{"title":"Efforts and their feelings","authors":"J. Bermúdez, Olivier Massin","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12894","url":null,"abstract":": Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach).","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"18 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41306732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deep Disagreement (Part 2): Epistemology of Deep Disagreement.","authors":"Chris Ranalli, Thirza Lagewaard","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12887","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>What is the epistemological significance of deep disagreement? Part I explored the nature of deep disagreement, while Part II considers its epistemological significance. It focuses on two core problems: the incommensurability and the rational resolvability problems. We critically survey key responses to these challenges, before raising worries for a variety of responses to them, including skeptical, relativist, and absolutist responses to the incommensurability problem, and to certain steadfast and conciliatory responses to the rational resolvability problem. We then pivot to the ethical and political dimensions of deep disagreement. We focus on whether an unwillingness to engage with positions one considers to be immoral or repugnant might be good, and conclude with some reflections on the moral risks of engagement.</p>","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"17 12","pages":"e12887"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/ca/59/PHC3-17-0.PMC10078492.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9274108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.","authors":"Chris Ranalli, Thirza Lagewaard","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12886","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are 'deep disagreements'. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others.</p>","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"17 12","pages":"e12886"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/06/ee/PHC3-17-0.PMC10077999.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9327119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Counterspeech","authors":"Bianca Cepollaro, Maxime Lepoutre, R. Simpson","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12890","url":null,"abstract":". Counterspeech is communication that tries to counteract potential harm brought about by other speech. Theoretical interest in counterspeech partly derives from a libertarian ideal – as captured in the claim that the solution to bad speech is more speech – and partly from a recognition that well-meaning attempts to counteract harm through speech can easily misfire or backfire. Here we survey recent work on the question of what makes counterspeech effective at remedying or preventing harm, in those cases where it is effective, as well as work investigating when and why there is a duty to engage in counterspeech. We suggest that the most fruitful area for philosophical inquiry on this topic, currently, relates to the questions about efficacy. Specifically, we argue that there is a need for better frameworks for conceptualizing the efficacy of counterspeech. Philosophers have collaborative work to do, alongside social scientists, in developing these frameworks.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46074365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value","authors":"Uriah Kriegel","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12888","url":null,"abstract":":: Imagine a zombie world that looks “from the outside” just like ours, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. Creatures that look like us move about just as we do and make the same noises we do, but nobody experiences or feels anything. How much of the epistemic value that’s exemplified in our world survives in that one? The short answer is: any kind of epistemic value that requires the occurrence of consciousness for its exemplification cannot exist in that world, but epistemic value that doesn’t require consciousness can exist. The real question, though, is what kinds of epistemic value require the occurrence of consciousness. We will consider four central epistemic values: justification, truth, acquaintance, and understanding.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45461351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carnap's philosophy of mathematics","authors":"Benjamin Marschall","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12884","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12884","url":null,"abstract":"For several decades Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics used to be either dismissed or ignored. It was perceived as a form of linguistic conventionalism and thus taken to rely on the bankrupt notion of truth by convention. However, recent scholarship has revealed a more subtle picture. It has been forcefully argued that Carnap is not a linguistic conventionalist in any straightforward sense, and that apparently decisive objections to his position target a straw man. This raises two questions. First, how exactly should we characterise Carnap’s actual philosophy of mathematics? Secondly, is his position an attractive alternative to established views? I will tackle these by looking at Carnap’s response to the incompleteness theorems. Drawing on objections put forward by Gödel and Beth, I argue that some crucial aspects of Carnap’s positive account have remained underdeveloped. Suggestions on what a full evaluation of Carnap’s position requires are made.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45050985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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