“三仍是党”:串通入党实验

Marie Goppelsroeder
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文通过一个实验来检验顺序进入对寡头垄断市场合谋稳定性的影响。先前的研究表明,公司数量越多,维持勾结就越困难。我们发现,当一个群体开始时规模较小,而新进入者被告知她所在群体的历史时,共谋比开始时规模较大的群体更容易维持。隐性协调问题在较小的群体中可能更容易解决,而协调一旦建立,就可以通过共同的行为准则转移到扩大的群体。结果还表明,进入者会模仿群体行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Three is still a Party: An Experiment on Collusion and Entry
This paper presents an experiment to test effects of sequential entry on stability of collusion in oligopoly markets. Previous research suggests that the larger the number of firms, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We find that when groups start off small and the entrant is informed about the history of her group, collusion is easier to sustain than in groups starting large. Implicit coordination problems may be easier resolved in smaller groups and coordination, once established, can be transferred to enlarged groups by means of common codes of conduct. The results also suggest that entrants emulate group behavior.
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