{"title":"Voting for Democracy: Chile&Apos;S Plebiscito and the Electoral Participation of a Generation","authors":"E. Kaplan, F. Saltiel, Sergio S. Urzúa","doi":"10.3386/w26440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26440","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the long-term consequences of voting for democracy. We study Chile’s 1988 plebiscite, which ended 15 years of dictatorship and reestablished democracy. Taking advantage of individual-level voting data, we implement an age-based regression discontinuity design comparing long-run registration and turnout rates across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals. We find plebiscite eligibility increased electoral turnout three decades later. The magnitude of the initial mobilization emerges as the mechanism. Plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of less-educated voters to register compared to other upstream elections. The event contributed to the emergence of one-party rule the 20 years following democratization. (JEL D72, D82, O17)","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115984884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Did Trump&Apos;S Trade War Impact the 2018 Election?","authors":"Emily Blanchard, C. Bown, D. Chor","doi":"10.3386/w26434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26434","url":null,"abstract":"We findthat Republican candidates lost support in the 2018 US congressional election in counties more exposed to trade retaliation, but saw no commensurate electoral gains from US tariff protection. The electoral losses were driven by retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products, and were only partially mitigated by the US agricultural subsidies announced in summer 2018. Republicans also fared worse in counties that had seen recent gains in health insurance coverage, affirming the importance of health care as an election issue. A counterfactual calculation suggests that the trade war (respectively, health care) can account for five (eight) of Republicans' lost House seats.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130284062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertain Policy Implementation with Public Information","authors":"Mathew Knudson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456059","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians' policy proposals are often vetted by the media, academics, and non-partisan organizations. This paper explores the effects of this policy vetting, modeled as a public signal about the expected outcome of the policy, on a politician's incentive to implement the policies she proposes. In my model, the voter and the politician are uncertain about the competence of the politician and the suitability of her proposed policy. Because more competent politicians are more likely to propose good policies, the voter can use the policy signal to update her beliefs about the politician. This updating creates a perverse reputational incentive for the politician to implement her policy proposal if and only if its expected outcome is sufficiently low. When the results of vetting are shown only to the politician, she implements her policy only when its expected outcome is sufficiently high, because her policy information does not directly affect the voter's beliefs about her.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124140275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Salience and Accountability: School Infrastructure and Last-Minute Electoral Punishment","authors":"Nicolás Ajzenman, Ruben Durante","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3496369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3496369","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Can seemingly unimportant factors influence voting decisions by making certain issues salient? We study this in the context of Argentina’s 2015 presidential elections by examining how the infrastructure quality of the school where citizens voted influenced their choice. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of voters to ballot stations in public schools in Buenos Aires, we show that individuals assigned to poorer infrastructure schools were less likely to vote for Mauricio Macri, the incumbent mayor running for president. The effect is larger in lower-income areas, where private education is more unusual, and in places where more households have children of school age.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114708181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Candidate Competition on Differentiated Policy Sets","authors":"Mathew Knudson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3456073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the classical spatial model of two candidate competition, an equilibrium exists only if the distribution of voter ideal points is such that every median hyperplane passes through a single policy. The necessity of this condition crucially depends upon both candidates being able to propose any policy in a Euclidean space. We assume that each candidate is affiliated with a party which restricts the policies that its candidate can propose and that voters have Euclidean spatial preferences. We show that if the candidates can only make proposals from disjoint sets of policies, then an equilibrium exists if each median hyperplane passes through a region with a nonempty interior that contains the equilibrium policy. An equilibrium, if it exists, is generically robust to perturbations of the voters' ideal points.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116056026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Consensus Hurts: Experts’ Advice and Electoral Support","authors":"Antoni-Italo de Moragas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3647075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3647075","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed experts. I fi nd that, when citizens do not observe the vested interest of each expert and their interests are sufficiently correlated, the relationship between the share of experts endorsing an alternative and the share of citizens voting for it is non-monotonic. The explanation is that consensus among experts can be reached either because all experts share the same information or because experts ignore the information they have and provide their advice according to their own interests. The non-monotonic result holds even if experts are strategic.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116586728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resolving the Progressive Paradox: Conservative Value Framing of Progressive Economic Policies Increases Candidate Support","authors":"J. Voelkel, Robb Willer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3385818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3385818","url":null,"abstract":"While polls show progressive economic policies are popular, progressive candidates typically lose elections in the U.S. One explanation for this progressive paradox is that the opponents of progressive candidates often win through “symbolic politics,†successfully harnessing values and ideologies that receive broad support from the general public. Here we explore one solution to the progressive paradox, testing whether progressive candidates achieve greater support by framing their policy platforms in terms of values and ideologies that resonate beyond the progressive base. We tested this claim in two experiments (total N=4,138), including one pre-registered experiment conducted on a nationally representative sample. We found that a presidential candidate who framed his progressive economic platform to be consistent with more conservative value concerns like patriotism, family, and respect for tradition--as opposed to more liberal value concerns like equality and social justice--was supported significantly more by conservatives and, unexpectedly, by moderates as well. These effects were mediated by perceived value similarity with the candidate. Furthermore, a manipulation of how progressive the candidate’s platform was had weak and inconsistent effects, and did not interact with the framing of the platform. These findings indicate that in our experiments framing mattered more than policy, suggesting that moral reframing could be an effective alternative to policy centrism for candidates seeking broader support. Our results illustrate the important effects of value framing of economic policy, offering a solution to the longstanding puzzle regarding the gap between progressive policy and candidate support.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134472161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Citizens Enforce Accountability for Public Goods Provision? Evidence from India’s Rural Roads Program","authors":"Tanu M. Goyal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3378451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3378451","url":null,"abstract":"While a vast literature examines the prevalence of ethnic voting and clientelism in low-income contexts, empirical tests of whether elections are being used to hold politicians accountable for public goods provision are few. Leveraging a rare exogenous variation in the World's largest rural roads program, a high visibility Indian program that is unprecedented in using informational devices to raise citizens' awareness about roads provision, this paper examines this question at a scale than has previously been possible. With an original dataset of 180,000 rural roads provided across half a million Indian villages aggregated to various electoral levels, national, state and polling booth, over last 20 years, I find that roads provision fails to boost electoral support for the incumbent party. Exploiting subnational variation in program implementation and Indian politics, I show that quality or corruption concerns, attribution errors, timing of provision or variation in political competition, media access or literacy, cannot explain these results. The findings have implications for democratic governance and suggest that information constraints are unlikely to be a barrier to accountability in low-income contexts.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"28 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132880629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nour Abdul-Razzak, Carlo G. Prato, Stephane Wolton
{"title":"After Citizens United: How Outside Spending Shapes American Democracy","authors":"Nour Abdul-Razzak, Carlo G. Prato, Stephane Wolton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2823778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2823778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how lifting a ban on contributions from corporations and unions to groups engaging in outside spending (independent political advertising) affects electoral outcomes, representatives' ideology, and targeted public good provision. Using a differences-in-differences design, we find that removing constraints on the funding of outside spending improves the electoral chances of Republican candidates and leads to more conservative state legislatures. We also provide moderate evidence that these regulatory changes have increased polarization and some types of targeted public good provision. Using a game-theoretic framework, we show that these empirical results are consistent with an increase in the salience of local Republican candidates and (at worst) a moderate decrease in the salience of local Democratic candidates relative to national factors such as partisan tides. Our theoretical and empirical findings provide a first step towards understanding the role outside spending and, more generally, a more complete view of special interest group influence in elections.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116724724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strict Id Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008–2018","authors":"Enrico Cantoni, V. Pons","doi":"10.3386/w25522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w25522","url":null,"abstract":"U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.3-billion-observations panel, we find the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications and cannot be attributed to mobilization against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. ID requirements have no effect on fraud either – actual or perceived. Overall, our results suggest that efforts to reform voter ID laws may not have much impact on elections.","PeriodicalId":396883,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Voters & Elections (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116049201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}