{"title":"Marketable Securities: Storage or Investment?","authors":"Craig O. Brown","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1446683","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1446683","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate liquidity demand models view investments in marketable securities as a relatively simple store of excess liquidity (the storage view). However, compared to excess cash, marketable securities have more in common with investment and payout. For firms with repatriation tax exposure, constrained to a limited payout and permanent foreign real-investment plans, the average coefficient difference between excess cash and market investment regressions is zero. For all firms, the difference is 12%. The findings suggest that market investment is no longer a passive store of excess liquidity. Rather, market investment is associated with general investment and liability-driven investment.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124926710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Unintended Effect of FAS 123R on Firms’ Stock Repurchase Activity","authors":"J. Golden, M. Kohlbeck","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2512289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512289","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether or not Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 123R, which requires recognizing stock-based compensation at fair value, affects stock repurchase activity. Prior research has shown that the dilution effect of dividends on earnings per share (EPS) decreases the value of stock options. Therefore, firms tend to use stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders, which is known as the dividend substitution effect. Also, prior research shows that stock repurchases are used to manage earnings per share. FAS 123R negatively impacts EPS and return on assets as firms record stock-based compensation at fair value. Therefore, we hypothesize and find that FAS 123R is associated with increases in stock repurchases overall and that this effect is greater with increased levels of management stock options. Our study fills a gap in research on the potential effect that FAS 123R might have on how firms decide to return cash to shareholders. Furthermore, we provide evidence on unintended economic consequences of the change in accounting for stock-based compensation.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"194 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122510738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from China","authors":"Yordying Thanatawee","doi":"10.5539/ijef.v6n8p197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v6n8p197","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigates the impact of ownership structure on dividend policies of listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period 2007-2011. The results show that firms with higher ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership are more likely to pay dividends. However, the probability of paying dividends decreases when institutions hold more shares. It is also found that the magnitude of dividend payouts has a positive relationship with the ownership by the largest shareholder, ownership concentration, and government ownership but a negative relationship with the ownership by institutions and foreign investors.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121710484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory Disclosure and Firm Behavior: Evidence from Share Repurchases","authors":"A. Bonaimé","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1585459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585459","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines changes in corporate behavior around the 2003 modification to SEC Rule 10b-18, which mandates enhanced disclosure of repurchase transactions. Firms announce significantly fewer and slightly smaller open market repurchase plans in the enhanced disclosure environment. However, completion rates (the amount of stock repurchased as a percentage of the announced amount) significantly increase. More conservative announcement strategies and more aggressive completion rates are consistent with a decline in false signaling. Indeed, open market repurchase announcements are viewed as more credible on average in the enhanced disclosure environment; after controlling for firm characteristics, cumulative abnormal announcement returns are significantly greater in the high disclosure period. As with any analysis based on a regulatory change affecting all firms simultaneously, other unobservable, macroeconomic trends could have affected repurchase behavior. Nonetheless, these results are consistent with significant changes in corporate behavior around new mandatory disclosures.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123544308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agency Conflicts, Dividend Payout, and the Direct Benefits of Conservative Financial Reporting to Equity-Holders","authors":"Henock Louis, Oktay Urcan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2359031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2359031","url":null,"abstract":"Dividend payments are generally costly to shareholders. One principal reason for such payments is that they force managers to raise funds in the external capital markets to finance new projects, which presumably reduces their incentives to engage in empire-building activities. We posit that, because accounting conservatism can also mitigate managers’ incentives to engage in value-destroying projects, it could reduce the need for dividend payments and the associated costs. Accordingly, we find that dividend payments decrease with accounting conservatism. This effect holds even after we control for the underlying accounting factors that directly affect dividends, or limit the sample to firms that have no debt covenants pertaining to dividend payouts, indicating that the reason for the conservatism effect transcends the standard debt covenant restriction argument. More importantly, consistent with the agency cost explanation, the evidence also indicates that the conservatism effect increases with potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129945078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership Structure, Board Composition, and Dividend Policies - Evidence from Saudi Arabia","authors":"Mohammed M. Soliman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2258399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2258399","url":null,"abstract":"The opinions about the relative importance of different determinants of corporate dividend policies vary across both scholars and financial mangers. This study seeks to examine the effect of ownership structure and board of directors’ composition on dividend policies in Saudi Arabia, using pooled cross-sectional observations from the listed Saudi firms for three years between 2006 and 2008. It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership, board size, firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with higher earnings per share and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between other board composition factors and dividend decisions or ratios.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"282 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131734800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"除息日至發放日之間隔天數與公司財務彈性 (The Period from the Ex-Dividend Date to the Payment Date and Corporate Financial Flexibility)","authors":"Jen-Chang Liu, Mei-Hui Lu, Jr-Jung Chiou","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2218274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2218274","url":null,"abstract":"Chinese Abstract: 本文分析台灣股市2002至2006年之現金股息發放資料,發現除息日至發放日之間隔天數分布於6至155日;而且,全體市場之間隔天數有逐年增加之現象。持續檢視2007至2009年之發放資料後,發現上述現象顯著改善,主要原因是台塑集團改變股息發放政策。本研究估計台塑集團因此項政策改變,而導致$1.61億之利息收入機會成本,但投資人權益卻獲得改善。本研究再分析樣本公司之財務報表資料,發現集團別是間隔天數長短之主要決定因素,而且間隔天數與公司財務彈性(現金與約當現金除以總資產)呈現顯著負相關。此發現證明財務彈性與股息發放政策存在互動關係,且符合自由現金流量假說的廣義解讀。本研究也說明:部分發放公司遵循一致且穩定的短間隔天數政策,呈現重視股東權益之發放模式。 English Abstract: This article analyzes the cash dividend distribution of firms in the Taiwan stock market between 2002 and 2009. The duration between the ex-dividend date and the payment date is between 6 and 155 days. The dividends-weighted average periods increased gradually between 2002 and 2006. However, it decreased between 2007 and 2009. This is due to a change in the Formosa Group’s dividend payment policy. The change incurred a potential opportunity cost of TW$ 161 million of interest revenue to the Formosa Group. On the other hand, investors have benefited from this policy change. This study examines both the dividend policy and the financial position. In addition to finding the group identification factor is closely related to the period between the ex-dividend date and the payment date, we discovered the period correlated negatively to the level of financial flexibility (cash/asset). This evidence supports the view that financial flexibility matters in the short run. These findings are in line with the spirit of the free-cash-flow hypotheses. We also document evidence that some firms follow a policy of short and consistent periods between the ex-dividend date and the payment date, which benefits the shareholder.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129665499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dividend Month Premium","authors":"Samuel M. Hartzmark, David H. Solomon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1930620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930620","url":null,"abstract":"We find an asset pricing anomaly whereby companies have positive abnormal returns in months when they are predicted to issue a dividend. Abnormal returns in predicted dividend months are high relative to other companies and relative to dividend-paying companies in months without a predicted dividend, making risk-based explanations unlikely. The anomaly is as large as the value premium, but less volatile. The premium is consistent with price pressure from dividend-seeking investors. Measures of liquidity and demand for dividends are associated with larger price increases in the period before the ex-day (when there is no news about the dividend) and larger reversals afterward.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126128068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shareholders’ Preferences, Business Cycles and Market Reactions to Dividend Announcements in Public Companies – Empirical Evidence","authors":"Agnieszka Perepeczo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2548969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2548969","url":null,"abstract":"The effect of corporate decisions concerning the profit distribution on market value of a company has been addressed by numerous empirical studies. Observations carried out in developed markets show that dividend initiation decisions result in an increase of abnormal returns. The main objective of this paper is to present results of shareholders’ reaction to dividend initiation decisions and an impact of market cycles on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). At the beginning, a review of similar studies is carried out. Next, the sample selection and methodology were discussed. The shareholders’ reactions for the whole sample were positive but abnormal returns under two models were different in the event window (-60, 60) and not homogeneous. In the case of over 45% of dividend initiations the reaction was negative. Moreover, the author have indicated that observed market business cycles may influence shareholders’ reactions and abnormal returns.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115606629","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Payout Policy Relevance and Accounting Based Valuation","authors":"C. Clubb, M. Walker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2111558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2111558","url":null,"abstract":"DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) (D&D hereafter) argue that ‘payout policy is not irrelevant and investment is not the sole determinant of value, even in frictionless markets.’ We first re-examine their critique using M&M’s (1961) multiperiod valuation framework and identify non-essential operating cash expenses as an important mechanism for managerial free cash flow (FCF) retention, thus confirming D&D’s argument that payout policy is relevant and demonstrating the role of both earnings measurement and investment policy in an effective payout policy. Second, we develop a general analysis of the valuation and informational roles of FCF payout in a perfect capital market and apply this framework to the well-known accounting valuation models of Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1996), showing how these models permit payout valuation relevance due to managerial FCF retention but not payout informational relevance. Finally, we consider how the Feltham and Ohlson (1996) model can be extended to incorporate time variation in expected profitability of capital investment caused by time variation in managerial FCF retention activities and show that this model embeds both payout value relevance and payout informational relevance. We conclude that, while research on accounting valuation models based on the assumption of payout valuation irrelevance is of theoretical and practical interest, the development of models where FCF payout plays an explicit valuation and informational role due to issues of moral hazard is an interesting and important direction for future research.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132096253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}