Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

How does epistemological disjunctivism relate to the wider issue of the nature of knowledge? I answer this question by considering how epistemological disjunctivism can be embedded within my own preferred theory of knowledge, anti-luck virtue epistemology. The motivation for the latter is outlined, and a case is made that not only is epistemological disjunctivism consistent with anti-luck virtue epistemology, but that the proposals are also a natural fit. It is further shown that the kind of strong (albeit non-classical) epistemic internalism that is integral to epistemological disjunctivism is entirely compatible with interpreting anti-luck virtue epistemology, qua a structural thesis about the nature of knowledge, along epistemic externalist lines. 1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS One philosophical lesson that I have learnt over the years3⁄4learnt the hard way, I might add3⁄4is the importance of recognising when philosophical projects can be usefully run together, and when they really need to be kept apart. I’ve discovered more than once that projects that initially seemed to go naturally together are in fact to some significant degree orthogonal to each other. So, for example, in earlier work3⁄4see especially Pritchard (2005)3⁄4I had a tendency to suppose that one could usefully simultaneously offer an account of (i) knowledge in general, (ii) perceptual knowledge in particular, and (iii) how best to respond to the problem of radical scepticism. In fact, all three projects I’ve discovered3⁄4eventually!3⁄4need to be kept apart. This point is relevant to our current purposes since now that I do keep these projects separate, it raises the question of how they all relate. In particular3⁄4see, especially Pritchard