{"title":"Settling a Question","authors":"G. Longworth","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128203929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disjunctivism and Other Minds","authors":"A. Avramides","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125957832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemological Disjunctivism and Its Representational Commitments 1","authors":"C. French","doi":"10.4324/9781315106243-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-9","url":null,"abstract":"As it is standardly presented, epistemological disjunctivism involves the idea that paradigm cases of visual perceptual knowledge are based on visual perceptual states which are propositional – states of seeing that p (McDowell (1982, 1995, 2008), Haddock and Macpherson (2008b), Pritchard (2012, 2016)). I look at the crow perched in the tree, in excellent perceptual conditions, with fully functioning perceptual and cognitive capacities, I come to know that the crow is black. I know this on the basis of visual perception. And the epistemological disjunctivist spells this out as follows: I have this knowledge in virtue of the fact that I can see that the crow is black. Given this, the orthodox version of epistemological disjunctivism takes on controversial commitments in the philosophy of perception. Specifically, it is committed to the claim that some of our perceptual states are propositional attitudes, and hence have propositional representational contents. And in virtue of this, it is committed to the more general claim that some of our perceptual states are representational, where here this is understood merely as the idea that some of our perceptual states have representational contents. ese are the representational commitments of orthodox epistemological disjunctivism. Must epistemological disjunctivism involve these commitments? Must the view be hostage to the fortunes of representational views in the philosophy of","PeriodicalId":383038,"journal":{"name":"New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130172699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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