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Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13最新文献

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Secure introduction of one-way functions 安全引入单向函数
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856941
D. Volpano
{"title":"Secure introduction of one-way functions","authors":"D. Volpano","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856941","url":null,"abstract":"Conditions are given under which a one-way function can be used safely in a programming language. The security proof involves showing that secrets cannot be leaked easily by any program meeting the conditions unless breaking the one-way function is easy. The result is applied to a password system where passwords are stored in a public file as images under a one-way function.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130291433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 52
Invariant generation techniques in cryptographic protocol analysis 密码协议分析中的不变量生成技术
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856934
C. Meadows
{"title":"Invariant generation techniques in cryptographic protocol analysis","authors":"C. Meadows","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856934","url":null,"abstract":"The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic protocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different techniques for generating and describing invariants that are defined in terms of what messages an intruder can and cannot learn. These invariants, which can be used to prove authentication as well as secrecy results, appear to be central to many different tools and techniques. However, since they are usually developed independently for different systems, it is often not easy to see what they have in common with each other than the ones for which they were developed. We attempt to remedy this situation by giving an overview of several of these techniques, discussing their relationships to each other, and developing a simple taxonomy. We also discuss some of the implications for future research.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"170 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116324659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 21
Relating strands and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis 用于安全协议分析的相关链和多集重写
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856924
I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, John C. Mitchell, P. Lincoln, A. Scedrov
{"title":"Relating strands and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis","authors":"I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, John C. Mitchell, P. Lincoln, A. Scedrov","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856924","url":null,"abstract":"Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on an set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces and multiuser rewriting with existential quantification. Although it is fairly intuitive that these two languages should be equivalent in some way, a number of modifications to each system are required to obtain a meaningful equivalence. We extend the strand formalism with a way of incrementally growing bundles in order to emulate an execution of a protocol with parametric strands. We omit the initialization part of the multiset rewriting setting, which formalizes the choice of initial data, such as shared public or private keys, and which has no counterpart in the stand space setting. The correspondence between the modified formalisms directly relates the intruder theory from the multiset rewriting formalism to the penetrator strands.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129131800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 93
Optimizing protocol rewrite rules of CIL specifications 优化CIL规范的协议重写规则
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856925
G. Denker, J. Millen, A. Grau, J. Bowles
{"title":"Optimizing protocol rewrite rules of CIL specifications","authors":"G. Denker, J. Millen, A. Grau, J. Bowles","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856925","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856925","url":null,"abstract":"For purposes of security analysis, cryptographic protocols can be translated from a high-level message-list language such as CAPSL into a multiset rewriting (MSR) rule language such as CIL. The natural translation creates two rules per message or computational action. We show how to optimize the natural rule set by about 50% into a form similar to the result of hand encoding, and prove that the transformation is sound because it is attack-preserving, and unique because it is terminating and confluent. The optimization has been implemented in Java.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122946290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 19
Towards automatic verification of authentication protocols on an unbounded network 实现无界网络中认证协议的自动验证
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856932
J. Heather, Steve A. Schneider
{"title":"Towards automatic verification of authentication protocols on an unbounded network","authors":"J. Heather, Steve A. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856932","url":null,"abstract":"Schneider's (1998) work on rank functions provides a formal approach to verification of certain properties of a security protocol. However, he illustrates the approach only with a protocol running on a small network; and no help is given with the somewhat hit-and-miss process of finding the rank function which underpins the central theorem. We develop the theory to allow for an arbitrarily large network, and give a clearly defined decision procedure by which one may either construct a rank function, proving correctness of the protocol, or show that no rank function exists. We discuss the implications of the absence of a rank function, and the open question of completeness of the rank function theorem.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132603709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols 如何防范针对安全协议的类型漏洞攻击
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856942
J. Heather, G. Lowe, Steve A. Schneider
{"title":"How to prevent type flaw attacks on security protocols","authors":"J. Heather, G. Lowe, Steve A. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856942","url":null,"abstract":"A type flaw attack on a security protocol is an attack where a field that was originally intended to have one type is subsequently interpreted as having another type. A number of type flaw attacks have appeared in the academic literature. In this paper we prove that type flaw attacks can be prevented using a simple technique of tagging each field with some information indicating its intended type.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115606349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 239
Information flow analysis in a discrete-time process algebra 离散时间过程代数中的信息流分析
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856935
R. Focardi, R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli
{"title":"Information flow analysis in a discrete-time process algebra","authors":"R. Focardi, R. Gorrieri, F. Martinelli","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856935","url":null,"abstract":"Some of the non-interference properties studied in (Focardi, 1998; Focardi and Gorrieri, 1995) for information flow analysis in computer systems, notably BNDC, are reformulated in a real-time setting. This is done by enhancing the Security Process Algebra of (Focardi and Gorrieri, 1997; Focardi and Martinelli, 1999) with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting); and then by studying the natural extensions of those properties in this enriched setting. We prove essentially the same results known for the untimed case: ordering relation among properties, compositionality aspects, partial model checking techniques. Finally, we illustrate a case study of a system that presents no information flows when analyzed without considering timing constraints. When the specification is refined with time, some interesting information flows are detected.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121504418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 92
Reasoning about secrecy for active networks 对活动网络保密的推理
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856931
P. Kakkar, Carl A. Gunter, M. Abadi
{"title":"Reasoning about secrecy for active networks","authors":"P. Kakkar, Carl A. Gunter, M. Abadi","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856931","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a language of mobile agents called uPLAN for describing the capabilities of active (programmable) networks. We use a formal semantics for uPLAN to demonstrate how capabilities provided for programming the network can affect the potential flows of information between users. In particular, we formalize a concept of security against attacks on secrecy by an 'outsider' and show how basic protections are preserved in the presence of programmable network functions such as user-customized labeled routing.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126840185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Analyzing single-server network inhibition 分析单服务器网络抑制
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856930
T. Aura, M. Bishop, Dean Sniegowski
{"title":"Analyzing single-server network inhibition","authors":"T. Aura, M. Bishop, Dean Sniegowski","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856930","url":null,"abstract":"Network inhibition is a denial-of-service attack where the adversary attempts to disconnect network elements by disabling a limited number of communication links or nodes. We analyze a common variation of network inhibition where the links have infinite capacity and the goal of the attacker is to deny connections from a single server to as many clients as possible. The problem is defined formally and shown to be NP complete. Nevertheless, we develop a practical technique for network-inhibition analysis based on logic programming with stable-model semantics. The analysis scales well up to moderate-size networks. The results are a step towards quantitative analysis of denial of service and they can be applied to the design of robust network topologies.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115576515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Confidentiality for mobile code: the case of a simple payment protocol 手机代码的保密性:一个简单的支付协议的情况
Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13 Pub Date : 2000-07-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSFW.2000.856940
M. Dam, Pablo Giambiagi
{"title":"Confidentiality for mobile code: the case of a simple payment protocol","authors":"M. Dam, Pablo Giambiagi","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856940","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an approach to support confidentiality for mobile implementations of security-sensitive protocols using Java/JVM. An applet which receives and passes on confidential information onto a public network has a rich set of direct and indirect channels available to it. The problem is to constrain applet behaviour to prevent those leakages that are unintended while preserving those that are specified in the protocol. We use an approach based on the idea of correlating changes in observable behaviour with changes in input. In the special case where no changes in (low) behaviour are possible we retrieve a version of noninterference. Mapping our approach to JVM a number of particular concerns need to be addressed, including the use of object libraries for IO, the use of labelling to track input/output of secrets, and the choice of proof strategy. We use the bisimulation proof technique. To provide user feedback we employ a variant of proof-carrying code to instrument a security assistant which will let users of an applet inquire about its security properties such as the destination of data input into different fields.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"293 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131691714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 30
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