{"title":"Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology","authors":"D. Pritchard","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-3","url":null,"abstract":"How does epistemological disjunctivism relate to the wider issue of the nature of knowledge? I answer this question by considering how epistemological disjunctivism can be embedded within my own preferred theory of knowledge, anti-luck virtue epistemology. The motivation for the latter is outlined, and a case is made that not only is epistemological disjunctivism consistent with anti-luck virtue epistemology, but that the proposals are also a natural fit. It is further shown that the kind of strong (albeit non-classical) epistemic internalism that is integral to epistemological disjunctivism is entirely compatible with interpreting anti-luck virtue epistemology, qua a structural thesis about the nature of knowledge, along epistemic externalist lines. 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS One philosophical lesson that I have learnt over the years3⁄4learnt the hard way, I might add3⁄4is the importance of recognising when philosophical projects can be usefully run together, and when they really need to be kept apart. I’ve discovered more than once that projects that initially seemed to go naturally together are in fact to some significant degree orthogonal to each other. So, for example, in earlier work3⁄4see especially Pritchard (2005)3⁄4I had a tendency to suppose that one could usefully simultaneously offer an account of (i) knowledge in general, (ii) perceptual knowledge in particular, and (iii) how best to respond to the problem of radical scepticism. In fact, all three projects I’ve discovered3⁄4eventually!3⁄4need to be kept apart. This point is relevant to our current purposes since now that I do keep these projects separate, it raises the question of how they all relate. In particular3⁄4see, especially Pritchard","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129819629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ringers for Belief","authors":"Casey Doyle","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-17","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-17","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"222 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115003716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Was Wittgenstein a Disjunctivist Avant la Lettre?","authors":"Genia Schönbaumsfeld","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131205541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism","authors":"J. Milburn, Andrew Moon","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132405228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person","authors":"Adrian Haddock","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-13","url":null,"abstract":"One can sometimes tell what someone else feels or thinks by seeing and hearing what he says and does. It is very common for philosophers to interpret this idea so that ‘what he says and does’ is taken to allude to a basis for knowledge of what the person feels or thinks. The thought of a basis here has two elements. The first is that the basis is something knowable in its own right ... knowledge of the basis could have this status—be knowledge—independently of the status of what it is a basis for. The second is that judgments about what the person feels or thinks emerge as knowledgeable in favourable cases because of an inferential relation in which they stand to the basis. The notion of a criterion, as used by Wittgenstein in connection with this sort of knowledge, is often interpreted on these lines. 1","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129565526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disjunctivism and Credence","authors":"R. Neta","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127301108","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disjunctivism and Realism","authors":"S. Sedivy","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115581558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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