{"title":"Libertarian Welfarism","authors":"R. Korobkin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1361071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361071","url":null,"abstract":"In a series of publications, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, and Colin Camerer et al., have proposed an approach to legal policy that encourages individuals to pursue actions that will maximize their expected utility while not imposing on those individuals' decisional autonomy. In this article, forthcoming in the California Law Review, I contend that this policy approach - which has been called \"libertarian paternalism\" - implies a complementary approach as well, which I call \"libertarian welfarism.\" Libertarian welfarism relies on the same set of policy tools as does libertarian paternalism but with a different goal: to encourage individuals to act in a way that maximizes social welfare. I show that libertarian welfarism leads to different policy prescriptions than does libertarian paternalism, and I argue that the former approach rests on a stronger normative foundation and is less subject to problems of indeterminacy than the latter.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"358 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122742021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Three is still a Party: An Experiment on Collusion and Entry","authors":"Marie Goppelsroeder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1368728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1368728","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an experiment to test effects of sequential entry on stability of collusion in oligopoly markets. Previous research suggests that the larger the number of firms, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We find that when groups start off small and the entrant is informed about the history of her group, collusion is easier to sustain than in groups starting large. Implicit coordination problems may be easier resolved in smaller groups and coordination, once established, can be transferred to enlarged groups by means of common codes of conduct. The results also suggest that entrants emulate group behavior.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128072833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements","authors":"Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1346038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1346038","url":null,"abstract":"This paper extends the economic literature on settlement and draws some practical insights on reverse payment settlements. The key contributions follow from the distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, w and under which reverse settlements will be observed among injunctive settlements. Reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules. (JEL K10, K40, K41, D24, O34)","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"341 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133455509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory Strategies","authors":"Marianne Ojo D Delaney PhD","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1407220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1407220","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, there has been a shift from a wide command-and-control style of supervision whereby the regulator imposes detailed rules with which regulators supervise to one which consists of risk based regulatory strategies. 'Enforced Self Regulation', a regulatory strategy whereby negotiation takes place between the State and the individual firms, lies between the command-and-control style of supervision and meta risk regulation in that firms are still required to regulate but according to their own models. It differs from the traditional command-and-control style of bank supervision in that firms and not the regulator, are required to regulate. It is similar to meta-risk regulation in that the individual firm's model is taken into consideration in regulating such firms. Whilst the merits and disadvantages of the individual regulatory strategies are considered, this paper concludes that all regulatory strategies should take into consideration the importance of management responsibilities – both on individual and corporate levels.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114466954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings","authors":"Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392927","url":null,"abstract":"One argument for forcing governments to pay compensation for regulatory takings is that they will tend to over regulate if compensation is not paid. In this paper, a model is developed in which there are two groups in society, one of which bears all of the costs of regulation. Regulation provides (potentially unequal) benefits to both groups. In the absence of compensation, a biased government will not choose the efficient level of regulation. If taxes are non-distorting, a compensation rule can be designed to achieve the first best outcome. The optimal rule always involves a positive degree of compensation regardless of the direction of the government bias. If the government is biased in favor of the regulated group, then compensation will increase the level of the regulation. When taxes are distortionary, the first best outcome cannot be achieved, and the optimal level of compensation may be 0.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132078729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law","authors":"Wolfgang Kerber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392163","url":null,"abstract":"The governance of competition on global markets is an open policy question (lack of international competition policy). In this paper, it is analyzed to what extent different types of regulatory competition, which in other regulatory contexts (as, e.g., corporate law) can be beneficial, might also be a solution in competition law (instead of seeking harmonisation and centralization). In a first step, it is demonstrated why regulatory competition of competition laws can only be beneficial under very spe-cial circumstances and should therefore be generally avoided. However, yardstick competition as one specific type of regulatory competition, which promotes innovation and mutual learning in regard to competition law rules and practices, might be so valuable that a fairly decentralised multi-level system of competition laws might be recommended. Therefore, in a second step, the basic elements of a global multi-level system of competition laws are presented, which allows for decentralised experimen-tation with new possibilities for protecting competition (laboratory federalism). Some conclusions are drawn for the International Competition Network (ICN).","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134121064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predictability and Patentable Processes: The Federal Circuit's In re Bilski Decision and Its Effect on the Incentive to Invent","authors":"W. Schuster","doi":"10.7916/D8Q52VVK","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8Q52VVK","url":null,"abstract":"Throughout the past two centuries, the U.S. patent system has defined the scope of (potentially) patentable processes by proscribing patents on fundamental principles (including abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena). Unfortunately, such a description of patentable subject matter led to ambiguity and unpredictability in the application of the patent laws. In 2008, the Federal Circuit addressed this uncertainty by promulgating a new standard to describe the ambit of patentable processes: a process may constitute patentable subject matter if (1) it utilizes a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms an object into a different state or thing.This article describes how the Federal Circuit's new standard furthers the underlying policy goal of all patent laws: the incentivization of innovation. Specifically, this paper argues that this new rule presents a simple and easy to apply standard which will increase the predictability of the patent laws. In the presence of such predictability, prospective inventors and investors are more likely to engage in research and development, thus leading to increased inventive activity.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121105004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Empirical Assessment of the Employee Free Choice Act: The Economic Implications","authors":"A. Layne-Farrar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1353305","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1353305","url":null,"abstract":"The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which is pending before the US Congress, would provide for union representation when an employee majority has signed union authorization cards and would create a system of mandatory arbitration if a collective bargaining agreement is not reached approximately 130 days after a union is newly certified. I critically assess the arguments presented for passing EFCA and consider the likely unintended consequences it will generate, should it be passed. I find that while card checks could be expected to increase union membership as hoped by EFCA proponents, EFCA is unlikely to achieve its main goal of improving social welfare, which should take into account possible consequences not only for union members but for all individuals. In particular, my quantitative analysis indicates that passing EFCA would likely increase the US unemployment rate and decrease US job creation substantially. The precise effect on unemployment will depend on the degree to which EFCA increases union density, but for every 3 percentage points gained in union membership through card checks and mandatory arbitration, the following year's unemployment rate is predicted to increase by 1 percentage point and job creation is predicted to fall by around 1.5 million jobs. Thus, if EFCA passed today and resulted in an increase in unionization from the current rate of about 12% to 15%, then unionized workers would increase from 15.5 to 19.6 million while unemployment a year from now would rise by 1.5 million, to 10.4 million. If EFCA were to increase the percentage of private sector union membership by between 5 and 10 percentage points, as some have suggested, my analysis indicates that unemployment would increase by 2.3 to 5.4 million in the following year and the unemployment rate would increase by 1.5 to 3.5 percentage points in the following year.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121756559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig
{"title":"Financial Regulation and Securitization: Evidence from Subprime Loans","authors":"Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1346131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1346131","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators' capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have [`]skin in the game' and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders' incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124028389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulating the Financial Markets by Examinations","authors":"Tamar Frankel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1339913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1339913","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay proposes changing future government examinations of market intermediaries and focusing on bubbles and crashes as the main dangers to the financial system and the economy. Prior substantive regulation has an undesirable effect on innovations and freedom of the markets. Regulating after a crash (when the \"horse has left the barn\") is undesirable and ineffective. Therefore, the Essay proposes tighter and closer examinations somewhat different from the current ones: (1) Examine more frequently when market prices rise (not when the have fallen); (2) Examine entities that are too large to fail; those that are highly leveraged; those whose shares-prices rise steadily with little or no fluctuation; and entities that have obtained exemptions from regulation. (3) Examiners should search for violations of the law (and the spirit of the law), but not economic or financial rationalizations. (4) Examiners should be experts, highly paid and incentivized to remain in government employ. Expert information about the markets will hopefully reduce the impact of bubbles and inevitable crashes and the loss of investors trust that decimates the financial system.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121299962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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