Principia最新文献_第5页

¿Es la Lectura de Mentes una Capacidad Unimodal? 读心术是单模态能力吗?

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e78054

Anyerson Stiths Gómez Tabares

引用次数: 1

Grundlagen §64: an alternative strategy to account for second-order abstraction Grundlagen§64：解释二阶抽象的替代策略

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e77217

Vincenzo Ciccarelli

引用次数: 0

Henkin on Nominalism and Higher-Order Logic Henkin论唯名论与高阶逻辑

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e78594

D. Fernandes

{"title":"Henkin on Nominalism and Higher-Order Logic","authors":"D. Fernandes","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e78594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e78594","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper a proposal by Henkin of a nominalistic interpretation for second and higher-order logic is developed in detail and analysed. It was proposed as a response to Quine’s claim that second and higher-order logic not only are (α) committed to the existence of sets, but also are (β) committed to the existence of more sets than can ever be referred to in the language. Henkin’s interpretation is rarely cited in the debate on semantics and ontological commitments for these logics, though it has many interesting ideas that are worth exploring. The detailed development will show that it employs an early strategy of using substitutional quantification in order to reduce ontological commitments. It will be argued that the perspective adopted for the predicate variables renders it a natural extension of Quine’s nominalistic interpretation for first-order logic. However, we will argue that, with respect to Quine’s nominalistic program and his notion of ontological commitment, (α) still holds and thus Henkin’s interpretation is not nominalistic. Nevertheless, it will be seen that (β) is addressed successfully and this provides further insights on the so-called “Skolem Paradox”. Moreover, the interpretation is ontologically parsimonious and, in this respect, it arguably fares better than a recent proposal by Bob Hale.","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41564963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction 归纳法问题的直观解

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81977

A. D. Bassford

{"title":"An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Induction","authors":"A. D. Bassford","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e81977","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this essay is the classical problem of induction, which is sometimes attributed to David Hume and called “the Humean Problem of Induction.” Here, I examine a certain sort of Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem, which appeals to the concept of natural kinds in its response to the inductive skeptic. This position is most notably represented by Howard Sankey and Marc Lange. The purpose of this paper is partly destructive and partly constructive. I raise two questions. The first is: Are the natural kind solutions to the problem successful? The first thesis of this paper is that they are not, and I will show how and why they fail. And the second question I raise here is: Is there nonetheless some alternative Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem which is successful and can overcome the shortcomings endemic to the Sankey-Lange account? The second thesis is that there is, and I’ll attempt to sketch one. My stance here may be summarized by saying that, while I agree with Sankey and Lange that the problem of induction can be adequately resolved, and while I am on the whole sympathetic with the Aristotelian spirit of their account(s), I am, for all that, dissatisfied with the letter of them. Nothing short of a more thoroughgoing Aristotelianism about the epistemology of induction will do.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46099714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Sobre el Lugar de Frege (y Moore) en el Psicologismusstreit 关于弗雷格(和摩尔)在心理学史上的地位

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e83767

Mário Ariel González Porta

引用次数: 0

Abilism Ascendant? Abilism Ascendant？

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e80667

Kevin Meeker

引用次数: 0

On Mr Truetemp's Lack of Virtue 论特鲁埃特姆先生缺乏美德

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e83748

H. Sankey

引用次数: 0

An alternative View for Scientific Models Based on Metaphors: a case analysis from Darwin's use of metaphors 基于隐喻的科学模型的另一种观点——从达尔文对隐喻的使用看

Principia Pub Date : 2022-08-19 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84682

De Oliveira

引用次数: 0

What is the aim of models in formal epistemology? 形式认识论中模型的目的是什么?

Principia Pub Date : 2022-06-07 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84677

Matheus de Lima Rui

{"title":"What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?","authors":"Matheus de Lima Rui","doi":"10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84677","url":null,"abstract":"It is certainly well accepted that formal models play a key role in scientific job. Its use goes from natural sciences like physics and even to social sciences like economics and politics. Using mathematics allows the researcher to consider more complicated scenarios involving several variables. Some models are developed to make predictions, others to describe a phenomena, or just to improve the explanation of events in the world. But what has all this to do with philosophy? The aim of the present paper is to investigate debates on the role of formal models in a specific philosophical subject, precisely, the epistemology of rationality. Are we able to explain why models are needed in epistemological work? This answer will be addressed on the assumptions that epistemological theorizing is committed with normative statements. More specifically, epistemologists are concerned with normative questions about what rationality requires from epistemic agents. The first goal is to discuss some assumptions about the role of mathematical models in formal epistemology undertaking. And secondly, I will argue for the following two claims: (i) formal models are useful tools for predicting consequences of normative assumption about what is intuitively required by rationality; and (ii) insofar rationality theory is normative in virtue of being instrumentalist and aiming at truth, formal models are means-end tools, therefore, for rationality, mathematical models are devices for maximizing truth in doxastic states.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":38561,"journal":{"name":"Principia","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47212524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Models as Felicitous Falsehoods 模型是幸福的谎言

Principia Pub Date : 2022-06-07 DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e84576

C. Elgin

引用次数: 3