, then subjectivity is an exclusive way‐of‐ being in the world. Rather than inhabit this exclusion from human subjectivity as a lack, american Black people—as is evidenced by Blues—create a social otherwise with distinct ways of living—not just surviving or enduring—created within, but not wholly determined by, the pornotrope or the wake. This paper begins to sound out a way that this social otherwise breathes life into its own socio‐ethical experience via a turn to the aural. This paper takes up Blues to explore what expressive and affective ways‐of‐ being in the world are possible with an ear‐forward sensorial organization.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral worth 道德价值
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12982
Euan K. Metz
{"title":"Moral worth","authors":"Euan K. Metz","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12982","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of moral worth, of being creditworthy for doing the right thing, is often seen as essential feature of a moral theory. It forces us to provide a clear account of the relationship between moral motivation and moral action, raising important questions about the demands that morality makes of us. Work on moral worth has a long lineage, especially in Kantian scholarship. Recent years, however, have seen a more focused interest in the nature of moral worth outside of the Kantian tradition. Indeed, part of this interest stems from a rejection of an orthodox Kantian understanding of what moral worth is. In this article, I chart prominent reasons for rejecting the orthodoxy, and distinguish between two rival camps that have emerged: Right Reasons Accounts and Rightness Accounts. I delineate some of the demands that these accounts must meet, and end by discussing a potential way forward that has emerged via hybrid views and goal‐based views that attempt to utilise the most promising features of each.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to be a perspectival pluralist 如何成为视角多元主义者
IF 1.8 1区 哲学
Philosophy Compass Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12980
Olla Solomyak
{"title":"How to be a perspectival pluralist","authors":"Olla Solomyak","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12980","url":null,"abstract":"The temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of <jats:italic>perspectives on reality</jats:italic>: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective <jats:italic>privileged</jats:italic> above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a <jats:italic>pluralist</jats:italic> conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the <jats:italic>absoluteness</jats:italic> of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2024-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140842322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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