CGN: Distributions: Dividends最新文献

{"title":"Financial Reporting Quality and Dividend Policy: New Evidence from an International Level","authors":"Christian Haddad, Q. Trinh, Kim Thuan Tran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3845499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3845499","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the link between financial reporting quality and dividend payout across 123 countries. We find that financial reporting quality increases dividend payout after controlling for firm and country specifics. We also investigate different channels that mediate the relation between financial reporting quality and dividend payout. We find that the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and dividend payout is more pronounced when firms have free cash flow problems, face financial constraints, and are located in countries with greater minority shareholder protection rights. Conversely, firms benefit less from this positive relation when located in countries with higher accounting standards. The findings remain consistent after several robustness checks, thus highlighting the effectiveness of more transparent disclosure of financial information in reducing information asymmetry related to firms’ internal agency costs and their relationships with external parties.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123372019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Stock Manipulation Distort Corporate Investment? The Role of Short Selling Costs and Share Repurchases","authors":"Murillo Campello, R. Matta, P. Saffi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3669172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3669172","url":null,"abstract":"We characterize the effect of short selling costs on interactions between informed and uninformed speculators, showing how this dynamic impacts corporate decisions such as investment and share repurchases. Manipulation coexists with informed trading at low shorting costs, reducing price informativeness and investment. Manipulation becomes less profitable as shorting costs increase, making prices more (less) informative and boosting (hindering) investment if speculators are less (more) likely to be informed. At high shorting costs, informed shorting is unprofitable even without manipulation threats, resulting in low price informativeness and constraining firm financing. Our model shows that the ability to pre-commit funds before prices reflect speculators' information yields a negative relation between investment and shorting costs. Critically, it demonstrates how managers can stop manipulative shorts through repurchases, leading to efficient investment. Stock liquidity, cash flow uncertainty, and management-creditor agency problems shape the impact of shorting costs on corporate policies.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"137 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120936259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Characteristics of the Board of Directors and the Policy of Dividend Distribution: Study of Tunisian Non-Financial Listed Companies.","authors":"Ghanmi Najiba, Ellouz Siwar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3443389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3443389","url":null,"abstract":"In a context of the Tunisian non-financial listed companies between 2001-2014. Our results show a positive effect between the characteristics of the board of directors proxies (the size of the board of directors, the remuneration of the leader and the duration of the meetings of the board of directors) and the policy of dividend distribution in a context of Tunisian non-financial listed companies. In the same way, our empirical work do not make it possible to highlight a positive effect between the independence of members of the board of directors and the level of dividend distribution. On the other hand, our results of the estimate do not enable us to highlight the existence of a negative effect between the number of board meetings and the share of capital held by the leader and the policy of dividends distribution in the same context of Tunisian.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130973811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Book-to-Market Decomposition, Net Share Issuance, and the Cross Section of Global Stock Returns","authors":"Douglas W. Blackburn, Nusret Cakici","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2977934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2977934","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides global evidence supporting the hypothesis that expected return models are enhanced by the inclusion of variables that describe the evolution of book-to-market—changes in book value, changes in price, and net share issues. This conclusion is supported using data representing North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia. Results are highly consistent across all global regions and hold for small and big market capitalization subsets as well as in different subperiods. Variables measured over the past twelve months are more relevant than variables measured over the past thirty-six months, demonstrating that recent news is more important than old news.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"126 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122579139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Social Costs of Dividends and Share Repurchases","authors":"J. B. Heaton","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3330269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3330269","url":null,"abstract":"A long-held view in the academy is that shareholders are \"residual claimants\" in the sense that shareholders are paid in full only after the corporation pays its creditors. The reality on the ground is far different. Corporations give assets away to their shareholders long before they have satisfied creditors, both voluntary contract creditors and involuntary tort creditors. In particular, existing U.S. corporate and voidable transfer laws allow corporations to pay dividends and make share repurchases up to the point where the corporation is insolvent or nearly so. Voluntary creditors can limit dividends and share repurchases by contract, but involuntary creditors like tort claimants cannot and unsophisticated voluntary creditors rarely do so. I use a simple Black-Scholes model of a debtor firm to illustrate the incentive that shareholders have to take dividends and share repurchases before debts are repaid. I then present data on the huge payouts of asset value by indebted U.S. publicly-traded corporations from 2010 to 2018. While good for shareholders, the permissiveness of corporate payout rules brings with it substantial social costs. Dividends and repurchases (1) dramatically increase the riskiness of corporate debt, diverting large resources into credit monitoring and speculation, (2) require a larger bankruptcy system to process large and complex corporate failures, (3) makes firms more fragile and less resilient to financial crises, (4) unfairly shifts costs to involuntary and unsophisticated creditors in violation of the implicit social bargain of limited liability, and (5) distorts the supply of securities toward riskier debt that is publicly subsidized through tax deductibility of interest expense, simultaneously reducing the availability of safe assets that are in high demand. It would be socially beneficial to restrict dividends and share repurchases to corporations that are much safer than now is the case, with low debt and adequate insurance against harm to involuntary creditors, and which meet higher thresholds for wages and benefits. Such a rule would still allow corporations to operate without doing those things - they could still have high debt, be underinsured, and pay minimum wages with minimal benefits. But if they did so, they could not pay out assets to shareholders until they first met all their other obligations.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133906134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Share Repurchases: Market Timing and Abnormal Returns","authors":"Matt Gunn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3105712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3105712","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research shows positive abnormal returns follow the announcement of a new share repurchase program, but do firms earn abnormal returns on their actual repurchases? An obstacle to answering this question has been poor data on the timing of corporate share repurchases. I build a near complete dataset of monthly share repurchases using software I wrote to extract the data from 10-Q and 10-K filings. Constructing portfolios based upon the share repurchase signal, I find small to medium firms earn abnormal returns while large firms do not. Furthermore, I find evidence consistent with a market reaction to the disclosure of share repurchases. Firms experience positive abnormal returns around their 10-Q and 10-K filing date relative to non repurchasers with public programs, and using machine learning techniques to forecast share repurchases, I find the share repurchase surprise, actual minus forecast repurchases, is associated with positive abnormal returns around a firm’s earning announcement and 10-Q, 10-K filing dates. \u0000My main contributions are thus threefold: I provide systematic, machine extracted data on repurchases, show that small to mid-size firms have positive abnormal returns while large firms do not, and use machine learning techniques to forecast repurchases and show abnormal returns around earning announcement days and 10-Q and 10-K filing dates are positively associated with the unexpected component of repurchases, the share repurchase surprise.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116777152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Price Support for Overvalued Equity a Motive for Increasing Share Repurchases?","authors":"Harrison Liu, E. Swanson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2283764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2283764","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research shows that companies repurchase stock during quarters with low returns, presumably because the stock is undervalued. We focus on repurchase increases and investigate another motive: Are repurchases increased to provide price support for a stock that, despite recent low returns, remains overvalued? Using an increase in short selling to indicate overvaluation, we regress quarterly changes in share repurchases on quarterly changes in short interest. Consistent with price support, the association is positive and statistically significant each year from 2003 to 2014. We find that the price support quarter is followed by a sharp multi-quarter decline in ROA (return on assets), but the corresponding decline in EPS (earnings per share) is modest due to the reduction in outstanding shares. Abnormal returns after the price support quarter are positive, indicating that price support is effective. We also examine trading by insiders. While insiders generally sell when shorts sell, they hold onto shares during the price support quarter. This indicates that insiders are confident that they can maintain the current stock price.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123839439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Integrated Land Governance for Eco-Urbanization","authors":"Zhan Wang, Xiangzheng Deng, C. Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2739495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2739495","url":null,"abstract":"“Eco-urbanization” emphasizes the importance of the ecological and environmental aspects of urbanization, which is to approach a balanced and healthy ecosystem through paying attention to the ecological intercorrelation of many factors. This involves balancing the stocks and utilization of multi-resources and balancing the efficiency and equality of multi-resources allocation to improve the quality of life for both urban and rural areas. In this dynamic process, resource allocations are carried out at different administrative levels, which have posed challenges of developing an integrated approach for eco-urbanization. Due to interaction and intersection of ecological activities among adjacent regions, a complex ecosystem tends to be in a fluid catchment area with dynamic flows of activities that transcend rigid administrative boundaries. The management of ecosystem sensitively impinges on the effectiveness of having an integrated approach of land governance in a comprehensive planning of urban–rural development. This will require scientific findings to support a policy-oriented management approach, which can take account of land use/cover changes (LUCC), ecosystem services and functions, interactive impacts of socio-economic transformation and climatic variations for optimum land use allocation to achieve the objective of ecosystem conservation and socio-economic development for both urban and rural area in a sustainable approach. Three aspects of development are identified as the importance of achieving advanced land governance for eco-urbanization. This paper aims to discuss these in turn: first, to find the adaptive measures in response to the uncertainty of climatic variation; second, to understand and research the scale and level of sustainable consumption for balancing resource saving and consumption; and third, to study ecological intercorrelation among multiple factors. We, therefore, argue that the far insight of “economic growth” via an ecologically-centered approach based on scientific solutions of all three aspects and intergovernmental consultations is important to support land governance for eco-urbanization and to strike a balance between environmental conservation and economic development.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"95 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125975514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Open Market Share Repurchase Programs and Corporate Governance: Company Performance","authors":"Gary L. Caton, Jeremy C. Goh, Y. Lee, S. Linn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2594977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2594977","url":null,"abstract":"Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly-governed companies outperform weakly-governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with strongly-governed companies using the financial flexibility derived from choosing share repurchases over cash dividends to drive better performance. Consistent with current literature on attenuation of former anomalies, the associations we find between governance and post-announcement performance tend to disappear in the latter half of our sample period.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115330123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Overconfidence and the Timing of Share Repurchases","authors":"Jonathan Handy, S. Underwood","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2622097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622097","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the efficiency of open market repurchases across managerial confidence types. We find that moderately confident managers repurchase at relatively lower prices than overconfident managers and at prices that are closer to the quarterly low stock price. Additionally, we analyze bid-ask spreads and show that spreads are relatively lower in quarters when overconfident managers are repurchasing shares. Our results suggest that repurchases by moderately confident managers are informed attempts to time the market, while repurchases by overconfident managers are either ill-informed or made for other reasons.","PeriodicalId":372148,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Distributions: Dividends","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123275740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}