{"title":"Central Bank Tone and Currency Risk Premia","authors":"Asad Dossani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3304785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3304785","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze how the tone of central bank press conferences impacts risk premia in the currency market. I measure tone as the difference between the number of hawkish and dovish phrases made during a press conference. I show that central bank tone contemporaneously explains option implied risk aversion, and predicts future variance swap returns. A one standard deviation increase in the hawkishness of a press conference increases option implied risk aversion by 1.5%, and reduces the one month variance swap return by 4.5% per year, relative to the average of -28.8% per year. In addition, I show that the impact of tone on currency markets comes primarily from the questions and answers, or the unscripted portion of the press conference.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128171209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Note on Liquidity Policies and Financial Networks","authors":"Danilo Lopomo Beteto Wegner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3222034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3222034","url":null,"abstract":"This note provides an example of how government and central bank policies that promote market liquidity (e.g., quantitative easing programs) can change the structure of the banking system, leading to financial networks that are better capitalized (networth of the banking system is higher) but, at the same time, more fragile (higher likelihood of bank failures). In the illustration provided, banks have to recur to the interbank market to raise funds necessary to invest in assets affected by liquidity policies, creating new channels for financial contagion in case the real sector is hit by negative shocks.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128462772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price Dispersion and the Costs of Inflation","authors":"Volker Hahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3205295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205295","url":null,"abstract":"The new Keynesian literature typically makes the assumption that firms always have to satisfy demand. Because this assumption is at odds with profit-maximizing behavior under Calvo pricing when long-run inflation is positive, we present a new Keynesian model that relaxes this assumption. Our model predicts that inflation causes a substantially smaller loss in effective aggregate productivity compared to a benchmark model without the possibility of rationing. Moreover, under positive inflation, firms choose smaller markups over marginal costs in our model than in the benchmark model. As a result, our analysis suggests that the standard new Keynesian model may exaggerate the welfare costs of inflation. We also show that the effects are plausible to be quantitatively important.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130194404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Survey on Germans’ Attitudes Towards and Knowledge of Monetary Policy Issues: Documentation of Survey Methodology and Descriptive Results","authors":"B. Hayo, Edith Neuenkirch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3199723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3199723","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides background information, questionnaires, and basic descriptive statistics for a representative survey of the German population conducted on our behalf by GfK in 2011. Our aim is to discover the German public’s knowledge about the ECB specifically, and monetary policy in general. We also examine our respondents’ self-perception of their knowledge and how they use media relating to the topic. A detailed descriptive analysis reveals that the German public’s factual knowledge is far from perfect, and their self-perception of this knowledge is equally poor. The general public is reasonably interested in information about the ECB and mainly watches TV or reads newspapers to keep informed. We discover significant differences in knowledge and media use across socio-demographic subgroups. On average, male respondents and those with higher levels of education or income are more interested in the ECB, more knowledgeable about it, and more confident in their own knowledge.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124375002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impacts of New External Shock on Russia’s Monetary Policy","authors":"A. Bozhechkova, P. Trunin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3183744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3183744","url":null,"abstract":"The Bank of Russia’s Board of Directors decided in April to keep the key interest rate unchanged on the heels of new sanctions on Russia that affected seriously the Russian rouble. The exchange rate pass-through to prices can guide, sooner than it was expected, inflation closer to its 4% target rate. There remain high risks of further escalation of geopolitical tension, leading to heightened uncertainty about developments on the economic scene.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129289567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do We Really Know that US Monetary Policy Was Destabilizing in the 1970s?","authors":"Qazi Haque, Nicolas Groshenny, M. Weder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3182146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3182146","url":null,"abstract":"The paper re-examines whether the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was a source of instability during the Great Inflation by estimating a sticky-price model with positive trend inflation, commodity price shocks and sluggish real wages. Our estimation provides empirical evidence for substantial wage-rigidity and finds that the Federal Reserve responded aggressively to inflation but negligibly to the output gap. In the presence of non-trivial real imperfections and well-identified commodity price-shocks, U.S. data prefers a determinate version of the New Keynesian model: monetary policy-induced indeterminacy and sunspots were not causes of macroeconomic instability during the pre-Volcker era.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"40 22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128475905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance","authors":"Christopher A. Martin, M. Puri, Alex Ufier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3172256","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3172256","url":null,"abstract":"Using unique, daily, account-level balances data we investigate deposit stability and the drivers of deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors from the bank following bad regulatory news. We find that government deposit guarantees, both regular deposit insurance and temporary deposit insurance measures, reduce the outflow of deposits. We also characterize which accounts are more stable (e.g., checking accounts and older accounts). We further provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with the run-off, gross funding inflows are large and of first-order impact — a result which is missed when looking at aggregated deposit data alone. Losses of uninsured deposits were largely offset with new insured deposits as the bank approached failure. We show our results hold more generally using a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action. Our results raise questions about depositor discipline, widely considered to be one of the key pillars of financial stability, raising the importance of other mechanisms of restricting bank risk taking, including prudent supervision.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"27 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120918607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The FOMC Versus the Staff, Revisited: When Do Policymakers Add Value?","authors":"C. Binder, Samantha Wetzel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163456","url":null,"abstract":"The Board of Governors staff and the Federal Open Market Committee both publish macroeconomic forecasts. Romer and Romer (2008) show that policymakers’ attempts to add information to the staff forecasts are counterproductive. In more recent years, however, policymakers have improved upon staff forecasts. We show that policymakers’ value-added in forecasting is greater when economic conditions are unfavorable or uncertain.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127175589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Costs of Sovereign Defaults: Restructuring Strategies, Bank Distress and the Capital Inflow-Credit Channel","authors":"T. Asonuma, M. Chamon, Aitor Erce, Akira Sasahara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3486806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3486806","url":null,"abstract":"Sovereign debt restructurings are associated with declines in GDP, investment, bank credit, and capital flows. The transmission channels and associated output and banking sector costs depend on whether the restructuring takes place pre-emptively, without missing payments to creditors, or whether it takes place after a default has occurred. Post-default restructurings are associated with larger declines in bank credit, an increase in lending interest rates, and a higher likelihood of triggering a banking crisis than pre-emptive restructurings. Our local projection estimates show large declines in GDP, investment, and credit amplified by severe sudden stops and transmitted through a “capital inflow-credit channel”.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128565632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Fixed-Rate Purchase Operations by the Bank of Japan Control the Yield Curve? Evidence from High-Frequency Data","authors":"Takahiro Hattori","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3028405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028405","url":null,"abstract":"This is the first study known to analyze fixed-rate purchase operations by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), as conducted under the policy of Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) with Yield Curve Control (YCC). On February 3, 2017, the BOJ conducted the first unlimited purchase of 10-year Japanese government bonds (JGB). We interpret this new operation as an attempt to convert the nonstationary process into a stationary process, and using intraday data empirically show that the BOJ successfully stabilized the JGB yield as a result.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124200449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}