Feminist Philosophy Quarterly最新文献_第5页

“Knower” as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition 作为伦理概念的“知者”:从认知代理到相互承认

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6228

Matthew Congdon

引用次数: 14

“Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition “我也是”:认识上的不公正和争取承认的斗争

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6231

D. Jackson

引用次数: 29

Recognizing Settler Ignorance in the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 加拿大真相与和解委员会承认定居者的无知

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6229

Anna Cook

{"title":"Recognizing Settler Ignorance in the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission","authors":"Anna Cook","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6229","url":null,"abstract":"The Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has been mandated to collect testimonies from survivors of the Indian Residential Schools system. The TRC demands survivors of the residential school system to share their personal narratives under the assumption that the sharing of narratives will inform the Canadian public of the residential school legacy and will motivate a transformation of settler identity. I contend, however, that the TRC provides a concrete example of how a politics of recognition fails to transform relationships between Native and settler Canadians not only because it enacts an internalization of colonial recognition, but because it fails to account for what I call “settler ignorance.” Work in epistemologies of ignorance and epistemic oppression gives language to explain sustained denial and provide tools to further understand how settler denial is sustained, and how it can be made visible, and so challenged. For this task, Mills’s articulation of white ignorance should be expanded to a consideration of white settler ignorance. Over and above an account of white ignorance, such an account will have to consider the underlying logics of settler colonialism. This characterization of settler ignorance will show that the denial of past and ongoing violence against Indigenous peoples, through the reconstruction of the past to assert the primacy of settlers, is not explainable in terms of a lack of recognition but is rather structural ignorance.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114942345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

“Prediscursive Epistemic Injury”: Recognizing Another Form of Epistemic Injustice? “前话语认知伤害”:认识认知不公正的另一种形式?

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6232

Andrea Lobb

{"title":"“Prediscursive Epistemic Injury”: Recognizing Another Form of Epistemic Injustice?","authors":"Andrea Lobb","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6232","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice (2007) through one specific aspect of Axel Honneth’s recognition theory. Taking a first cue from Honneth’s critique of the limitations of the “language-theoretic framework” in Habermas’ discourse ethics, it floats the idea that the two categories of Fricker’s groundbreaking analysis—testimonial and hermeneutical injustice—likewise lean towards a speech-based metric (equating harm to the capacities to know with compromise to the capacity to speak of what one knows). If we accept, however, that there are also implicit, preverbal, affective, and embodied ways of knowing and channels of knowledge transmission, this warrants an expansion of Fricker’s original concept. By drawing on Honneth’s recognition theory (particularly his Winnicottian-inspired account of ‘first order’ recognition and basic trust), I argue it is possible to extend the account of epistemic injustice beyond Fricker’s two central categories, to glimpse yet another register of serious “wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower.” I define this harm as prediscursive epistemic injury and offer two central cases to illustrate this additional form of epistemic injustice.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"23 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133238734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory: A New Conversation —Afterword 认知不公与认知理论:一种新的对话-后记

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6235

M. Fricker

{"title":"Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory: A New Conversation —Afterword","authors":"M. Fricker","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6235","url":null,"abstract":"The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dimension of our agency and selfhood. Might we talk intelligibly—while staying in tune with Honneth’s concepts and their Hegelian key—of a generic idea of epistemic recognition? Such an idea might itself be seen to apply at the same three levels to indicate: first, basic epistemic self-confidence; second, our status as epistemically responsible; and third, a certain epistemic self-esteem that reflects the epistemic esteem we receive from others. The papers in this volume surely sound a chord in the affirmative, and together they steer us towards a multifaceted conception of how epistemic injustice is related to epistemic misrecognition, and indeed how we might construe a positive relation of epistemic recognition.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132778463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Misrecognition and Epistemic Injustice 错误认识和认识的不公正

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-12-17 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.4.6233

José Medina

引用次数: 18

The Institution of Gender-Based Asylum and Epistemic Injustice: A Structural Limit 基于性别的庇护制度与认识上的不公正:一个结构性的限制

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-10-08 DOI: 10.5206/fpq/2018.3.5775

Ezgi Sertler

引用次数: 4

Eating Identities, “Unhealthy” Eaters, and Damaged Agency 饮食身份，“不健康”的食客，和受损的代理

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-10-08 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5778

Megan A. Dean

{"title":"Eating Identities, “Unhealthy” Eaters, and Damaged Agency","authors":"Megan A. Dean","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5778","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that common social narratives about unhealthy eaters can cause significant damage to agency. I identify and analyze a narrative that combines a “control model” of eating agency with the healthist assumption that health is the ultimate end of eating. I argue that this narrative produces and enables four types of damage to the agency of those identified as unhealthy eaters. Due to uncertainty about what counts as healthy eating and various forms of prejudice, the unhealthy eater label and its harms to agency are more likely to stick to some people than others and may reinforce patterns of oppression. I argue that fat people are especially vulnerable to this identification and the damage it can do. I then consider possible “counterstories” about unhealthy eaters, alternative narratives that might be less damaging to agency than the control narrative. I identify one promising counterstory but suggest that it may be limited when it comes to repairing damage to the agency of fat people. Overall, this paper illustrates some of the complex ways that healthism about eating affects agency, and emphasizes the ethical importance of the ways we think about and discuss eating and eaters.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121606301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

Authority and Gender: Flipping the F-Switch 权威和性别:拨动f开关

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-10-08 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5772

Lynne Tirrell

{"title":"Authority and Gender: Flipping the F-Switch","authors":"Lynne Tirrell","doi":"10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5772","url":null,"abstract":"The very rules of our language games contain mechanisms of disregard. Philosophy of language tends to treat speakers as peers with equal discursive authority, but this is rare in real, lived speech situations. This paper explores the mechanisms of discursive inclusion and exclusion governing our speech practices, with a special focus on the role of gender attribution in undermining women’s authority as speakers. Taking seriously the metaphor of language games, we must ask who gets in the game and whose moves can score. To do this, I develop an eclectic analysis of language games using basic inferential role theory and the concept of a semantic index, and develop the distinction between positional authority and expertise authority, which often conflict for members of oppressed groups. Introducing the concepts of master switches and sub-switches that attach to the index and change scorekeeping practices, I argue that women’s gender status conflicts with our status as authoritative speakers because sex marking in semantics functions as a master switch—“the F-switch”—on the semantic index, which, once thrown, changes the very game. An advantage of using inferentialism for understanding disregard of women’s discursive authority is that it locates the problem in the sanctioned moves, in the deontic structure of norms and practices of scorekeeping, and not primarily in the individual intentions of particular people.","PeriodicalId":387473,"journal":{"name":"Feminist Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127215001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Values in Good Caring Relations 良好关怀关系的价值

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Pub Date : 2018-10-08 DOI: 10.5206/FPQ/2018.3.5781

Thomas E. Randall

引用次数: 6