Relating strands and multiset rewriting for security protocol analysis

I. Cervesato, N. Durgin, John C. Mitchell, P. Lincoln, A. Scedrov
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引用次数: 93

Abstract

Formal analysis of security protocols is largely based on an set of assumptions commonly referred to as the Dolev-Yao model. Two formalisms that state the basic assumptions of this model are related here: strand spaces and multiuser rewriting with existential quantification. Although it is fairly intuitive that these two languages should be equivalent in some way, a number of modifications to each system are required to obtain a meaningful equivalence. We extend the strand formalism with a way of incrementally growing bundles in order to emulate an execution of a protocol with parametric strands. We omit the initialization part of the multiset rewriting setting, which formalizes the choice of initial data, such as shared public or private keys, and which has no counterpart in the stand space setting. The correspondence between the modified formalisms directly relates the intruder theory from the multiset rewriting formalism to the penetrator strands.
用于安全协议分析的相关链和多集重写
安全协议的形式化分析主要基于通常称为Dolev-Yao模型的一组假设。两种表述该模型基本假设的形式在这里是相关的:链空间和存在量化的多用户重写。虽然这两种语言在某种程度上应该是等价的,这是相当直观的,但是需要对每个系统进行大量修改才能获得有意义的等价。为了模拟带有参数链的协议的执行,我们用增量增长束的方式扩展了链的形式化。我们省略了多集重写设置的初始化部分,该部分形式化了初始数据的选择,例如共享公钥或私钥,并且在站点空间设置中没有对应的部分。修正形式之间的对应关系直接将侵入者理论从多集重写形式主义与穿透者链联系起来。
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