2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)最新文献_第8页

Towards Malicious address identification in Bitcoin 比特币恶意地址识别研究

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00066

Deepesh Chaudhari, R. Agarwal, S. Shukla

{"title":"Towards Malicious address identification in Bitcoin","authors":"Deepesh Chaudhari, R. Agarwal, S. Shukla","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00066","url":null,"abstract":"The temporal aspect of blockchain transactions enables us to study the address's behavior and detect if it is involved in any illicit activity. However, due to the concept of change addresses (used to thwart replay attacks), temporal aspects are not directly applicable in the Bitcoin blockchain. Several pre-processing steps should be performed before such temporal aspects are utilized. We are motivated to study the Bitcoin transaction network and use the temporal features such as burst, attractiveness, and inter-event time along with several graph-based properties such as the degree of node and clustering coefficient to validate the applicability of already existing approaches known for other cryptocurrency blockchains on the Bitcoin blockchain. We generate the temporal and non-temporal feature set and train the Machine Learning (ML) algorithm over different temporal granularities to validate the state-of-the-art methods. We study the behavior of the addresses over different time granularities of the dataset. We identify that after applying change-address clustering, in Bitcoin, existing temporal features can be extracted and ML approaches can be applied. A comparative analysis of results show that the behavior of addresses in Ethereum and Bitcoin is similar with respect to in-degree, out-degree and inter-event time. Further, we identify 3 suspects that showed malicious behavior across different temporal granularities. These suspects are not marked as malicious in Bitcoin.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114607241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

On The Legislation Prospective For Consumer Protection Of Stablecoin 论稳定币消费者保护的立法前景

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00035

Zhiqin Shi, Weiping He, Josephine Liu

{"title":"On The Legislation Prospective For Consumer Protection Of Stablecoin","authors":"Zhiqin Shi, Weiping He, Josephine Liu","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00035","url":null,"abstract":"Stablecoin, as a specific type of cryptocurrency, is undoubtedly one of the underlying infrastructures that underpin the rapidly growing decentralised finance (Defi) ecosystem. It is regarded and used as the on-chain “legal currency”. Questions arise as to is it such a low-volatility cryptocurrency really stable and is it able to always stay stable. The answers are probably no. Whether the underlying code is law is for debate, but it is not yet applicable to Defi and stablecoins. The law would undoubtedly play a positive role in improving the stability of stablecoin. Through this paper, we focus on the consumer protection aspect of stablecoin legislation and regulation. We set out to analyse the nature of stablecoins in a legal sense. We first survey the legislative practice of cryptocurrencies in multiple jurisdictions and extract proposals specifically for stablecoins for comparative analysis propose how to best regulate stablecoins. The definition of “stable” is explored from three critical aspects: price stability, collateral stability and permissionless. Finally, we conclude by proposing a general legislative framework for stablecoins. We aim to contribute to the current state of stablecoin and provide insight for international principles for such regulation in the future.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130501483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

An Examination Protocol for Handling Programmable Answers Using a Public Blockchain 使用公共区块链处理可编程答案的检查协议

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00057

Shuichi Takayama, Yuto Takei, Kazuyuki Shudo

引用次数: 0

The Blockchain-Based Edge Computing Framework for Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning 基于区块链的隐私保护联邦学习边缘计算框架

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00085

Shili Hu, Jiangfeng Li, Chenxi Zhang, Qinpei Zhao, Wei Ye

引用次数: 0

A Blockchain-Based Approach for Collaborative Formalization of Mathematics and Programs 基于区块链的数学和程序协作形式化方法

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-11-21 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00051

Jin Xing Lim, B. Monnot, Shaowei Lin, G. Piliouras

{"title":"A Blockchain-Based Approach for Collaborative Formalization of Mathematics and Programs","authors":"Jin Xing Lim, B. Monnot, Shaowei Lin, G. Piliouras","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00051","url":null,"abstract":"Formalization of mathematics is the process of digitizing mathematical knowledge, which allows for formal proof verification as well as efficient semantic searches. Given the large and ever-increasing gap between the set of formalized and unformalized mathematical knowledge, there is a clear need to encourage more computer scientists and mathematicians to solve and formalize mathematical problems together. With blockchain technology, we are able to decentralize this process, provide time-stamped verification of authorship and encourage collaboration through implementation of incentive mechanisms via smart contracts. Currently, the formalization of mathematics is done through the use of proof assistants, which can be used to verify proofs as well as algorithms. Furthermore, with the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly machine learning, we can apply automated reasoning tools in these proof assistants and (at least partially) automate the process of synthesizing proofs. In our paper, we demonstrate a blockchain-based system for collaborative formalization of mathematics and programs incorporating both human labour as well as AI tools. We explain how Token-Curated Registries (TCR) and smart contracts are used to ensure appropriate documents are recorded and encourage collaboration through implementation of incentive mechanisms respectively. Using an illustrative example, we show how formalized proofs of different sorting algorithms can be produced collaboratively in our proposed blockchain system.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"2021 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128062730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

A Voting-Based Blockchain Interoperability Oracle 基于投票的区块链互操作性Oracle

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-11-19 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00030

Michael Sober, Giulia Scaffino, Christof Spanring, Stefan Schulte

引用次数: 13

Effect of Miner Incentive on the Confirmation Time of Bitcoin Transactions 矿工激励对比特币交易确认时间的影响

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-11-04 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00079

Befekadu G. Gebraselase, B. Helvik, Yuming Jiang

{"title":"Effect of Miner Incentive on the Confirmation Time of Bitcoin Transactions","authors":"Befekadu G. Gebraselase, B. Helvik, Yuming Jiang","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00079","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00079","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain is a technology that provides a distributed ledger that stores previous records while maintaining consistency and security. Bitcoin is the first and largest decentralized electronic cryptographic system that uses blockchain technology. It faces a challenge in making all the nodes synchronize and have the same overall view with the cost of scalability and performance. In addition, with miners' financial interest playing a significant role in choosing transactions from the backlog, small fee or small fee per byte value transactions will exhibit more delays. To study the issues related to the system's performance, we developed an $M(t)/M^{N}/1$ model. The backlog's arrival follows an inhomogeneous Poison process to the system that has infinite buffer capacity, and the service time is distributed exponentially, which removes $N$ transactions at time. Besides validating the model with measurement data, we have used the model to study the reward distribution when miners take transaction selection strategies like fee per byte, fee-based, and FIFO. The analysis shows that smaller fee transactions exhibit higher waiting times, even with increasing the block size. Moreover, the miner transaction selection strategy impacts the final gain.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125878142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Chirotonia: A Scalable and Secure e-Voting Framework based on Blockchains and Linkable Ring Signatures Chirotonia:基于区块链和可链接环签名的可扩展和安全的电子投票框架

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-11-03 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00065

Antonio Russo, Antonio Fernández, María Isabel González Vasco, S. Romano

引用次数: 4

Rational Agreement in the Presence of Crash Faults 存在崩溃故障时的合理协议

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-11-02 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00072

Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, V. Gramoli

{"title":"Rational Agreement in the Presence of Crash Faults","authors":"Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, V. Gramoli","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00072","url":null,"abstract":"Blockchain systems need to solve consensus despite the presence of rational users and failures. The notion of ($k, t$)-robustness is key to derive impossibility results with $k$ rational players and $t$ faulty players. However, these $t$ faulty players are always considered Byzantine in that they can act arbitrarily. What is less clear is whether these impossibilities hold if these faults are crashes. In this paper, we bridge the gap between games that are robust against Byzantine players and games that are robust against crash players. Our first result is an impossibility result: We show that no ($k, t$)-robust consensus protocols can solve consensus in the crash fault model if $k+2tgeq n$ unless there is a particular punishment strategy, called the ($k, t$)-baiting strategy. This reveals the need to introduce baiting as the act of rewarding a colluding node when betraying its coalition, to make blockchains more secure. Our second result is an equivalence relation between crash fault tolerant games and Byzantine fault tolerant games, which raises an interesting research question on the power of baiting to solve consensus. To this end, we show, on the one hand, that a ($k, t$)-robust consensus protocol becomes ($k+t, t$)-robust in the crash model. We show, on the other hand, that the existence of a ($k, t$)-robust consensus protocol in the crash model that does not make use of a baiting strategy implies the existence of a ($k-t, t$)-robust consensus protocol in the Byzantine model, with the help of cryptography.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115231192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Networks of Ethereum Non-Fungible Tokens: A graph-based analysis of the ERC-721 ecosystem 以太坊不可替代代币网络:ERC-721生态系统的基于图形的分析

2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-10-24 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00033

S. Casale-Brunet, Paolo Ribeca, P. Doyle, M. Mattavelli

引用次数: 37