{"title":"联邦公开市场委员会与工作人员,重新审视:政策制定者何时增加价值?","authors":"C. Binder, Samantha Wetzel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3163456","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Board of Governors staff and the Federal Open Market Committee both publish macroeconomic forecasts. Romer and Romer (2008) show that policymakers’ attempts to add information to the staff forecasts are counterproductive. In more recent years, however, policymakers have improved upon staff forecasts. We show that policymakers’ value-added in forecasting is greater when economic conditions are unfavorable or uncertain.","PeriodicalId":376562,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The FOMC Versus the Staff, Revisited: When Do Policymakers Add Value?\",\"authors\":\"C. Binder, Samantha Wetzel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3163456\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Board of Governors staff and the Federal Open Market Committee both publish macroeconomic forecasts. Romer and Romer (2008) show that policymakers’ attempts to add information to the staff forecasts are counterproductive. In more recent years, however, policymakers have improved upon staff forecasts. We show that policymakers’ value-added in forecasting is greater when economic conditions are unfavorable or uncertain.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376562,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-04-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163456\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Central Banks - Impacts (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163456","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The FOMC Versus the Staff, Revisited: When Do Policymakers Add Value?
The Board of Governors staff and the Federal Open Market Committee both publish macroeconomic forecasts. Romer and Romer (2008) show that policymakers’ attempts to add information to the staff forecasts are counterproductive. In more recent years, however, policymakers have improved upon staff forecasts. We show that policymakers’ value-added in forecasting is greater when economic conditions are unfavorable or uncertain.