Feminist Philosophy Quarterly最新文献_第4页

Religious Faith in the Unjust Meantime: The Spiritual Violence of Clergy Sexual Abuse 非正义时期的宗教信仰:神职人员性侵的精神暴力

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-07-25 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7290

T. Tobin

引用次数: 6

Global Gender Justice and Epistemic Oppression: A Response to an Epistemic Dilemma 全球性别正义与认知压迫:对认知困境的回应

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-07-25 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7294

Corwin Aragon

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引用次数: 2

Global Gender Justice and The Feminization of Responsibility 全球性别正义与责任女性化

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-07-25 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7282

Serene J. Khader

引用次数: 1

Introduction to the Special Issue: In the Unjust Meantime 特刊导言:在不公正的时期

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-07-25 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.8184

B. Emerick, Scott Wisor

引用次数: 0

The Construction of a Consumable Body 可消耗身体的构造

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-03-30 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.1.7311

A. Suen

引用次数: 2

Feminist Aims and a Trans-Inclusive Definition of “Woman” 女权主义目标与跨包容性的“女性”定义

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-03-30 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.1.7313

Katie Kirkland

引用次数: 7

Anatomy of the Thigh Gap 大腿间隙解剖

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2019-03-30 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2019.1.7312

C. Leboeuf

引用次数: 5

Introduction: Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory 导论:认知不公与认知理论

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6227

P. Giladi, N. McMillan

引用次数: 5

Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice 冒犯白人男性:种族诋毁、误认和认知不公

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6234

Louise Richardson‑Self

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引用次数: 6

Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice 抵制结构性认知不公

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6230

Michael D. Doan

{"title":"Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice","authors":"Michael D. Doan","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6230","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6230","url":null,"abstract":"What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and ongoing political struggles. Recent work in the theory of recognition—particularly the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists—can help to identify and correct the shortcomings of these approaches. I offer a critical appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three characteristics of Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of political struggles. I propose that a theory of epistemic injustice can better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of such struggles by acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126969438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13