{"title":"Lorenz and Colossus [military cryptography]","authors":"Anthony E. Sale","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856938","url":null,"abstract":"The German Army High Command asked the Lorenz company to produce for them a high security teleprinter cipher machine to enable them to communicate by radio in complete secrecy. The Lorenz company designed a cipher machine based on the additive method for enciphering teleprinter messages invented in 1918 by Gilbert Vernam in America. The Vernam system enciphered the message text by adding to it, character by character, a set of obscuring characters thus producing the enciphered characters which were transmitted to the intended recipient. The paper discusses the Colossus computer. Colossus reduced the time to break Lorenz messages from weeks to hours and just in time for messages to be deciphered which gave vital information to Eisenhower and Montgomery prior to D Day.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133371801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Possibilistic definitions of security-an assembly kit","authors":"H. Mantel","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.2000.856936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.2000.856936","url":null,"abstract":"We present a framework in which different notions of security can be defined in a uniform and modular way. Each definition of security is formalized as a security predicate by assembling more primitive basic security predicates. A collection of such basic security predicates is defined and we demonstrate how well-known concepts like generalized non-interference or separability can be constructed from them. The framework is open and can be extended with new basic security predicates using a general schema. We investigate the compatibility of the assembled definitions with system properties apart from security and propose a new definition of security which does not restrict non-critical information flow. It turns out that the modularity of our framework simplifies these investigation. Finally, we discuss the stepwise development of secure systems.","PeriodicalId":377637,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop. CSFW-13","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131266186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}