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VII—The Straight-edge of Virtue: Aristotle on the Rational Significance of Beauty-in-Action VII--美德的直尺：亚里士多德论行动之美的理性意义
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-06-12 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae009
G. R. Lear
{"title":"VII—The Straight-edge of Virtue: Aristotle on the Rational Significance of Beauty-in-Action","authors":"G. R. Lear","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Aristotle claims that the virtuous person acts for the sake of to kalon. To understand this idea, I examine the analogy he draws between craft and virtue. I argue that the kalon is a formal feature of well-ordered wholeness and that the virtuous person takes intellectual pleasure in perceiving (or remembering or imagining) the kalon-in-action, akin to pleasure in observing artworks or works of nature. However, the virtuous person’s pleasure in kalon action is primarily a pleasure of practical reason. In these ways, Aristotle’s concept of the kalon is and is not like the modern aesthetic concept of the beautiful.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141351004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Relevance of Belief Outsourcing to Whether Arguments Can Change Minds 信念外包与论证能否改变思想的相关性
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-06-03 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae010
Scott Hill
{"title":"The Relevance of Belief Outsourcing to Whether Arguments Can Change Minds","authors":"Scott Hill","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is a wealth of evidence which indicates that arguments are not very efficient tools for changing minds. Against this scepticism, Dutilh Novaes (2023) presents evidence that, given the right social context, arguments sometimes play a significant role in belief revision. However, drawing on Levy (2021), I argue that the evidence Dutilh Novaes cites is compatible with the view that it is not arguments that change individual minds but instead belief outsourcing that occurs alongside the consideration of arguments.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141272721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Unity Without Truth? Contra Trueman’s IMMODEST Identity Theory 没有真理的统一？反驳特鲁曼的 IMMODEST 特性理论
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae008
Julian Dodd
{"title":"Unity Without Truth? Contra Trueman’s IMMODEST Identity Theory","authors":"Julian Dodd","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Robert Trueman (2022) sets out and defends an ‘immodest’ identity theory of truth: that is, an identity theory in which the facts with which true propositions are identical are things whose totality is the world: i.e. obtaining states of affairs. This brief reply argues that Truman’s theory falls foul of a perennial objection to such immodest identity theories: namely, that it cannot explain how a candidate proposition’s putative elements can be unified into a proposition proper without this proposition being true.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141279574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
VIII—Situational Dependence and Blame’s Arrow VIII--情境依赖与责备之箭
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae006
Jessica Isserow
{"title":"VIII—Situational Dependence and Blame’s Arrow","authors":"Jessica Isserow","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A looming deadline. A difficult situation at home. A heated phone conversation that redirects our attention. Certain features of our circumstances can be (at least partially) excusing; sometimes, agents who act wrongly in the face of circumstantial pressures are not (that) blameworthy for having done so. But we’re rather bad at detecting these factors that excuse others from blame. When put together, these two observations yield an under-appreciated problem: we fall short of procedural norms of blame in fairly systematic ways.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"74 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141280752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Epistemic Models Misfire: Lessons for Everyday Rationality 当认识论模型失灵时：对日常理性的启示
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae005
Scott Sturgeon
{"title":"When Epistemic Models Misfire: Lessons for Everyday Rationality","authors":"Scott Sturgeon","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Three natural assumptions about rationality lead to conflict when they are formalized in natural ways. The paper examines how the assumptions are built into formal frameworks and why they lead to conflict. Several lessons are learned for the type of rationality ordinary people manifest in everyday life.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"31 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141118129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
II—Ownership, Property and Belonging: Some Lessons to Learn from Thinkers of Antiquity about Economics and Success 二-所有权、财产和归属感：从古代思想家那里学到的关于经济学和成功的一些经验
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-05-14 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae004
Catherine Rowett
{"title":"II—Ownership, Property and Belonging: Some Lessons to Learn from Thinkers of Antiquity about Economics and Success","authors":"Catherine Rowett","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I explore some enlightening alternative economic theories in Plato’s Republic which help to cast doubt on standard models of rationality in economics. Starting from Socrates’ suggestion that things work best if everyone says ‘mine’ about the same things, I discuss a kind of ‘belonging’ which merits more attention in political and economic theory. This kind of belonging is not about owning property, but it can (better) explain the desire to do things for others and for the collective good. But did Socrates forget to invoke it when addressing the puzzle about why the philosopher would willingly return to the cave?","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"100 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140978401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
III—Doing Our ‘Best’? Utilitarianism, Rationality and the Altruist’s Dilemma III-尽我们的 "最大努力"？功利主义、理性与利他主义者的困境
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae001
Max Khan Hayward
{"title":"III—Doing Our ‘Best’? Utilitarianism, Rationality and the Altruist’s Dilemma","authors":"Max Khan Hayward","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Utilitarians think that what matters in ethics is making the world a better place. In that case, it might seem that we each rationally ought to do our best—perform the actions, out of those open to each of us, with the best expected outcomes. In other words, we should follow act-utilitarian reasons. But often the result of many altruistic agents following such individualistic reasons is worse than the result of them following collectivist ‘team-reasons’. So utilitarians should reject act utilitarianism, and accept a dualist view according to which both individualistic and team reasons are fundamental. In order to align these distinct kinds of reason, utilitarians must focus centrally on questions of political and social reform—as did their historical forebears.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"18 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
V—Wise Trust V-Wise 信托基金
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoae002
Karen Jones
{"title":"V—Wise Trust","authors":"Karen Jones","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Justified trust is rationally permitted trust; wise trust is excellent trust. Excellent (dis)trust is always justified (dis)trust, but the reverse is not true. You can be justified in distrusting someone and yet it be wise for you to trust. Contrary to folk saying, wisdom does not favour distrust ahead of trust. This paper explores what it takes to be wise in entering, maintaining, modifying and exiting trust relations. Wisdom is socially scaffolded, including by distributed networks of distrust that make local trust wise.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"32 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140378403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
I—The Presidential Address I 主席致辞
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoaa001
H. Steward
{"title":"I—The Presidential Address","authors":"H. Steward","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about free will (in the sense of genuine agency) and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of free will, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof of an external world. I draw attention to analogies and disanalogies between the arguments offered in each case in order to suggest that although the Agency Argument shares with its Moorean relative the unfortunate property of being dialectically ineffective against some of those it is mainly hoping to convince, it will not be dialectically ineffective against all of them. It is also argued that the Agency Argument is less vulnerable than Moore’s proof to worries about its justificatory structure.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"6 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141218128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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