{"title":"Precarious Embodiment","authors":"D. Koukal","doi":"10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5433","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay I endeavor to provide such an account, and describe at a pretheoretical level an embodied subjectivity at odds with its own state of embodiment, and on the other hand, to explore the limited agency induced by constraints that fall upon an embodied subject who is compelled to live a body which is free to engage the various possibilities of the world in every respect except one, within the context of an intercorporeal social reality. This description will provide a sound ontological foundation where the central place of embodiment in the abortion debate can be re-asserted and properly taken into account. What this description will reveal is the ontological drama of such “aversely pregnant subjectivities” at a time when ever more legislation is being passed that poses ever more restrictions on reproductive rights of women in the United States (Guttmacher Institute 2018). This investigation is all the more pertinent in light of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s recent announcement that he is retiring from the U.S. Supreme Court, which may well put the right to legal abortions in jeopardy (Davis 2018). My highest ambition, however, is to convey the significance of these restrictions to those who have never been and never can become pregnant, but who by and large determine the polices that play a substantial role in shaping such subjectivities. ","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"573 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123124766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Finding Yourself in a State of Nature","authors":"Jordan Pascoe","doi":"10.5206/fpq/2019.3.6210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2019.3.6210","url":null,"abstract":"I defend the right to an abortion at any stage of pregnancy by drawing on a Kantian account of consent and innate right. I examine how pregnant women are positioned in moral and legal debates about abortion, and develop a Kanitan account of bodily autonomy in order to pregnant women’s epistemic authority over the experience of pregnancy. Second, I show how Kant's distinction between innate and private right offers an excellent legal framework for embodied rights, including abortion and sexual consent, and I draw on the legal definition of sexual consent in order to show how abortion discourse undermines women's innate right. I then explore Kant’s treatment of the infanticidal mother, and draw out the parallels between this case and contemporary abortion rights in order to develop a distinctly Kantian framework of reproductive rights in non-ideal conditions. Finally, I explore the implications of this non-ideal approach for contemporary abortion discourse, arguing that debates about the legality of abortion should more broadly engage the barbaric conditions of reproductive injustice.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121571186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against Abolition","authors":"M. Cull","doi":"10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5898","url":null,"abstract":"Analytic metaphysics of gender has taken an ameliorative turn towards ethical and political questions regarding what our concept of gender ought to be, and how gendered society should be structured. Abolitionism about gender, which claims that we ought to mandate gender out of existence, has therefore seen renewed interest. I consider three arguments for abolitionism from radically different perspectives: Haslanger’s simple argument, Escalante’s Gender Nihilism, and Okin’s argument from ideal theory. I argue that none of the above manage to establish the desirability of abolitionism and that we should be wary of the abolitionist position, as it imperils trans lives.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"229 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132607834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Caregiving and the Abuse of Power","authors":"J. Walsh","doi":"10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/fpq/2019.3.5418","url":null,"abstract":"Caregiving relationships are often characterized by an imbalance of power between the caregiver and her cared-for. The danger that this power will be abused is a source of serious moral concern. In this article, I argue that the risk of an abuse of power sometimes stems not from the possession of power itself, but from the very nature of caring relationships. This is because carers must be prepared to exercise non-minimal amounts of power over their cared-fors, even if doing so is likely to cause the cared-for distress or even pain. This means that caring itself, rather than the malign influence of power dynamics, generates a risk of unintentional abuse. One of the ways in which this risk can be reduced, I argue, is by trying to avoid an exclusive focus on the outcomes of care, and by paying more attention to the way in which that care is delivered.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114601710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Multicultural Literacy, Epistemic Injustice, and White Ignorance","authors":"Amandine Catala","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7289","url":null,"abstract":"The traditional blackface character Black Pete has been at the center of an intense controversy in the Netherlands, with most black citizens denouncing the tradition as racist and most white citizens endorsing it as harmless fun. I analyze the controversy as an utter failure, on the part of white citizens, of what Alison Jaggar has called multicultural literacy. This article aims to identify both the causes of this failure of multicultural literacy and the conditions required for multicultural literacy to be possible. I argue that this failure of multicultural literacy is due to hermeneutical injustice and white ignorance. I close by considering possible avenues for fostering multicultural literacy.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125165898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Study of Moral Revolutions as Naturalized Moral Epistemology","authors":"D. Lowe","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7284","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for the merits of studying historical moral revolutions to inform moral and political philosophy. Such a research program is not merely of empirical, historical interest but has normative implications. To explain why, I situate the proposal in the tradition of naturalized epistemology. As Alison M. Jaggar and other scholars have argued, a naturalistic approach is characteristic of much feminist philosophy. Accordingly, I argue that the study of moral revolutions would be especially fruitful for feminist moral and political philosophers.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133271214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Clinician Knows Best”? Injustices in the Medicalization of Mental Illness","authors":"Abigail Gosselin","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7285","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a non-ideal theory approach advocated for by Alison Jaggar to show that practices involved with the medicalization of serious mental disorders can subject people who have these disorders to a cycle of vulnerability that keeps them trapped within systems of injustice. When medicalization locates mental disorders solely as problems of individual biology, without regard to social factors, and when it treats mental disorders as personal defects, it perpetuates injustice in several ways: by enabling biased diagnoses through stereotyping, by exploiting and coercing people who are seen as insufficiently competent, and by perpetuating idealized conceptions of choice and control that do not take into account people’s real limitations and the social context of health. Through practices of diagnosis, treatment, and recovery, medicalization can perpetuate injustices toward people who have serious mental disorders.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129210798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three Hypotheses for Explaining the So-Called Oppression of Men","authors":"Peter W. Higgins","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7291","url":null,"abstract":"Are men oppressed as men? The evidence given in support of affirmative responses to this question usually consists in examples of harms, limitations, or requirements masculinity imposes on men: men are expected to pay on dates, men must be breadwinners for their families, men can be drafted for war, and so forth. This article explicates three hypotheses that account for the harms, limitations, and requirements masculinity imposes on men and, drawing on the work of Alison Jaggar, seeks to show that these hypotheses collectively are explanatorily superior to the hypothesis the men are oppressed as men. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131450356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thinking about Justice in the Unjust Meantime","authors":"Alison M. Jaggar","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7283","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers endorse the ideal of justice yet disagree radically over what that ideal requires. One persistent problem for thinking about justice is that the unjust social arrangements that originally motivated our questions may also distort our thinking about possible answers. This paper suggests some strategies for improving our thinking about justice in the unjust meantime. As our world becomes more just, we may expect our thinking about justice to improve. \u0000 ","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126281715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sisterhood and \"Doing Good\": Asymmetries of Western Feminist Location, Access and Orbits of Concern","authors":"Uma Narayan","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2019.2.7299","url":null,"abstract":"There are a variety of discourses and practices that position Western feminists (and Western political subjects more generally) as people who have a moral and political obligation to concern themselves with the welfare, suffering, or empowerment of non-Western subjects, often women, and intervene to “do good” on their behalf. Conversely, there are virtually no discourses and practices that assign moral and political obligations to non-Western feminists (or non-Western political subjects more generally) to intervene in matters involving the welfare or suffering of Western subjects, including women. A central goal of my paper is to make this asymmetry explicit and distinguish it from charges such as “essentialism” more commonly made against Western feminist representations of their Others. I explore the consequences of discourses and practices that construct Western subjects as entitled to and obligated to concern themselves with the world entire, while not extending this global scope of concern to non-Western subjects. I critically examine, among other things, the roles assigned Western-funded NGOs in enabling Western subjects to engage in practices of “doing good” and I explore alternative possibilities that are more explicitly “political.” Along the way, I examine certain blind spots in Western political theory that appear connected to the picture of Western subjects as obligated to “do good” in distant places. My analysis engages substantially with Alison Jaggar’s essay, “Saving Amina,” drawing attention to matters of agreement and possible disagreement.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121546100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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