监管收入的最优补偿

Paul Pecorino
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引用次数: 8

摘要

要求政府为监管收入支付补偿金的一个理由是,如果不支付补偿金,政府将倾向于过度监管。本文建立了一个模型,其中社会上有两个群体,其中一个群体承担所有的监管成本。监管为这两个群体提供了(可能不平等的)利益。在缺乏补偿的情况下,一个有偏见的政府不会选择有效的监管水平。如果税收是非扭曲性的,那么可以设计一种补偿规则来实现第一种最佳结果。无论政府偏向的方向如何,最优规则总是包含一定程度的正补偿。如果政府偏向于受管制的群体,那么补偿将增加管制的程度。当税收具有扭曲性时,第一个最佳结果无法实现,最优补偿水平可能为0。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings
One argument for forcing governments to pay compensation for regulatory takings is that they will tend to over regulate if compensation is not paid. In this paper, a model is developed in which there are two groups in society, one of which bears all of the costs of regulation. Regulation provides (potentially unequal) benefits to both groups. In the absence of compensation, a biased government will not choose the efficient level of regulation. If taxes are non-distorting, a compensation rule can be designed to achieve the first best outcome. The optimal rule always involves a positive degree of compensation regardless of the direction of the government bias. If the government is biased in favor of the regulated group, then compensation will increase the level of the regulation. When taxes are distortionary, the first best outcome cannot be achieved, and the optimal level of compensation may be 0.
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