{"title":"VII--美德的直尺:亚里士多德论行动之美的理性意义","authors":"G. R. Lear","doi":"10.1093/arisoc/aoae009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Aristotle claims that the virtuous person acts for the sake of to kalon. To understand this idea, I examine the analogy he draws between craft and virtue. I argue that the kalon is a formal feature of well-ordered wholeness and that the virtuous person takes intellectual pleasure in perceiving (or remembering or imagining) the kalon-in-action, akin to pleasure in observing artworks or works of nature. However, the virtuous person’s pleasure in kalon action is primarily a pleasure of practical reason. In these ways, Aristotle’s concept of the kalon is and is not like the modern aesthetic concept of the beautiful.","PeriodicalId":386537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"VII—The Straight-edge of Virtue: Aristotle on the Rational Significance of Beauty-in-Action\",\"authors\":\"G. R. Lear\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/arisoc/aoae009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Aristotle claims that the virtuous person acts for the sake of to kalon. To understand this idea, I examine the analogy he draws between craft and virtue. I argue that the kalon is a formal feature of well-ordered wholeness and that the virtuous person takes intellectual pleasure in perceiving (or remembering or imagining) the kalon-in-action, akin to pleasure in observing artworks or works of nature. However, the virtuous person’s pleasure in kalon action is primarily a pleasure of practical reason. In these ways, Aristotle’s concept of the kalon is and is not like the modern aesthetic concept of the beautiful.\",\"PeriodicalId\":386537,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoae009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
VII—The Straight-edge of Virtue: Aristotle on the Rational Significance of Beauty-in-Action
Aristotle claims that the virtuous person acts for the sake of to kalon. To understand this idea, I examine the analogy he draws between craft and virtue. I argue that the kalon is a formal feature of well-ordered wholeness and that the virtuous person takes intellectual pleasure in perceiving (or remembering or imagining) the kalon-in-action, akin to pleasure in observing artworks or works of nature. However, the virtuous person’s pleasure in kalon action is primarily a pleasure of practical reason. In these ways, Aristotle’s concept of the kalon is and is not like the modern aesthetic concept of the beautiful.