2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Decentralised Trustworthy Collaborative Intrusion Detection System for IoT 物联网分散可信协同入侵检测系统
2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-10-21 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00048
G. D. Putra, Volkan Dedeoglu, Abhinav Pathak, S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak
{"title":"Decentralised Trustworthy Collaborative Intrusion Detection System for IoT","authors":"G. D. Putra, Volkan Dedeoglu, Abhinav Pathak, S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00048","url":null,"abstract":"Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been the industry standard for securing IoT networks against known attacks. To increase the capability of an IDS, researchers proposed the concept of blockchain-based Collaborative-IDS (CIDS), wherein blockchain acts as a decentralised platform allowing collaboration between CIDS nodes to share intrusion related information, such as intrusion alarms and detection rules. However, proposals in blockchain-based CIDS overlook the importance of continuous evaluation of the trustworthiness of each node and generally work based on the assumption that the nodes are always honest. In this paper, we propose a decentralised CIDS that emphasises the importance of building trust between CIDS nodes. In our proposed solution, each CIDS node exchanges detection rules to help other nodes detect new types of intrusion. Our architecture offloads the trust computation to the blockchain and utilises a decentralised storage to host the shared trustworthy detection rules, ensuring scalability. Our implementation in a lab-scale testbed shows that the our solution is feasible and performs within the expected benchmarks of the Ethereum platform.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126285147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Irrationality, Extortion, or Trusted Third-parties: Why it is Impossible to Buy and Sell Physical Goods Securely on the Blockchain 非理性、勒索或可信第三方:为什么不可能在区块链上安全地买卖实物商品
2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-10-19 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00021
A. K. Goharshady
{"title":"Irrationality, Extortion, or Trusted Third-parties: Why it is Impossible to Buy and Sell Physical Goods Securely on the Blockchain","authors":"A. K. Goharshady","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00021","url":null,"abstract":"Suppose that Alice plans to buy a physical good from Bob over a programmable Blockchain. Alice does not trust Bob, so she is not willing to pay before the good is delivered off-chain. Similarly, Bob does not trust Alice, so he is not willing to deliver the good before getting paid on-chain. Moreover, they are not inclined to use the services of a trusted third-party. Traditionally, such scenarios are handled by game-theoretic escrow smart contracts, such as BitHalo. In this work, we first show that the common method for this problem suffers from a major flaw which can be exploited by Bob in order to extort Alice. We also show that, unlike the case of auctions, this flaw cannot be addressed by a commitment-scheme-based approach. We then provide a much more general result: assuming that the two sides are rational actors and the smart contract language is Turing-complete, there is no escrow smart contract that can facilitate this exchange without either relying on third parties or enabling at least one side to extort the other.**A preprint of this work appeared in [1].","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131103226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Transaction Fees on a Honeymoon: Ethereum's EIP-1559 One Month Later 蜜月的交易费用:一个月后以太坊的EIP-1559
2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-10-10 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00034
Daniël Reijsbergen, Shyam Sridhar, B. Monnot, Stefanos Leonardos, Stratis Skoulakis, G. Piliouras
{"title":"Transaction Fees on a Honeymoon: Ethereum's EIP-1559 One Month Later","authors":"Daniël Reijsbergen, Shyam Sridhar, B. Monnot, Stefanos Leonardos, Stratis Skoulakis, G. Piliouras","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00034","url":null,"abstract":"Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP) 1559 was recently implemented to transform Ethereum's transaction fee market. EIP–1559 utilizes an algorithmic update rule with a constant learning rate to estimate a base fee. The base fee reflects prevailing network conditions and hence provides a more reliable oracle for current gas prices. Using on-chain data from the period after its launch, we evaluate the impact of EIP–1559 on the user experience and market performance. Our empirical findings suggest that although EIP–1559 achieves its goals on average, short-term behavior is marked by intense, chaotic oscillations in block sizes (as predicted by our recent theoretical dynamical system analysis [1]) and slow adjustments during periods of demand bursts (e.g., NFT drops). Both phenomena lead to unwanted inter-block variability in mining rewards. To address this issue, we propose an alternative base fee adjustment rule in which the learning rate varies according to an additive increase, multiplicative decrease (AIMD) update scheme. Our simulations show that the latter robustly outperforms the EIP–1559 protocol under various demand scenarios. These results provide evidence that variable learning rate mechanisms may constitute a promising alternative to the default EIP–1559-based format and contribute to the ongoing discussion on the design of more efficient transaction fee markets.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134370230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 23
Improving Security for Users of Decentralized Exchanges Through Multiparty Computation 通过多方计算提高去中心化交易所用户的安全性
2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain) Pub Date : 2021-06-21 DOI: 10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00038
Robert Annessi, Ethan Fast
{"title":"Improving Security for Users of Decentralized Exchanges Through Multiparty Computation","authors":"Robert Annessi, Ethan Fast","doi":"10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain53845.2021.00038","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges offer compelling security benefits over centralized exchanges: users control their funds and avoid the risk of an exchange hack or malicious operator. However, because user assets are fully accessible by a secret key, decentralized exchanges pose significant internal security risks for trading firms and automated trading systems, where a compromised system can result in total loss of funds. Centralized exchanges mitigate this risk through API key based security policies that allow professional users to give individual traders or automated systems specific and customizable access rights such as trading or withdrawal limits. Such policies, however, are not compatible with decentralized exchanges, where all exchange operations require a signature generated by the owner's secret key. This paper introduces a protocol based upon multiparty computation that allows for the creation of API keys and security policies that can be applied to any existing decentralized exchange. Our protocol works with both ECDSA and EdDSA signature schemes and prioritizes efficient computation and communication. We have deployed this protocol on Nash exchange, as well as around several Ethereum-based automated market maker smart contracts, where it secures the trading accounts and wallets of thousands of users.","PeriodicalId":372721,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129881257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信