Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011213
R. Farley
{"title":"Casullo on Experiential Justification","authors":"R. Farley","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011213","url":null,"abstract":"In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a priori is undermined.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80720330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201113
Nicole Dular
{"title":"Harder, Better, Faster, Stronger","authors":"Nicole Dular","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme20201113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201113","url":null,"abstract":"Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these asymmetries. According to this unified account, moral beliefs typically have a higher epistemic standard than non-moral beliefs. This means, roughly, that it is typically more difficult for agents to receive the relevant positive epistemic credit (e.g. knowledge) for moral beliefs than for non-moral beliefs. After presenting this account, I consider two alternative unified accounts. According to the first alternative, moral matters are more cognitively demanding; according to the second, moral beliefs have more defeaters. I argue that neither of these alternative accounts succeed, and that my higher standards account is the best unified explanation.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79348135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011324
Perry Hendricks
{"title":"The Subject’s Perspective Objection to Externalism and Why it Fails","authors":"Perry Hendricks","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011324","url":null,"abstract":"The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation for why so many people find cases that motivate the SPO convincing.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77975408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201112
D. Bertini
{"title":"The Conflict of Rigidity and Precision in Designation","authors":"D. Bertini","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme20201112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201112","url":null,"abstract":"My paper provides reasons in support of the view that vague identity claims originate from a conflict between rigidity and precision in designation. To put this stricly, let x be the referent of the referential terms P and Q. Then, that the proposition “that any x being both a P and a Q” is vague involves that the semantic intuitions at work in P and Q reveal a conflict between P and Q being simultaneously rigid and precise designators. After having shortly commented on an example of vague identity claim, I make the case for my proposal, by discussing how reference by baptism conflicts with descriptive attitudes towards understanding conceptual contents.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90578022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011321
R. Dunphy
{"title":"Agrippan Problems","authors":"R. Dunphy","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011321","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems,” where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Finally, I suggest that there is a distinctive Agrippan problem present at the beginning of Hegel’s Science of Logic.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84602712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910437
M. Shaffer
{"title":"The Availability Heuristic and Inference to the Best Explanation","authors":"M. Shaffer","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910437","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen's infamous \"best of a bad lot\" objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response is presented and defended.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77555238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910433
S. Aikin, Brian Ribeiro
{"title":"Skeptical Theism and the Creep Problem","authors":"S. Aikin, Brian Ribeiro","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910433","url":null,"abstract":"Skeptical theism is the view that human knowledge and understanding are severely limited, compared to that of the divine. The view is deployed as an undercutting defeater for evidential arguments from evil. However, skeptical theism has broader skeptical consequences than those for the argument from evil. The epistemic principles of this skeptical creep are identified and shown to be on the road to global skepticism.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73269825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910435
Seungbae Park
{"title":"Surrealism Is Not an Alternative to Scientific Realism","authors":"Seungbae Park","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME201910435","url":null,"abstract":"Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81530788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438
Xintong Wei
{"title":"The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”","authors":"Xintong Wei","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910438","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has been argued that the obligation norm is jointly incompatible with the maxim ought implies can and the assumption that there exists some truth that we cannot believe. The problem of the incompatible triad has motivated some to adopt the permissible norm of truth. I argue that the permissible norm faces an analogous problem of the incompatible triad.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81270240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2019-12-17DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910434
Tommaso Ostillio, M. Bukat
{"title":"The Knobe Effect with Probable Outcomes and Availability Heuristic Triggers","authors":"Tommaso Ostillio, M. Bukat","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme201910434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910434","url":null,"abstract":"This paper contributes to the existing philosophical literature on the Knobe Effect (KE) in two main ways: first, this paper disconfirms the KE by showing that the latter does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes; second, this paper shows that KE is strongly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. In particular, this paper presents two main findings from three empirical tests carried out between 2016 and 2018: the first finding concerns the fact that if the issuer of a decision with consequences on third parties is unlikely to be perceived as unfriendly, then KE is reduced or absent; the second finding regards instead the fact that if an action has two possible outcomes (one likely to obtain with strong intensity and one likely to obtain with less intensity), then KE does not obtain for decisions whose side-effects have limited consequences on third parties.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80000160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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